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 Chapter 1: Introduction 
There is an incongruity between theories about the economic effect of 
property rights, specifically in the form of land legislation, and the empirical 
outcomes in countries around the world. Several scholars state that a clearly defined 
system of property rights is an essential component of economic growth. This belief 
arises from the conception of property rights as institutions, or sets of rules that 
resolve conflict over the competition for scarce resources, and provide for 
predictable behavior . However, the empirical results do not align with theoretical 
predictions in that implementation of property rights does not always result in 
security, increased productivity, investment or economic growth . Two cases will 
illustrate this problem. 
In 1974, Cameroon passed a Land Ordinance. The ordinance offered title to 
any farmer who had “peacefully occupied” and “productively used” a given parcel of 
land .The process of obtaining this title involved submitting an application and having 
a government official go to the property to inspect the land.  The official would place 
boundary markers on the land, after which, the application would be sent to various 
government offices for approval.  
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Firmin-Sellers and Sellers studied how this process affected the Babéte and Akum 
groups of the Bamiléké Kingdom in Cameroon. They obtained titling data on titling 
requests, and when (if at all) the requests were abandoned, from the period 1974 to 
1996.  They also conducted interviews with government officials, bureaucrats and 
farmers. They report that only a few successful applicants used their title to 
mortgage or sell their land. Further, they show that many title applicants stopped the 
application process after government officials set up boundaries on the property. 
One might conclude from this that the land ordinance did not have its intended 
effect.  
Alston et. al.  conducted a study of two frontier states in Brazil, Pará and 
Paraná. The process of titling in Brazil was similar to that of Cameroon. The land must 
have been occupied by the claimant and productively used.  The process entailed a 
group of settlers organizing collectively and traveling to a local government office. 
The office would survey and mark the territory and then grant the authorization to 
occupy the territory. Finally, the relevant information would be forwarded to the 
appropriate national office for recordation. The study by Alston et. al. relied on a 
survey of 206 households in Pará and census data for both Pará and Paraná. One of 
their findings was that title had a statistically significant impact on land-related 
investments.  
Why is there a difference in results between the two titling laws? Why did the 
program succeed in Brazil but not in Cameroon? The importance of this question is 
immediate. A vast literature has developed based upon theories of property rights , 
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even though this puzzle has not been resolved. In addition, countries have enacted 
policies based upon these theories. For example, both USAID and the World Bank 
have sponsored land programs worldwide that are based upon these theories of 
property rights, and the results have been inconsistent. This research project 
attempts to explain this empirical variability and deviation of outcomes from the 
uniform theoretical expectations. It will explain why countries implementing laws 
based on theories about property rights do not always achieve the expected results. 
It will also explain why countries implementing similar types of property laws achieve 
different results.   
Theory and Outline of the Dissertation  
The theory offered here can help explain this variation in outcomes. By 
disaggregating the conception of property rights, further traction can be gained in 
understanding the political and economic dynamics of property rights. Property 
rights are often thought of and analyzed as a single, coherent entity. However, they 
are in fact, a bundle of multiple rights over the same object. The different 
components in this bundle can have different effects on economic outcomes, and 
perhaps more significantly, can have different distributional consequences. These 
distributional consequences can, in turn, have an effect on the motivation for interest 
groups to pursue the enactment of various types of property laws.  
Chapter 2 of this dissertation explores the literature on property rights. It 
traces the development of the concept of property rights in the economic literature, 
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arguing that the concept remains underdeveloped. It then shows how this 
underdevelopment results in validity problems for those theories which attempt to 
explain the effects of property rights on macroeconomic outcomes. Finally, this 
chapter ends with an analysis of how concepts of property rights have been applied 
in the microeconomic literature.  Here case studies are used to show that, by 
adjusting our conception of property rights to include multiple types of rights, and by 
examining the distributional consequences of these specific types of rights, we can 
gain a better understanding of the role of property rights in society.  
In chapter 3, the theory sketched in chapter 2 is expounded upon. Specifically, 
this chapter relies on an economic model and graphical analysis to demonstrate the 
distributional consequences of property rights for the owners of land, labor, and 
capital. It also uses a model as well as literature on political institutions to derive 
hypothesis about which types of laws, specifically, restrictions on ownership, use or 
transferability, should be more prevalent in different societies.  Chapter 4 relies upon 
an economic model to show how different types of rights, ownership, use and 
transferability, should differently affect economic growth.  Specifically, this chapter 
concludes  that restrictions on ownership will not affect growth, while restrictions on 
use and transferability will negatively affect growth.   
Given the underlying conceptual and measurement problems discussed in 
chapter 2 and the detailed disaggregation of  the “property rights” bundle central to 
the theories of chapters 3 and 4,  chapter 5 suggests a different method of creating 
measures of property rights. Theoretically, this method is derived from two 
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comparative law methods. It reflects a positivist notion of rights as they are 
expressed by the state, rather than a notion of rights as an ideal-type.  
Chapter 6 contains the empirical analysis. Specifically, it reports the results of several 
regression models testing the hypotheses derived in chapters 3 and 4. Although data 
limitations are evident, the results generally support the theory of the dissertation, 
and support in part, the hypotheses derived in chapters 3 and 4.  General conclusions 
and future directions for research are presented in chapter 7. 
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Chapter 2: Macro and micro analyses of property rights   
Introduction 
This chapter explores two sets of literature in the field of the political 
economy of property rights: New Institutional Growth economics and 
macroeconomic theories of growth. The first literature begins with the Coase 
theorem and has continued into the present in the form of New Growth Economics 
(NGE). The second literature focuses on the application of the concepts developed in 
the macro literature to specific case studies.  In reviews of both the macro and micro 
literature, this chapter demonstrates deficiencies in the extant theories of property 
rights. The deficiencies derive from a lack of recognition of the multiplicity hidden 
within the blanketing concept of property rights, and consequently a lack of analysis 
of the preferences of different groups for different rights. 
The Underdeveloped Concept of Property Rights  
Taken as a whole, the property rights literature summarized in the chart 
below presents a fairly comprehensive picture of property rights: in response to 
conflict arising from changes in value of resources, groups will organize to demand 
changes to the existing property rights institutions (Riker and Sened, 1991). The 
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success of these groups in organizing depends on numerous factors, such as their 
size, geographical proximity and homogeneity (Libecap, 2003). In response to 
demands for changes in the property rights institutions, and motivated by either 
economic  or political reasons (Joireman, 2001)  governments will respond by 
supplying property rights.  The supply of property rights may differ depending on the 
type of political institution (Clague, et. al., 1996), the degree of corruption (Dong and 
Torgler, 2012), state capacity and credible commitment. (Frye, 2004).  What is 
supplied are institutions that define, assign and enforce property rights.  The 
outcome of this process is an institution that has been shown to effect economic 
growth in a variety of large-empirical studies, though not necessarily in case studies, 
both of which are discussed below.  
This work contributes to this vast body of literature in several important ways. 
First, this work refines the definition of property rights. Drawing on the legal 
literature, that argues that rights can be expressed as a bundle (Hohfeld, 1913, 1917), 
the theory developed here and in the ensuing chapters claims that property rights 
are best understood and analyzed as distinct components. The different parts of the 
bundle will affect different interest groups in different ways.   
As the demand side inputs literature suggests, groups will organize in 
response to changes in value to property in order to advocate for rights ( For 
example, see Demsetz, 1967 arguing that changes in the value of resources precede 
the desire for property rights; Anderson and Hill, 1975 and 2003 discussing the types 
of factors that cause the change in value; Riker and Sened, 1991, outlining the political 
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process of demand and supply of property rights) . The success of these groups in 
organizing can vary depending on the size and heterogeneity and perceived benefit 
(Libecap, 2003). The second way that this work contributes to the body of property 
rights literature is by expanding on the motivation for the demand for property rights 
in this literature. The theory developed in this work claims that the perceived benefit 
depends on the type of right for which the groups are advocating. Owners of land 
may not have the same perceived benefit from rights of sale as they do from rights of 
use, for example.  Thus, a combination of change in value and anticipated benefit will 
motivate certain groups to demand particular rights.  
According to the theory of the work, institutions will respond by defining, 
assigning and enforcing particular types of rights. Finally, this work informs the body 
of property rights literature by arguing different types of rights have different 
economic outcomes. For example, rights to own will have different economic 




Figure 1: The current understanding of property rights   
Macro Literature 
Part of this analysis of the macroeconomic literature traces the concept of 
property rights as it has developed from the early modern scholars to new growth 
economists.  By doing so, it will be shown that the concept as developed lacks 
construct validity, and consequently neither supports the types of analyses scholars 
have conducted using the concept nor the weight of inferences drawn from these 
analyses.   
Early Modern Economic Literature 
It is well established in the economic literature that property rights affect 
economic outcomes.  According to early modern economists such as Coase , Cheung , 
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Alchian , and Demsetz , property rights serve to allocate resources in the context of 
scarcity.1 Property rights reduce transaction costs and externalities and provide 
incentives for individuals to operate with greater efficiency in market settings.2 These 
economists emphasized the role of property rights in furthering the efficiency of 
market exchanges and they minimized the role of government in creating and 
enforcing property rights. 
The most (in)famous of the early modern economists was Coase.3 In 1960, 
Coase authored a seminal article in transaction cost economics, “The Problem of 
Social Cost.”4 Written largely in response to Pigou’s Wealth and Welfare, in this 
article, Coase suggests that Pigou’s argument, that economic cost should be 
                                                        
1  For examples, see the following: “Capitalism relies heavily on markets and private property rights to 
resolve conflicts over the use of scarce resources.” (Alchian and Demsetz, 16); “It argues that the 
purpose of trade (and production) is to exchange bundle of rights to do things with goods that are 
exchanged. Thus the value of the goods that are traded increases and, consequently, the terms of 
trade improve with increases in the degree of property rights in those goods. It follows that the scope 
and content of property rights over resources affect the way people behave in a world of 
scarcity.”(Pejovich, 41) 
 
2 “Under public ownership the costs of any decision or choice are less fully thrust upon the selector than under 
private property.” (Alchian, 146) 
 
3 Coase is revered by some as the progenitor of the law and economics movement, and criticized by others as 
misrepresenting, and leading to the overall abuse of, the concept of property rights (See Merrill and Smith, “What 
Happened to Property in Law and Economics?” 2001) 
 
4 “The Problem of Social Cost” is only one of a triad of articles that scholars have used to derive the Coasian 
concept of property rights. Prior to the publication of “The Problem of Social Cost”, in 1937, Coase, published 
“The Nature of the Firm.” In this article, Coase sought to explain why firms arise in markets. He did so by arguing 
that they are substitutes for the price mechanism. By making those decisions internally which would otherwise be 
made in the market, and therein be subject to the forces of supply and demand, firms save money, using authority 
as economic alternatives to markets. In other words, firms exist because they can save on information, 
transaction and contracting costs of production. This explanation of the operation of the firm is analogous to the 
operation of property rights, as economists have come to understand them. Like the firm, property rights, clearly 
defined and enforced, reduce transaction and contracting costs. 
A lesser known, but still significant article is “The Federal Communications Commission” According to Merrill and 




assigned by balancing private cost to an individual with cost to society, is incorrect5. 
What should be the consideration, Coase argued, is the total cost to society of 
forcing either party to cease his actions. Thus, this article addresses the problem of 
how society should assign rights when the actions of two individuals collide. 
One of Coase’s famous example is a hypothetical dispute between a farmer 
and a neighboring cattle herder. The cattle herder’s cows graze on the farmer’s land 
and destroy his crops. In another example, Coase describes a railway, in which the 
sparks from the train tend to cause fires in a nearby forest. The question in both 
cases is who should bear payment for the damage done, or who should be forced to 
cease his actions?  In other words, where is the initial assignment of rights? It is in this 
article that Coase famously argued that where transactions are costless, the initial 
assignment of property rights is irrelevant, because people will negotiate to achieve 
the most economically efficient outcome.6  In reply to Pigou, he argued that where 
property rights are assigned, and transactions are costless, there is no need for the 
government to “correct” the market imperfections with taxes. However, where 
transactions are not costless, the initial assignment of rights is significant.  
                                                        
5 Pigou advanced a concept of market externalities. In Pigou’s conception, the determination of whether or not 
an action is good or bad is made by balancing the cost or gain to society of an individual’s action, and the private 
cost or gain to the individual of his action. In the case of negative externalities, Pigou argued that it is possible to 
tax the actor to correct the externalities. If the actor is taxed to the same degree as the general cost to society, 
then the private cost to him of undertaking the action is higher, and he will do it less, or cease the action 
altogether. This type of tax is known as a Pigouvian tax. 
 
An externality is a type of market failure that occurs when the costs or benefits of an action are not borne (or 
gained) by the actor. When these actions occur, the market will either overproduce a product (in the case of a 
negative externality where the cost is not born by the actor) or under produce a product (in the case of a positive 
externality where the benefit is not gained by the actor).   
 
6 Thus, in the example of the farmer and the cattle raiser, if the farmer had the initial “right” such that the cattle 
herder was prohibited from grazing his cattle on the farmer’s crops, but the cattle herder found that his profit 
margin from having his cows graze on the crops exceeded the penalty he would incur, he would continue to graze 
his cattle on the crops and use the excess money to pay the farmer. 
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Institutions such as firms, governments, courts and by extension, property rights, 
arise to reduce these transaction costs.   
The significance of this work for present purposes derives from the focus on 
the use of property rights to reduce externalities in a market setting. The sole 
purpose of the property rights model, according to these early modern economists, 
was to enable a fuller explanation of theories of the firm . The result of a theory of 
property rights focused on the firm was that property rights were defined by their 
function and not by their essence. For example, Cole and Grossman (2002) find that 
economists often conflate property rights with uses of a right or claims of a right.  For 
example, a popular introductory economics textbook states that “’Firms do in fact 
have rights to discharge obnoxious substances into the air, as proved by the fact that 
they do it openly and are not fined. They have both actual and legal rights to 
pollute.’” 7 The authors suggest that this conception of rights confuses doing 
something with a right to do something.  In other words “There is a tendency among 
economists to use the term property ‘to describe virtually every device – public or 
private, common-law or regulatory, contractual or governmental, formal or informal- 
by which divergences between private and social costs or benefits are reduced.”8 In 
the context of the firm, property rights were defined as the use of resources, and 
often the use of resources for the purpose of reducing transaction costs and 
externalities.  For example, Demsetz (1967) suggests that “a primary function of 
property rights is that of guiding incentives to achieve a greater internalization of 
                                                        
7 Cole and Grossman, 322 
8 Merrill and Smith, 358 (quoting Posner) 
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externalities.”9 The conceptual foundation upon which the property rights literature 
rests is faulty in this regard.  
Douglas North 
In 1973, North and Thomas published The Rise of the Western World. The 
theoretical question that this book sought to answer was what explains the rapid 
economic ascendancy of some European countries between the 10th and 17th 
centuries? The answer the authors suggest is that this ascendancy is due to the 
degree to which states developed efficient economic organization. The authors 
define efficient economic organization as a system in which property rights bring the 
rate of private return to the rate of social return, and so provide individuals an 
incentive to innovate. In this analysis, when externalities exist, such that an individual 
does not reap the full benefit of his action, he will not undertake actions which 
society needs to grow economically. Such situations arise when property rights are 
poorly defined.  
From North, it is understood that efficient property rights are institutions that 
help to equate the private and social rates of return. Because of this, they provide 
incentives for individuals to undertake activities that further a country’s economic 
growth . In addition, North argued that property rights are not the result of market 
forces. Rather they are given by the state for the purposes of maximizing benefits to 
the state . As such, contrary to the underlying notions of efficiency in the early 
modern economic literature, property rights are neither necessarily efficient nor 
                                                        
9 Demsetz, 348 
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conducive to economic growth.  While this work advanced the concept of property 
rights by detaching it from the firm and applying to the state, and by positing that 
property rights are not necessarily efficient, as discussed below, the work did little to 
supply a solid conceptual understanding of property rights.  
New Growth Economics 
The New Growth Economists (NGE) developed the next substantial body of 
work analyzing the relationship between property rights and economic growth. The 
broader questions of interest to these scholars are what causes economic growth, 
and under what conditions will countries converge to their steady state growth rates. 
On the basis of the research of North, many of the New Growth Scholars with an 
interest in property rights conducted large scale econometric analyses on the 
relationship between property rights and economic growth. These studies 
consistently conclude the property rights and the security of property rights are 
positively related to economic growth. For example, in one of the earlier studies, 
Barro  found a positive relationship between property rights and growth. Knack and 
Keefer  improved upon the manner in which property rights was measured, and used 
Barro’s regressions to find an even stronger relationship between property rights 
and growth. Hall and Jones  theorized that institutions, which they label “social 
infrastructure”, influence output per worker. Similar to North’s definition of property 
rights, they suggest that social infrastructure are the institutions and policies that 
provide incentives for individuals and firms to undertake productive or predatory 
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activities.10 Barro  used 85 countries in a regression analysis and found that there is a 
relationship between property rights protection and enforcement and economic 
growth. Clague conducted a similar analysis and also found a positive relationship 
between property rights protection and enforcement and growth. Similar studies 
confirmed these results11.  These works have established a firm and often replicated 
connection between some concept of property rights and various economic 
outcomes.  However, because these are econometric studies, they rely on precision 
in the conception of property rights as well as precision in the measurement of 
property rights. Yet as previously adumbrated, the development of the concept of 
property rights in the economic literature is lacking.   
Definitional Problems in the Property Rights Literature 
The way in which scholars understand property rights is limitingly vague and 
superficial in conception. There are three main problems with the concept of 
property rights in early modern economic literature. First, a problem with some of 
these earlier works is that they do not clearly define property rights. For example, 
although the work of Coase  is the foundation for much of the modern scholarship on 
property rights and economic outcomes, Coase neither mentions nor define property 
rights, although he does discuss mention the concept of “rights”. This is not as much 
                                                        
10 Hall and Jones, 95 
11 For example, see Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff, 2002, finding that weak property rights 
discourage investment, or see Kaufmann, Kray and Zoido-Laboton, 1999, finding that property rights 




of a problem for the arguments of Coase as it is for the arguments that purport to be 
based on Coase.  
Second, for those early modern scholars that do define property rights, the 
nascent conceptions of property rights that they offer are not essential definitions, 
but non-essential definitions by final cause or purpose . That is, they do not 
necessarily define property rights by describing the essential features, but rather 
they define property rights by describing what their purpose is. In other words, they 
have a conception of de facto property rights. While this alone is not necessarily a 
problem, definitions by final cause tend to result in overbroad constructs. For 
example Demsetz  suggests that property rights are “… an instrument of society and 
derive their significance from the fact that they help a man form those expectations 
which he can reasonably hold in his dealings with others.”12 Further, “property rights 
convey the right to benefit or harm oneself or others.”13 This is problematic because 
it significantly broadens the concept of property rights to include things that were 
not likely intended by the scholars. For example, in terms of Demsetz’s definition, an 
instrument of society that helps one to form expectations in dealings with another 
could be something as simple as driving rules. Yet, it is doubtful that Demsetz would 
have argued that one could have property rights in driving rules. Finally, all of Coase’s 
examples of property rights are two party disputes.  As Merrill and Smith argue, this 
may have unintentionally given rise to a misconception of property rights as a merely 
                                                        




a version of contract rights. Contract rights and property rights have different 
implications and meanings in the law.14    
 The conceptual problems with property rights continued in the work of 
North. In Structure and Change in Economic History, North’s famous conceptualization 
of  efficient property rights is that they are structures within a society that bring the 
private rate of return equal to the social rate of return for a given investment or 
activity. This conception of property rights is again, a definition by purpose, and can 
result in an overly broad notion.15 In Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic 
Performance, North defines property rights as “the rights individuals appropriate 
over their own labor and the goods and services they possess” Further, 
“[a]ppropriation is a function of legal rules, organizational forms, enforcement and 
norms of behavior- that is, the institutional framework.”16 But defining property 
rights as rights is a tautology. While it clarifies North’s conception of property (labor, 
goods and services they possess), it does not clarify the concept of rights.  As a 
result, it is still unclear what property rights mean.  
                                                        
14 Property rights are in rem, that is they are rights that are good “against the world”. Contract rights, 
by contrast , in personam, that is, they are rights that are good against a limited number of people. 
Further, property rights have general forms, where as contract rights can be created at-will by the 
parties to a contract. By using two-party examples, and discussing the ease with which rights can be 
re-distributed and re-organized, the authors suggest that Coase may have unwittingly given rise to an 
idea that property rights and contract rights are the same. Further, they suggest that this notion is 
prevalent among today’s law and economics scholars and has contributed to the disintegration of the 
meaning of property rights.  
 
15 North further states that the essence of property rights is the right to exclude (21), and this is a 
helpful beginning for narrowing the construct. 
 
16 North, 33 
18 
 
Conceptual Problems in the NGE literature 
The conceptual problems are most prevalent in the work of the New Growth 
Economists. Whereas the early modern economists and North relied on case studies 
and historical surveys, the New Growth Scholars use econometric modeling. 
Consequentl,y their work is more contingent upon precise measurement of a concept 
which yet remains unclear.  These problems manifest in several ways. First, in some 
works, the concept of property rights remains undefined . The lack of explicit 
definition may be a reason why the measurement of the concept is often overbroad.  
Second, definitions that are offered are problematic. Some of them are 
tautologies. Consequently, there is a semblance of definition even when the concept 
of property rights remains undefined. For example, Clague, Keefer, Knack and Olson  
define property rights as “the individual rights that relate to things that may be 
bought and sold”.  While this definition is an improvement over that of North 
(discussed earlier) because it is significantly less broad, it has one of the same 
problems that the North definition had. The term rights is not defined, and by 
implication, all that has been done is to proffer a definition of property. Other 
definitions have the same problem of being overbroad that some of the definitions of 
the early modern scholars had. For example, Acemoglu, et. al. define property rights 
institutions as “the rules and regulations protecting citizens against the power of 
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government and elites”17. It is possible to imagine several institutions that are not 
property rights that perform this function.18 
Third, there is frequent conflation in the literature of property rights with 
other concepts. For example, many scholars interchange the terms “property rights” 
with either “security or secure property rights” or “property rights enforcement” or 
“property rights protection”  . While such an interchange of terms may seem 
innocuous, the establishment of property rights and the protection of property rights 
are two different processes that require different resources of the state and may 
depend upon different political dynamics. Further, this type of conflation obscures 
the fact a state can establish different types of property rights, and choose to protect 
all, some or none of these rights. Other scholars frequently discuss property rights 
protection or property rights establishment in the same terms as the rule of law . This 
type of conflation is essentially the same problem as conflating property rights with 
property rights enforcement.  A state that does not have or respect the rule of law 
can still have property rights, and may even choose to enforce some or all of them. 
Still other scholars discuss and measure property rights and contract rights 
together . The problems with this type of error are the same as with the conflation of 
property rights and property rights security. The two constructs are in fact quite 
different. Contract rights are rights that can be exercised only against other parties 
to an agreement. Contrarily, property rights can be exercised against anyone who 
                                                        
17 Acemoglu, et. al. 2005, p. 955. 
18 For example, first amendment freedoms such as press, speech and assembly may well perform 
these functions.  
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interferes with one’s property, regardless of their consent . The error obscures the 
differences between types of contract and property rights, and the differences 
between property rights and contract rights themselves. Further, it ignores the 
differences in political dynamics that may give rise to the two types of rights, and it 
ignores the differences in economic outcomes that the two types of rights may 
affect.  
The Measurement of Property Rights in the New Growth Literature 
In general, the most commonly used measures of property rights, while 
advantageous for their ability to aid in cross-national comparisons, have several 
problems. First, they are not nuanced enough to address the particularities of 
property rights protections.  Second, because of the opaqueness of their methods, it 
is not clear what aspects of property rights they may be measuring. As a result of 
these measurement problems, these studies may not be conclusive as to the 
relationship between property rights and economic growth.  
The econometric analyses of the New Growth Scholars demonstrate that 
“property rights” is fundamental to economic growth. However, the lack of 
conceptual development among economic scholars has two unfortunate 
implications. First, it calls into question some of the conclusions in the literature. That 
is, if it is not property rights that are being measured, the conclusions that property 
rights are fundamental to growth becomes questionable. Second, it hinders further 
development of the ways that different property rights can effect economic growth. 
Conceiving of “property rights” in such general and vague terms obscures the fact 
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that there are many different property rights, and each of this may have different 
effects on economic growth.  
Micro Literature 
While many scholars discussed in the previous section focused on 
econometric studies, other scholars have chosen to focus on individual countries in 
order to understand in greater detail the relationship between property rights and 
economic outcomes. Since the earliest such studies in the early 1980s, there have 
been many studies attempting to understand the relationship between property 
rights and economic outcomes in single country contexts. These studies are heavily 
concentrated in Latin America and Africa, however, their coverage spans the globe , 
and also include historical studies as well (For examples, see the Old West in the 
United States   and 15th century Tuscany .  These studies use the constructs of the 
macro literature and examine whether or not the predictions of the macroeconomic 
literature are empirically validated in case-study contexts, and if not, why not. Much 
of this literature questions the general applicability the macro studies. These scholars 
often use land titling laws as a vehicle for this type of examination.  
The Theory of Land Titling Laws 
Land titling laws are laws that give title to land or create land registration 
systems. These systems create a record of all privately owned land within a country, 
and document ownership, transfers and encumbrances on those parcels of land. The 
purpose of such systems is to mitigate market inefficiencies. For example, 
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transactions revolving around land can suffer from inefficiencies due to asymmetric 
information. Sellers and owners of land are frequently in positions in which their 
informational advantage can create problems of adverse selection.  Land titling laws 
solve these problems by creating records in which parcels of land are documented to 
the extent that a potential buyer, or other 3rd party ,examining the record knows 
who owns the land and the encumbrances on the land. In varying degrees, such 
systems also provide assurance to 3rd parties about the likelihood that their claim on 
the land will be respected or enforced by the state.  
By providing information and assurance to 3rd parties, land titling laws are said 
stimulate economic growth and development by facilitating market operations 
revolving around land. Typically, such operations include obtaining credit, buying, 
selling, leasing of land, investments in infrastructure on the land, leading to increased 
productivity, and avoiding the costs of disputes over boundaries and invasions .   
Scholars describe two means through which titling laws are believed to lead 
to growth and development. First, having security is believed to stimulate 
“development”, through one of four mechanisms: obtaining credit (being able to use 
land as collateral to get loans), creating or enhancing markets increasing sale of land, 
increasing land-related investments and facilitating conflict settlement through 
clearly identifiable ownerships (Figure 2). Second, having title facilitates access to 
credit, which can then be used to finance land related investments or enhance 
markets, or having title facilitates dispute resolution that can enables buying and 





Figure 2: A proposed path of the relationship between titling and development 
 
 
Figure 3: An alternative path of the relationship between titling and development 
 
In adherence to this belief, many countries have begun land privatization or 
titling programs .  The US Agency for International Development has supported 
programs in El Salvador, Guyana Honduras, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Peru, and Ecuador .  
In addition, the World Bank has been the sponsor of several land titling programs in 
countries such as Venezuela, Ecuador, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Paraguay, 
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and Bolivia. Several studies of individual countries’ land titling programs have been 
conducted in the past 40 years.  By analyzing these studies as an aggregate, one can 
attempt to generalization of the findings about the relationship between land titling 
laws and development or growth.   
Table 1 shows a selected sample of country case studies of land titling 
legislation.  In the table, it can be seen that according to the results reported by the 
individual case studies, there is no consistency or uniformity across countries in 
results of the registration process.
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Results (measured in terms of 
outcome variable) 
Africa  
Barrows and Roth19  
1990 Tenure security Registration Increase20  
Africa  
Pinckney and Kimuyu21 
1994 Credit  Titling No increase 
Brazil  
Alston, Lee and Schneider,22 
1996 Investment  Titling  Increase 
Burkina Faso 23  
Malton24 
1994 Investment  Tenure 
security  
Little to no effect 
Cameroon 
Firmin-Sellers and Sellers25 
1999 Tenure security 
and investment 
Titling  Increase security; no increase in 
investment  
Costa Rica  
Seligson26 
1982 Credit  Titling  Increase  
Kenya 1994 Productivity Titling   No increase  
                                                        
19 This study also use investment, credit and land markets as dependent variables, and individualization as an explanatory variable 
20 The increase of security due to registration was among the Kisii. In addition, the relationship was present among high density areas among the Machokis, but 
lower among some Mbere. As investment and credit in Kenya, there was no correlation between title and investment in one study, but an increase in cash-crop 
production, land markets. A brief rise attributed to other factor. In Uganda, investment and credit: no investment increases, no credit increases due to non-
alienability of land, land markets: increase in land markets. In Uganda, the relationship between registration and tenure security was thought to vary depending 
on status. In Zimbabwe: increase in investment 
21 Credit in this study is based on the process of using land as collateral. The authors also used investment, inequality and land transactions as 
dependent variables. They found no relationship to any of these variables due to titling.   
22 Investment here is measured as the portion of the farm placed in either improvement pasture or permanent crops.  The reported increase was 
in most models.  
23 The Burkina Faso study also assessed the manner in which tenure institutions affect perceptions of tenure security (page 42) 
24 Investment in this study is measured as soil fertility. The explanatory variable is an indigenous system of security.  
25 One of the important conclusions of the article is that the increase in tenure security was in an unexpected way, and not through the 
mechanism envisioned by the law. Investment, specifically through the use of credit, did not increase. 
26 The authors measured credit as measured as loans. They also used other dependent variables: technical assistance measured as as help from 
government, and income measured as perceived income. Technical assistance and perceived income also increased.  
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 Migot-Adholla, Place and Oluoch-Kosura27 
Kenya 
 Carter, Wiebe and Blarel28 
1994 Productivity Titling  Increase 
Kenya  
Place and Migot-Adholla29 
1998 Productivity  Titling  No increase 
Madagascar 
Jacoby and Minten30 
2007 Investment  Titling No significant effect 
Mexico  
Johnson31 
2001 Assets Titling  Access to credit not a factor 
Nicaragua  
Deininger and Chamarro32 
2006 Land related 
investments 
Titling  Increase 
Nicaragua  
De Lagelsia33 
2004 Land related 
investments 








Somalia35 1994 Security  Titling  No significant effect  
Thailand  1987 Investment and Titling  Increases investment, and 
                                                        
27 The mechanism through which they tested the effect of land titles on productivity was through credit use.  
28 They note that the effect of titling on productivity is not robust to the inclusion of other variables in the model.  
29 Productivity is measured as yields. The authors also se security, concentration of land and credit use as dependent variables. They find no 
increase in any of these due to tilting.  
30 Investment was measured as (measured by clearing of land, installation of new infrastructure and maintenance of existing infrastructure).  
Land value and productivity (measured by rice yield) were also used as dependent variables. The study found a small effect on productivity and 
land values.  
31 The dependent variables were existing assets (measured as irrigated land) and expected future assets (measured as machinery). They found 
that although access to credit is not a factor, higher accessibility to services ( lower transaction costs) is a factor. 
32 They also used land values as a dependent variable and found that registration did increase land values.  
33 They also measured land values and credit. They found no relationship between titling and credit.  
34 This study also examines the relationship between land distribution, use and scarcity. Tenure security was measured as land rights (see later in 
this chapter). Agricultural development was measured as mortgage land improvements and crop yields. There was little relationship between 
security and credit and no relationship to crop yields.  
35 Security here is measured as perception of security. Other findings were that use of land as collateral was not significant for small holders, but 
the effect was greater for large landholders.  There was an insignificant effect on investment 
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Feder and Onchan, 1987  productivity productivity 
Uganda  
Roth, Cochrae and Kisama-Mugerwa36 
1994 Security  Titling  Increase  
                                                        
36 Security was measured as disputes and perceptions of security. The authors also used credit measured as loans, and investment measured in 
multiple ways, as dependent variables. They found some increases in long term investment and inconclusive results on credit.  
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In fact, scholars analyzing the relationship between titling and credit (path A 
in both diagrams), have found mixed results. Roth et. al.  found mixed results in 
Uganda.  The use of credit was slightly higher after titling, but most of the credit was 
informal. However, as Barrows and Roth  observe in their own study of Uganda, that 
this is likely due to the inalienability of land under the Ugandan law of the time. Roth 
et. al.  also report inconclusive results on analysis of the relationship between titling 
and credit. Pinckney and Kimuyu  found that titling did not lead to an increase in the 
use of credit in Kenya or Tanzania. Similarly, Barrows and Roth  did not find a 
significant relationship between titling and credit in Kenya. Contrarily, in a study of 
Costa Rica, Seligson  reports a positive relationship between titling and credit.  
Scholars analyzing path B, the relationship between titling and security have 
also varied in their findings. Barrows and Roth  have found that security increase 
among some groups and also decreased in Kenya. They found equally mixed results 
in Uganda. In Cameroon, Firmin-Sellers and Sellers  found that security increased, but 
not in the manner expected.37 
As to the relationship between land titling and investments, in Africa, the 
relationship has been negative, whereas elsewhere, the relationship has been 
positive. For example, Pinckney and Kimuyu  found no increase in investment in their 
study of Kenya and Tanzania. Jacoby and Minten  found that when investment was 
measured as the clearing of land and the installation and maintenance of 
                                                        
37 Many of those participating in titling did not complete the program (ultimately obtain title to land), 




infrastructure, there was no relationship between titling and investment. Contrarily, 
in two separate studies of Nicaragua, titling was found to be positively related to 
investments . Similarly, in Thailand, Feder and Onchan  found that titling increases 
investment.  
Only a handful of the selected studies have analyzed the relationship between 
titling and markets. Barrows and Roth  found an increase in land markets in both 
Kenya and Zimbabwe following the implementation of a land titling law, though in 
Kenya they attribute the increase to factors other than the law. Contrarily, in a study 
of Kenya and Tanzania, Pinckney and Kimuyu  found no increase in land transactions 
due to titling. Similarly, Place and Migot-Adholla  found no increase in sale (measured 
as concentration of land holdings) attributable to a land titling effort.  
As to security, the results have also been mixed. In Somalia, security was 
found to be negatively but insignificantly related to titling. Roth et. al.  found by 
means of interviews in a Uganda study, registered land owners did perceive a higher 
level of security than non-registered land owners. This was due in part to a sense of 
“freedom” from obtaining permission of the customary authorities before 
transacting in land, a sense that the power of the chiefs was waning, and confusion 
over what the customary rules were about confiscation of land.  
Finally, some scholars addressed the distal relationship, that of titling and 
productivity.  Migot-Adholla et. al.  found that titles had no significant effect on 
productivity in Kenya. Contrarily, Carter et. al.  in their study of Kenya, found that 
titling did have an effect on productivity, but the model was not robust to the 
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inclusion of other variables. In Madagascar, Jacoby and Minten  reported a small 
relationship between titling and productivity. In Thailand, Feder and Onchan  find a 
significant relationship between titling and productivity.  
Understanding the studies 
The overarching conclusion of the studies, in aggregate, is that there are no 
consistent results. Land titling, representing property rights security, does not 
consistently lead to increases in investment, productivity, market development or 
use of credit.   
While most of these studies examine the effect of titling on the economic 
activity of different groups or areas within a country, other scholars have used 
methods which hold individual level factors constant. In 2007, Jacoby and 
Minten conducted a study on a region in Madagascar. Each of the households 
in their survey had two different types of land, both titled and untitled. They 
found that titling had no significant difference on investment, a small (7%) 
difference on productivity, and a small (6%) difference on land values. This 
suggests that it is not merely titling or registration alone that causes the 
desired economic outcomes.   
Another approach is holding country specific factors constant. For example, there 
have been multiple studies conducted within the same country. Kenya has been 
examined at least 5 times. In three of the studies, the effects of titling on productivity 
were analyzed. Carter et. al.  studied the Njoro area, a region in the Rift Valley.  Migot-
Adholla et. al.  studied 4 sites, Kianjogu and Mweiga, Nyeri, a region in central Kenya, 
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and Madzu and Lumakanda, Kakamega district, a region in western Kenya. All three 
studies found no significant or robust relationship between titling and productivity.38 
Two of the studies, analyzed the relationship between titling and investment. 
Barrows and Roth  analyzed secondary data literature which described the effects of 
land registration in regions dominated by different ethnic groups. Pinckney and 
Kimuyu  studied groups in both Kenya and Tanzania.  Neither study found a 
relationship between titling and investment.  The fact that these studies found 
similar results, at different times, across different ethnic groups suggests that while 
titling may not be the cause of the relationship, a country-level factor may be.  
In short, using the studies in the aggregate and applying two different 
methodological approaches leads to the conclusion that land titling laws do not have 
the expected economic results. There have been many theories that attempt to 
explain why results differ across individual cases. However, current hypotheses do 
not explain why these laws have not had the theoretically expected results. For 
example, scholars have hypothesized that the reason for the discrepancy between 
the theory and empirical results is the absence and strength of financial markets and 
institutions , the incompatibility of market structures with communal systems of 
property , as well as factors such as land size , land location, value of land, elections 
and institutions .  Atwood  suggests that such laws can create, rather than reduce 
uncertainty because they abolish the cultural norms on which people relied for 
certainty of land transactions.  Other scholars have suggested that the potential for 
                                                        




cooption by political elites contributes to the uncertainty that some owners feel 
under new land titling regimes. However, no single explanation seems sufficient to 
explain the variation in outcomes across all of the cases. 
The Content of law 
The results of these studies suggest that there is an element to the existing 
theory of property rights that is lacking. This dissertation argues that the lacking 
element is an examination of the content of law, and an analysis of how specific types 
of rights lead to certain outcomes. For example, what is latent in most of the 
literature, though explicitly stated in some, is an understanding that titling laws 
enforce existing structures of land rights imposed by a state. In fact, most titling and 
registration laws contain clauses stating that once land is registered, rights and 
obligations attaching to the land are governed by the provisions of the act.  In other 
words, once land is registered, the only rights permitted are those outlined by the 
law.  Titling laws only reflect the actual content of the property right.  
A handful of studies have equated tenure security with land rights, and have 
examined the impact of these rights on the economic outcomes discussed above. 
This proves to be a more fecund approach, especially when aggregating studies in 
which the same country has been studied multiple times. The table below presents a 
summary of some of these studies. When compared with table 1, the results 
presented in table 2 appear to be more consistent.  
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Migot-Adholla, Blarel, Hazel and Place39 
1991 Productivity  Transfer rights No relationship  
Africa 
Place and Haze40l 
1993 Investment Land rights No relationship  
Burkina Faso 41  
Malton  
1994 Investment  Land use rights Little to no effect 
Ethiopia 
Deininger and Jin42 
2006 Investment  Transfer rights  Increase  
Ghana  
Migot-Adholla, Benneh, Place and 
Atsu43 
1994 Investment  Transfer rights  No influence44 
Ghana 
 Besley 
1995 Investment Transfer rights No increase 
Rwanda45 
 Blarel 
1994 Investments  Land use rights Increase 
Tuscany, 15th century  
Emigh, 199946 
1999 Productivity  Land tenure 
rights:  
Some increase more 
than others  
                                                        
39 They measured productivity as crop yield and credit as formal loans. They found no relationship 
between transfer rights and formal credit, some in Rwanda and Ghana between transfer and 
investment, but no relationship between productivity and rights in Ghana, Kenya and parts of Rwanda 
 
40 Also examined the relationship between rights and credit and rights and land improvement 
 
41 The Burkina Faso study also assessed the manner in which tenure institutions affect perceptions of 
tenure security (page 42). Investment in this study was measured as soil fertility. The rights here were 
based on an indigenous system of rights rather than a state system.  
 
42 Investment is measured as planting trees (visible investment) maintaining or establishing terraces 
(invisible investment). Transferability measured as the ability to mortgage or sell, tenure security 
measured as perceived security based on past re-allocation experience and future re-allocation 
expectations. They found that mortgage rights increase both types of investment, sale rights 
increases terracing.  
 
43 Investment was measured by improvements to land. 
 
44 In one region, a certain type of investment (mulching) increased when land size was smaller than .4 
hectares. 
 
45 This study also examines the relationship between land distribution, use and scarcity.  The study 
broadly measured agricultural development as mortgage, land improvements and crop yields.  
Investments, in my terminology here, was referred to as improvements on land in the study. The study 
also found little relationship for credit, and  no relationship for crop yields 
 
46 Land tenure rights were sharecropping and small holding. Share cropping was found to be more 






1995 Investment Transfer rights Insignificant 
 
For example, in Ghana, there have been several case studies analyzing the 
relationship between land transfer rights and investment. Migot-Adholla et. al.  and  
Migot-Adholla et. al.  measured transfer rights as temporary rights to transfer only 
within a family, or rights to sell. In all three studies, the authors found no significant 
relationship between the content of the right and land related investments. In the 
1991 study, the authors found that in two of the three regions, transferability rights 
were not related to investment, but in the third region, it was. Almost identically, a 
fourth study, by Place and Hazell  studied the same regions in Ghana and found that 
in two out of the three regions in Ghana they studied, investment was not related to 
transferability rights. Both studies found that the difference was in the same region 
(Anloga).  Contrarily, Besley  measured transfer rights as whether an individual can 
sell, gift, mortgage, rent pledge or bequeath the land. He then aggregated these 
rights numerically. He found that rights were significant in Wassa, but not in Anloga. 
However, he also reported the results for disaggregated rights for Wassa, and the 
right to sell was not significant.  All of these studies suggest that in Ghana (with the 
possible exception of the Anloga region), the right to sell is not significantly related 
to investment.  
                                                        
47 Broadly measured development as land related investments, use of credit. The study also measure a 
variety of rights as independent variables, and found the right to alienate land insignificant and mixed; 
In one region perception of ownership related to improvements in land, in another region, perception 
of ownership related to credit and improvements 
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Rwanda also, has been studied multiple times. Blarel  created a scale of 
transferability rights. In his analysis, “family lands” can only be transferred by 
bequest. “Lineage lands” can only be given to relatives, and “complete rights” can 
be sold. Similarly, Migot-Adholla et. al.  created a scale of rights, “limited transfer 
rights” are temporary rights, “preferential transfer rights” include rights to transfer 
only within a family, “complete transfer rights” include the right to sell.  Place and 
Hazell  use a similar scale, naming the categories “limited rights”, which cannot be 
transferred, “preferential rights” which can be transferred within a family, and 
“complete rights” which include the right to sell.   All three studies found that a 
significant difference between the lowest category (having no transferability rights) 
and having the right to transfer within a family. All three studies also found little 
difference between having “complete rights” and “lineage” or “preferential rights”, 
suggesting that the addition of the right to sell (in the presence of other rights) may 
not be an important factor for investment.  
Even across countries, the studies begin to be suggestive of a pattern. As 
explained above, In Ghana transferability was not related to land related 
investments. Similarly, in Zambia, Roth  found that the ability to sell land is not 
significantly related to investments. Place and Hazell  also did not find any 
relationship between transferability rights and investment in Kenya.  The only study 
that did not fit this pattern is the Deininger and Jin  study of Ethiopia. They found that 
transfer rights, measured as an individual’s perception of his ability to sell or 
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mortgage land had a strong and significant relationship to one type of investment 
(terracing) but not another (tree planting).  
 In the aggregate, these studies that focus on the content of a rights rather than a 
broader notion of property rights reveal more consistent results. In Ghana, Zambia 
and Kenya, they suggest that rights to sell are not related to investment. However, in 
Rwanda and Ghana, rights to transfer land are related to investment. The collective 
conclusion of these studies greatly improves on the understanding of the larger 
econometric studies where property rights are poorly defined and proxied with 
governance variables. It also improves on the bulk of the case study literature in 
which land titling, encompassing varying degrees of ownership, use and 
transferability rights, was the object of study. Yet, given the fact that the effect of 
transferability rights varies between countries, it can be said that there is still another 
piece of the puzzle to be discovered. Specifically, the economic structure of society 
and the interest groups that this structure creates is important for understanding the 
effectiveness of different components of the property rights bundle. By examining 
several studies in greater detail, these aspects of property rights become clearer.  
Interest Groups and the Content of Rights 
To undertake this analysis, this chapter relies on four cases studies. The cases 
were chosen for several reasons. First, two of the case studies, that undertaken by 
Alston, Lee and Schneider in Brazil, and that undertaken by Feder and Feeney in 
Thailand, are very prominent in the literature. Second, the countries that are the 
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object of study, Brazil, Thailand, Rwanda and Kenya, are very different. For example, 
the background descriptions provided by the scholars, shows that all four countries 
had different land histories and political approaches to land.  Three countries were 
colonized, Brazil was colonized by the Portuguese, while Rwanda was colonized by 
the Belgians and Kenya was colonized by the British. Thailand was not colonized, 
though it had a strong trade relationship with Britain, which some have characterized 
as coercive. The political structures of the countries are also different. Brazil has a 
long history of independence, and is a federal country. Rwanda and Kenya have much 
shorter histories of independence and are unitary state. Thailand was a monarchy.   
In addition, the history of land policies is also different. Much of the conflict in 
Brazil stems from multiple claims to the same land due to contradictory and 
overlapping land policies:  the presence of squatters, the lax granting of land under 
the sesimara system, and the unresolved conflicts with land grants under the new 
system. Contrarily, in Rwanda, the land institutions and policies were more phased: 
the Hutu system dissolved, in part due to the presences of the Tutsi’s, the Tutsi 
system was replaced by the laws of the colonial government, and the laws of the 
colonial government were then replaced by the laws of the independent state.  
Similarly, in Thailand, the land policies appear to be more phased. Land became a 
salient issue in the 19th century, and successive laws attempted to enact policy in this 
area. Also in Kenya, there was not a case of overlapping or conflicting policies, but 
rather a series of policies in response to political needs.  The differences of these 
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countries preclude explanations of path dependence or broader structural features 
as determinants of the outcomes.  
Third and finally, although the studies all address the same question, the 
relationship between security and investment, there is variation in the outcomes. In 
Brazil, Thailand and Rwanda, property rights security increased investment, while in 
Kenya it did not. Also of import is the selection of a country in Sub-Saharan where 
security increased investment (Rwanda), given that the bulk of studies in Sub-
Saharan show that security does not necessarily increase investment.  
The Studies in Brief: 
Brazil: Study Description 
 Alston, Lee and Schneider rely on two types of data for their study of Brazil. The first 
is a survey conducted between 1992 and 1993 of 206 landholders in the state of Para 
near the regions of Altamira, Tucuma, Sao Felix and Tailandia. The second is data 
from the Brazilian Agricultural Census in the states for Para (1970 to 1985) and for 
Parana (1940-1970). Part of their analysis entails examining the determinants of 
investment. Here, they measure investment as the amount of land placed in 
improved pasture and permanent crops. The investment data is derived from the 
census.  The purpose of this study is to measure the determinants and effects of land 
title. Consequently, the data incorporates two distinct regions and two different 
periods. The authors measure the impact of land title on investment for small farmers 
who obtained land through a process of claiming government land or adverse 
39 
 
possession of private land in “frontier” regions. They found that title does have a 
positive, statistically significant effect on land-related investments in most cases.  
Brazil Background of the Law 
The study by Alston, Lee and Schneider begins with the history of land rights 
in Brazil. Brazil was a Portuguese colony, and in occupying the land, Portugal 
implemented a system that had been used in other colonies- that of dividing the land 
and granting portions of the land to “captains”.  However, unlike other colonies, the 
colony of Brazil possessed no monetary appeal, and most of the “captains” either did 
not take possession of the land they were granted or did not make any significant 
investments in it. Still needing to establish a presence in its new colony, the 
Portuguese government abandoned the captain system, and in its place 
implemented a grant system (sesmaria). Under this system, large grants of land were 
given to individuals with the sole condition that the land be cultivated.  
As crops such as sugar became profitable in Brazil, and as various minerals 
were discovered in the colony, population increased.  Squatters appeared on land 
that had not yet been granted under the sesmaria system.  Brazil attained 
independence in 1822, and abandoned the sesmaria system, but did not replace it 
with another system until 1850. In the interim, individuals through occupation 
acquired government land.  
The precipitating factor for a new land law in 1850 was coffee production. Land that 
was once abundant and had little value, suddenly became scare, and the value of it 
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increased substantially. Conflicts arose between competing claimants to land and the 
Land Law of 1850 was passed.   
This law legalized the possession of those who had obtained land through 
occupation, revalidated the claims of those who had land under the sesmaria system, 
and established that after the passage of the law, land could only be obtained 
through purchase. The Brazilian government began to dispose of land “on the 
frontier” by offering land grants to colonization companies, and selling land to 
individuals. However, as population pressures increased, and the pace of expansion 
into the frontier also increased, such grants and sales were frequently made without 
resolving issues of who had prior claims to the land being granted or sold. Further 
complicating land distribution issues was the devolution of power to states, as Brazil 
became a Republic in 1899. States were given control over land settlement issues, 
and each state formed its own policy.  A persistent issue throughout this process was 
the fact that because of the sesmaria system, and its effective reinforcement through 
the law of 1850, land remained concentrated in the hands of a few owners.  
The law of 1964, Estatuto da Terra of 1964, and the constitution of 1988 both 
enacted agrarian reform. Cline  describes the 1964 law. The law established certain 
types of land as appropriate for expropriation and redistribution by the state. The 
government was to designate “priority areas” for expropriation, which were areas of 
high population density and high ownership concentration.  In these areas, specific 
types of land were to be targeted for expropriation. The law also stipulates tenancy 
conditions and taxation on lands of a certain size. The 1988 constitutions also has 
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specific measures on the use of land, in addition to targeting certain lands for 
expropriation and re-sale.  
In Brazil, the time of Portuguese colonization was marked by land abundance 
but labor and capital scarcity. Dean  notes that settlers who had been granted 
sesmarias were dependent on the Portuguese crown for credit and labor in the form 
of slaves. Furthermore, the inheritors of the large sesmarias were concerned about 
the labor supply and desired to restrict opportunities for new land in order to 
increase, or at least, maintain the current supply. This is particularly so after Britain 
began diplomatic pressure to end the slave trade.   Furthermore, the record of 
debate around the land laws of 1843 and 1850 highlight the importance of restricting 
land ownership to increase labor to the conservative party. 
Rwanda: Study Description 
 For the study of Rwanda, Blarel  relied on data from a survey conducted in 1988 by 
the Agricultural and Rural Development Department of the World Bank and the 
Services des Enquêtes et des Statistiques Agricoles (SESA). The survey occurred in 
three prefectures, Buatre, Gitarama and Ruhengeri and contained data on 232 
households. Although all regions are densely populated, the author notes that the 
regions vary according to when they were settled. One of the questions that Blarel 
investigates is whether land tenure security is related to increased investment. 
However, he defines land tenure security according to the fullness of a set of rights. 
He identified 24 distinct rights that individuals may have over land, and grouped 
these rights into five categories: short term usufruct, long term usufruct, family land 
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(which includes the right to bequeath), lineage land (which includes the right to give 
to other lineage or family members) or complete rights land. Those with more rights 
are deemed to have greater security.  Using logit analysis, Blarel finds that blocks of 
land with short term use rights are the least likely to have land improvements. Blocks 
of land with long term use rights are more likely, but not as likely as blocks of land 
with family, lineage or complete rights. He also finds that the difference in incidence 
of improvements between family, lineage and complete land is minor. In fact, there 
was no difference between lineage and complete rights land. 
Rwanda: Background of the law 
As Blarel reports, the history of land rights in Rwanda differs considerably 
from that in Brazil. The agricultural Hutus had established a land system called the 
ubukonde. Under this system, a community, related by a common ancestry, owned 
the land. Clan leaders allocated land to households, and households had long-term 
and exclusive rights to use the land, and transfer it to male children.  Land could not 
be sold, and unused lands reverted to the community, and could be redistributed to 
another household.  Blarel reports that this system eventually dissolved because of 
abuse of power by heads of clans (a patronage system developed), and by 
population pressures, some of which was brought by the pastoral Tutsis.  
The Tutsis had two different land systems, one applying to agricultural land, 
known as isambu, and one applying to pastoral land, known as igikingi.  The 
distinction between the Hutu and Tutsi systems was that use rights were given to 
individuals, and areas of land were no longer conceptualized as belonging to a 
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community.  However, even under this system, individuals were granted only 
usufruct rights.  
Belgian colonization introduced yet another distinct layer of land rights. While 
Belgium generally followed and recognized the system of the Tutsis, they also 
distinguished between indigenous lands, which were governed by Tutsi laws, and 
non-indigenous land, populated by foreign nationals, and governed by Belgian laws. 
These laws recognized individual ownership rights and established a system of land 
registration.  Colonial authorities eventually abolished significant parts of the 
customary system, and in 1960 established that if land was not registered, it became 
the domain of the state. However, under this new system, groups could purchase 
customary rights, and holders of customary rights could have land reclassified as 
private land. 
When Rwanda became independent in 1962, it ratified the system established 
by colonial authorities; in addition, it largely abolished the customary system (except 
in a few areas). Additional laws specified that land held under customary rights may 
be sold, provided the seller retains a portion of the land.  
In Rwanda, land policy dating back to the feudal system under King 
Rwaburgiri was designed to control access to land. Similar to Thailand, discussed 
below,  this system required that poorer classes, in this case Hutu, exchange labor for 
access to land owned primarily by Tutsi. The initial decree establishing that the land 
of the indigenous population remained under the customary law while the land of 
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the foreign settlers was governed by a different set of laws did little to change the 
land scarcity and conflict issues.  
In response to discontent among the poorer classes, the Belgian government 
abolished the system of corvee labor, and declared that all non-registered land 
(customary land) was state land. Those occupying the land were doing so by usufruct 
and not ownership rights. Individuals in customary areas could request private title to 
land by undergoing a land registration process. After independence, the Rwandan 
government enacted a further land law limiting the sale of customary land. Such sales 
had to be approved by the government, and also the seller had to retain a small 
portion of the land. 
Kenya: Study description  
 Migot-Adholla, Place and Oluoch-Kasura  conducted a study of the relationship 
between security of tenure and land productivity in Kenya. They relied on data 
conducted by a joint operation of the Agriculture and Rural Development 
Department of the World Bank and the Agricultural Economics Department of the 
University of Nairobi. This survey, conducted in 1988, contains data on 406 
households in the Kianjogu and Mweiga areas of the Nyeri district and the Madzu and 
Lumakanda areas of the Kakamega district. Like Blarel , Migot-Adholla et. al. define 
tenure security according to the rights associated with the land rather than as the 
presence or absence of registration.  They suggest that the right to sell land is the 
paramount right, and group the rights according to the degree of transferability. 
“Complete rights lands” are lands over which there are rights to sell. “Preferential 
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transfer lands” are lands that may not be sold but may be bequeathed or given to 
family. “Limited transfer lands” are those which cannot be transferred for any 
extended period of time. Using logit analysis, the authors found that there was little 
effect of land security on land improvements. Specifically, they found that land rights 
were not related to tree crops or terracing. They also found that individual rights 
were associated with greater improvements in Lumakanda, but not in the other areas 
under study.  Additionally, they found that security measured as land title had little 
effect on land improvements.  
Kenya: Background of the laws 
Prior to the arrival of the British, land was largely governed under the aegis of 
different ethnic groups.  However, after colonization, the most productive and fertile 
land was occupied by British colonizers during the colonial era, Kenyans were forced 
to live in “African reserves”, and a dual system of law was implemented throughout 
the region. British law applied to the British settlers and traditional tenure systems 
governed the African reserves. However, as Migot-Adholla et. al., observe, the British 
appointed the “chiefs” governed the African areas.  Under the British law, the Land 
Titles Act 1908, and the subsequent Registration of Titles Act 1919 governed land of 
the settlers.  
However, late in the colonial period, when population pressures and 
degradation of soil contributed land scarcity in the reserves and subsequently to 
unrest amongst the population, the British changed the policy. The Swynnerton Plan 
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of 1954 began the process of establishing individual land rights. This was followed by 
the Native Land Registration Ordinance of 1959 and the Registered Land Act of 1963.  
At the time of the study by Migot-Adholla et. al. , rights granted under the 
Registered Land Act, were subject to other laws, in particular the Land Control Act of 
1967, and various agricultural land use acts. Consequently, in Kenya the right of 
ownership in the absolute sense was tempered by restrictions on the sale and use of 
agricultural land. Additionally, in Kenya, ownership in the districts in the study was 
widespread, and land was considered scarce.  
The dual system of tenure and the restriction of land ownership outside the 
African Reserves benefited land owners and manufacturers by creating a ready 
supply of labor at minimal wages .  In 1954, the Swynnerton Plan represented the 
most comprehensive change in land policy in Kenya since colonization. The plan 
proposed individualization of plots of land in the African reserves. While economic 
reasons were initially stated in the plan itself , political motivations also governed its 
adoption. The African reserves were becoming overpopulated, and the quality of the 
land was deteriorating. The Mau Mau uprising was beginning and some policy makers 
believed that implanting the Swynnerton Plan would not only quell the uprising, but 
also create a class of landed Africans that would contribute to stability in the area . 
The land boards that were implemented concomitantly with the new land policy 
served to restrict land transactions. Thus, in Kenya, restriction in land prior to the 
Native Land Registration Ordinance of 1959 benefited land owners. Expansion of land 
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ownership after 1959 was limited and done for the purpose of preventing the need 
for wide-scale redistribution policies. 
Thailand: Study Description 
 Feder, Onchan, Chalamwong, and Hongladarom conducted their study in Thailand. 
The authors conducted surveys between 1984 and 1985 in the Lop Buri, Nakhon 
Ratchasima and Kon-Kaen provinces. In each areas the authors surveyed ten farmers 
in ten villages in the forest reserve and ten villages in the area outside of the reserve. 
They conducted additional surveys in the Chaiyaphum province the following year. 
For the question on the relationship between titled land and investment, data from 
the Chaiyaphum province was not used because the area experienced a drought.  The 
dependent variables were expenditure on power inputs, such as the cost of 
machinery hours or animal days. They found that use of inputs per land unit is greater 
on titled land than on untitled land. 
Thailand:  Background of laws 
Historically, land in Thailand was administered on a type of feudal system.  All 
land belonged to the king. The administration of land among his subjects was 
governed by a sakdi nā system. Accordingly, people were granted a certain number 
of rai contingent upon their feudal rank . The king and those higher up in the feudal 
system derived wealth primarily from a corvée labor. Freemen were required to give 
four months labor or negate the duties by the supply of commodities. In addition, 
Feder et. al.  describe slavery as a common practice. 
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 Both Kemp  and Feder et. al.  describe the impetus for change in this system 
as stemming from the increase in trade, particularly the export of rice. Kemp reports 
that this and other changes, such as the abolition of slavery and a dramatic change in 
the corvée system increased pressure on land somewhat. However, the land to 
population ratio was so high that this pressure was easily relieved by the movement 
of peoples outside of populous areas.  
In Thailand, prior to the 19th century, land was abundant and labor was scarce. 
The feudal system, in addition to other policies, helped to supply labor to the king. 
Private property was instituted in earnest as exports in rice increased. In fact, 
Johnston  suggests that it was because of the changes in the labor system that 
exports were able to increase. As labor requirements diminished, Thais were able to 
devote more time and effort into farming and by so doing, increase rice production.  
However, the Thai economy continued to suffer from both labor and capital 
shortages. Johnston also observes that the labor shortage was such that some 
cultivators were granted permission to use prisoners on their farms. Similarly, 
Johnston also discusses shortages in capital. He notes that some land mortgages 
were secured by loans of up to 67%. In the Thai case, where the country was land 
abundant, labor scarce and capital scarce, it seems that the more liberal land 
ownership policies benefited both labor and capital interests in the Thai economy. 
Labor benefited because more farms expanded the demand for labor. Similarly, more 
farms expanded the demand for capital.  
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The law in Thailand at the time of the Feder et. al.  study was the Land Code of 
1954. The law stipulates different rights associated with different certificates of 
registration.  Most of the certificates enable the user to transfer, use or mortgage the 
land. However, the types of transfer and the process required prior to the transfer of 
land vary according to how the land was surveyed.  In addition, these certificates 
carry with them a requirement that land be used or lost to the holder. The required 
years of use vary with the certificate.  
Comparison of Features 
 The results of the case studies appear to be inconsistent. In Thailand, Rwanda and 
Brazil security increased investment or improvement on land, while in Kenya it did 
not.  However, what is missing from the case studies is a more complete explanation 
of the laws and the groups that benefit from the laws. By examining the broader 
context in light of my proposed theory, that the rights are separable, that separate 
rights have both a differential distributional effect on groups, and have a differential 
effect on economic outcomes, more traction can be gained in explaining the results. 
The history of these cases shows that because of the distributional consequences of 
different property rights, groups will have preferences for different parts of the 
bundle and try to have those preferences enacted as law.  
In each of these cases, property rights in land benefited certain groups, and 
one may argue, were instituted because of the influence of these groups over the 
political system. In Kenya, for example, restrictions on land prior to 1954 benefited 
the landowners by creating a ready supply of cheap labor. Similarly in Brazil, 
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restrictions on land ownership prior to implementation of the land laws of 1843 and 
1850 were intended to benefit land owners by creating a supply of cheap labor. In 
both cases, the expansion of ownership rights was done in a limited way and because 
landowners feared political repercussions of not doing so.  
In Rwanda, as well, the restriction on access to land, which kept land in the 
hands of the Tutsis, and the government ownership of customary land, ostensibly 
benefited existing landowners.  In the Thai case, where the country was land 
abundant, labor scarce and capital scarce, it seems that the more liberal land 
ownership policies benefited both labor and capital interests in the Thai economy. 
Labor benefited because more farms expanded the demand for labor. Similarly, more 
farms expanded the demand for capital.  
Yet the laws that were ultimately implemented in these cases are not uniform, 
and represent the preferences for these groups over the set of property rights 
conceivable.  For example, the land sale and restrictions in Kenya benefit the land 
owning class by increasing the value of their land. In Brazil, although the land law of 
1850 extended the right of ownership of land to those squatting on lands, scholars 
have observed that the requirements for owning land were such that few could 
actually afford it. Consequently, the effective result was a restriction on 
landownership. In Rwanda, limitations on the sale of customary land and the use of 
land further benefited landowners. Finally, in Thailand, variations in the restrictions 
on land usage serve to benefit the capital interests.  
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Table 3: Summary of four country studies and the content of laws 
 Own Use Sale Land Labor Productivity Investment 
Rwanda Yes   Scarce Abundant Yes Yes 
Kenya  Yes Yes Scarce Abundant No No 
Thailand Yes Yes  Abundant Scarce Yes yes 
Brazil Yes  Yes  Abundant  Scarce Yes Yes 
 
The chart above summarizes the countries according to the concentration of 
ownership, the distribution of the factors of production, the types of laws under the 
studies and the outcomes of these laws.  Comparing two cases, Kenya and Thailand, 
where ownership of land in the areas under study is widespread, the laws have some 
restrictions. In Kenya, there are use restrictions on agricultural land as well as 
restrictions on transferability (in the form of land boards).   In Thailand, there are 
some use restrictions as well as restrictions on the size of land that may be owned. 
The outcome of these cases is different, suggesting that the land/labor ratio may play 
a role in determining the outcome of the land law. Comparing those countries with 
concentrated country-wide ownership, we see that where ownership is concentrated 
there are policies that are restrictive of either ownership or transferability.  In 
countries where ownership is more widespread, Kenya and Thailand, we see use 
restrictions. As for outcomes, the difference between Kenya and Rwanda, which 
have similar distributions of the factors of production, seems to be the content of the 
law. In Brazil and Thailand where there is no difference on salient features, or 




The empirical studies surveyed in the literature review of the first part of this 
chapter suggested a relationship between growth and property rights, but did not 
specify to a necessary degree of exactitude the type of property rights necessary to 
promote such growth.  The case studies analyzed in this chapter provided more 
details about the mechanisms through which property rights should affect growth. 
However, when taken altogether, the results of these case studies do not provide 
any additional insight into the nature of the relationship that can be applied 
generally.  Yet when underlying land rights are considered, the studies do begin to 
form a pattern. Coupled with investigations into the dynamics of interest groups in a 
country, the content of law appears to have an influence on economic outcomes. The 





Chapter 3: The politics of property rights laws 
 Introduction 
The preceding chapter reviewed the literature on property rights and 
economic outcomes. While the first part of the chapter explored the bulk of the 
literature and focused on the macroeconomic effects of property rights institutions, 
the second part focused on the case-study literature and the microeconomic effects 
of property rights institutions. I concluded that while the macroeconomic literature 
has explored the outcomes of property rights institutions, it has done little 
exploration of the content of property laws. The failure to distinguish between 
enforcement of property rights and the content of laws was highlighted by the case 
study analyses. Many case studies questioned validity of the theoretical thrust of the 
literature by collectively demonstrating that the efficient economic outcomes do not 
occur in all cases. Further, the results were more consistent when the content of the 
laws was considered.  This chapter seeks to explain the divergence from the uniform 
predictions of economic theory to the variegated actual observed outcomes, as well 
as the cross-country variation by arguing that differences in content of the laws 
determine the differences in observed outcomes. 
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In this chapter, I argue first, not all countries have the same bundle of 
property rights in their laws. Second, different types of rights give rise to different 
short-term economic effects, and consequently have different distributional 
implications for groups.  Finally, institutional forms that offer interest groups more 
opportunities to influence the legislative process are more likely to have aberrations 
from what may be considered the standard bundle of rights.  
The non-uniformity of property rights 
Property rights are not a uniform conglomerate. They are multiple rights 
adhering to one object.48 This can lead to a considerable amount of variance across 
countries. The variance in property rights stems from two sources. First, there are 
different components to the bundle.  Scholars have broadly characterized property 
rights into several categories.  For example, Demsetz  suggests that true ownership 
of property consists of a three-part bundle of rights, rights surrounding usage, rights 
of exclusion, and rights of transferability. Libecap  states that ownership 
encompasses the right to use, the right to appropriate returns, and the right to 
transfer.49  
A second source of variance is that states can also vary the definition of these 
rights. For example, the 2001 of Land Code of Thailand defines immovable property 
                                                        
48This idea of property rights as a “bundle” is vigorously contested in some legal literature. See for 
example, most famously, Thomas Grey, “The Disintegration of Property”, arguing that property as a 
bundle of rights results in an incoherence, See also J.E. Penner, 1996, “The Bundle of Rights Picture of 
Property”, arguing that the conception of property as a bundle of rights is atheoretical; Adam 
Mossoff,, 2003, “What is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together” refereeing to the “bundle of 
rights” concept as not only atheoretical but also one that stems from “the acid wash of a nominalism 
first popularized in the law by the legal realists” 372). 
49 Libecap, 145 
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(land)50, what constitutes private ownership51, how ownership may be acquired (sale, 
acquisitive prescription, gift, exchange, accretion),52 the conditions under which land 
may be leased,53 how land may be used,54 how individuals may create easements 
(agreements restricting use of land between themselves),55 and the circumstances 
under which land may be mortgaged.56 The power to define and specify the very 
nature of these rights gives states enormous potential to vary the property rights 
bundle such that even rights of the same name may have different implications in 
different countries.  For example, while in many common law countries, the law 
recognizes rights in leases and mortgages in many French-inspired legal systems, 
leases and mortgages are not considered “rights” in property, but rather 
encumbrances on property . 
In addition to the fact that the property rights bundle has several 
components, each of these components is separable from the others. Although there 
may be spillover effects, the presence of one part of the bundle does not guarantee 
the presence of other parts,. The variation in the content of property laws from 
country to country evinces this fact.  For example, rights to sell land do not exist in 
Tonga.  In Vanuatu, citizens may not mortgage their land. In addition, because of the 
historical development of property law, common law countries frequently recognize 
a greater variety of rights than civil law countries.   
                                                        
50 Article 2 
51 Articles 4-11; State and collective ownership are detailed in subsequent articles. 
52 Articles 29-84 
53 Articles 106-113 
54 Articles 117-141 
55 Articles 142-167 
56 Articles 197-225 
56 
 
Even in titling systems discussed in chapter 2 there is variance. While the 
underlying process of land titling is similar across different countries, there are 
numerous procedural and philosophical differences.  For example, French-inspired 
systems are most often called recordation, and the final act of recording the land 
transfer is declarative.  That is, recording the land transfer with the government 
office is not considered a requirement of a legitimate land transfer, the consent of 
the parties is sufficient. The recording only declares that a transfer has been made. In 
German-inspired systems, as well as in some common law jurisdiction, the 
terminology used is land titling, and recording the transfer with the local recording 
office is constitutive.  That is, it constitutes part of the process of transfer. The 
government in many of these countries will issue certificates of title. Any transfer of 
rights without proper registration or recording creates only an obligation due to the 
buyer. The buyer does not possess any real rights in the property. In other words, 
because of historical circumstance, philosophical basis, or deliberate choice, not all 
property laws will contain the same “bundle” of property rights.  
A consequence of the distinctness and separability of the bundle is that 
property rights have distributional consequences for different groups. Libecap  
argues that any form of restriction implies a decrease in economic options and a 
reduction in value.57  Further, he states “Because property rights define the 
behavioral norms for the assignment and use of resources, it is possible to predict 
                                                        




how differences in property rights affect economic activity.”58 These potential 
distributional consequences determine preferences of these groups for parts of the 
property rights bundle for the different rights. Further, the potential gains and losses 
of the different rights mobilize groups to advocate for their preferences to be 
enacted as law. The ability of these groups to successfully have their preferences 
enacted is constrained by the political institutions of which they are a part. The first 
part of this chapter articulates the theory of how the preferences for property rights 
are determined. Part two articulates the theory of how three political institutions 
constrain the ability of these groups to have their preferences enacted. 
Distributional consequences of different property rights 
This chapter uses a modified factors of production classical growth model and 
divide societies according to the factors of production: land, labor and capital. A 
group benefits if the anticipated return on their factor rises. Conversely, the group 
suffers if the anticipated return on their factor falls. This analysis will rely on a 
combination of economic models and graphical analysis to demonstrate the benefits 
and loses for the owners of the factors of production under different components of 
property laws, namely, ownership, use, and transferability. 59  
                                                        
58 Libecap, 145. He also states that these types of comparative statics are complicated by causality 
problems, as well as market adjustments and considerations of transactions costs. All of these 
variables will be accounted for in the statistical analysis.  
59 For ease of conceptualization, I will discuss property laws as restrictive of rights, rather than 
granting rights. 
 
However, this manner of discussion in no way reflects any philosophical conceptualization of rights. 
Some believe that rights only exist if a state grants them, because rights, by definition, can only be 




Simple economics suggests that restrictions in the quantity of land, or increases 
in the demand for land increase its value, and according the factors model, benefit 
owners of land. The analysis for labor and capital is more complicated.   
Labor 
 To determine the changes in the supply, demand and return on labor, I use the 
following models. 
Labor supplied by the household: 
Assume consumers are interested in maximizing consumption and leisure, 
given by the equation: 
    
   
          
(Equation 1)  
 
An individual’s consumption is equal to his income, or           .   
represents wages,   represents the return on capital, , and   represents the return 
on land,  . This equation can be substituted into the equation above, so that the 
equation becomes 
  
   
   
                   (Equation 2)  
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
by the state only limit a person’s rights. My choice to discuss rights in terms of restrictions by the state 
is not intended to be a statement about this debate. 
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Additionally, time is composed of labor and leisure. If time is represented as unity, 
then      . Using this in the equation above, the maximization problem then 
becomes 
    
   
                       
 
(Equation 3)  
 
To maximize, the first order condition (derivative) of this equation with respect to   
is taken, and the equation is set equal to zero. 
 













Cross- multiplying,  
                
Grouping like terms,  
                
Multiplying out the left-hand side, 
              
Re-grouping like terms, 
            
Isolating the w term, 
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Dividing through both sides by w 
     
     
 
 
Isolating the   term 
   
     
 
   
Re-writing the right-hand side 
   
       
 
 
Dividing through to isolate the   term results in 
 
  




      
Thus, to solve for L,       is substituted into the equation 
 
    
       
  
 
Solving for L 
   
       
  
   
Rewriting, 
   







    




(Equation 4)  
 
This equation suggests that labor supply is negatively related to the quantity of land. 
That is, as the quantity of land increases, labor supply decreases.  
Labor demanded by the firms: 
Using the Cobb-Douglas production function, a firm’s production function is 
given by  
 TLAKY   
The cost function of a firm is TrKwL   . Firms seek to maximize the profit, and in 
doing so, maximize the production function subject to the cost function. The 
maximization problem of the firm with respect to labor can be represented as: 




The derivative of which is: 
  wTLAK   1 . 
Setting the derivative equal to zero yields: 
  01  wTLAK  . 
Solving for L: 
  wTLAK    1 . 









And finally, solving for L 
 
    
 
      
 
 
   
 (Equation 5)  
 
This equation states that the demand for labor is positively related to labor demand. 
As the quantity of land increases, the labor demanded by firms also increases.  
Capital Supplied by Households 
The above analysis can also be used to derive the quantity of capital. Solving 
equation 0 for capital, the equation becomes: 
   





    
          
 
 (Equation 6)  
 
This equation suggests that the capital demand is positively related to both quantity 
of land T and the return on land    
Capital demanded by firms: 
A firm’s production function is given by  
           




The cost function of a firm is  TrKwL   
The maximization problem of the firm can be represented as: 




The derivative of which is: 
  rTLAK   1  
Setting the derivative equal to zero yields: 
  01  rTLAK   
Rewriting, 















    
 
        
 
 
   
 (Equation 8)  
 
This equation suggests that capital supply is positively related to the quantity 
of land, T. That is, increases in the quantity of land, also increase the capital supply.  
Using both the capital supply and capital demand equations in tandem, we can see 
that the quantity of land is positively related to capital. Laws which restrict the 
quantity of land will also restrict capital supply and demand. 
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Graphical analysis  
Below is  an alternative method of analysis. Using graphical representations, I 
show how changes in the laws will affect the land, labor and capital markets. Land 
laws, particularly, ownership laws are about access to land. Consequently, the state 
can control the quantity of land available to the populous by controlling access to the 
land.  The figure below is a static depiction of the supply and demand of land. The 
effects of changes in the supply and demand of land can be traced to labor and 
capital markets.  
 
Figure 4: The Supply and Demand of Land 
The quantity of land will affect the quantity of labor, but the direction of the 
relationship between land and labor is debatable. Some might suggest an inverse 
relationship between quantity of land available and the quantity of labor.  That is, 
that as the availability of land increases the quantity of labor decreases. This is also 
the conclusion of equation 5 above. One explanation for this might be that as land 
becomes more available for use or ownership, workers leave the labor market and 
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derive income from land-related activities. Thus, an increase in land supply in the land 
market results in a decrease in labor supply. All other factors constant, this supply 
side reduction in the quantity of labor would result in a wage increase.  
Conversely, one may also argue that the relationship between land and labor is 
direct rather than inverse.  As one acquires more land, one needs more labor to work 
it up to a certain point, where the marginal contribution of each additional unit of 
labor diminishes.  Thus, here, an increase in land supply results in an increase in labor 
demand, as predicted by equation 6. All other factors constant, the predicted results 
would be a wage increase. 
The literature on the relationship between supply of land and changes in labor is 
inconclusive. There exist only a small number of studies on the relationship between 
property rights and labor markets, and the majority of these use single-country 
analysis.  Some of these studies posit an inverse relationship between land and labor. 
For example, Rosenzweig (1978) uses both a theoretical model and an empirical data 
from India. Although the theoretical model is inconclusive, the empirical data 
supports a conclusion that increasing ownership among the landless population 
lowers the labor supply.  Besley, et. al. (2011) also find a relationship between tenancy 
regulations and adverse effects on the poor in India. As the poor are more likely to be 





Figure 5: The relationship between quantity of labor and quantity of land 
While neither logic nor empirical works yields conclusive results, for the purposes 
of this analysis, the ultimate outcome is the same. In cases of a positive relationship 
between land and labor (a labor supply decrease) or a negative relationship between 
land and labor (a labor demand increase), ceteris paribus, wages increase.  For the 
purposes of the graphical representation, the changes are modeled as a negative 
relationship, though the analysis is the same if modeled as a positive relationship.  
 
Figure 6: Supply and Demand of Labor 
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Wages affect the supply and demand of capital.  Generally, savings is a function of 
income, usually conceived as income less taxes and consumption.   
            60 
where Y is national output or income, T is taxes, C is consumption, G is government 
spending, and I is investment.  This can be re-written as  
    
where S= savings 
As a general statement, higher wages lead to higher income and higher quantities 
saved.  The supply of loanable funds is also a function of the quantity of money 
saved. Therefore, an increase in wages will lead to an increase in the quantity of 
capital, as depicted in the figure below.  
 
 We can now model different types of land laws as effecting the supply and 
demand of land, and trace these changes to the labor and capital markets.  Assuming 
that preferences over laws will be determined by changes in the return on the factors 
of production for land, labor and capital, then tracing the effects of changes in the 
supply and demand of land in the different markets enables us to articulate the 
preferences of these groups for different types of property laws.   
A restriction in who may own land does not change the demand. The demand for 
land and the uses to which land may be put does not change.  For example, in many 
countries, rental arrangements are common in the absence of well functioning land 
                                                        
60 Mankiw, 60 
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markets.61 Therefore, a restriction in who may own land acts a quantity restriction, 
akin to a government license or quota. It reduces the quantity available in the market 
below the market–clearing price and quantity. Consequently, the supply of land is 
lower than the demand, allowing landowners to benefit. This is depicted in the first 
box of the figure below.  
The dotted lines in the figure show how the changes in the relationship depicted 
in one box can be mapped onto another relationship, depicted in a different box. In 
the present case of changes in who may own land, the change in the decrease in the 
supply of land can be mapped onto box 2. In box 2 is a 45 degree line which merely 
reflects but does not alter the lines. These lines can be traced to box 3, which depicts 
the relationship between quantity of land and quantity of labor.  This shows that  a 
decrease in supply of land, shown in box 1 leads to a decrease in the quantity of labor, 
shown in box 3. This change can be traced to box 4, which depicts that supply and 
demand of labor. The decrease in the quantity of labor, is a represented as a supply 
side shift. A decrease in the supply of labor leads to an increase in the wage rate. The 
increase in the wage rate can be traced to the relationships between wage and 
quantity of capital depicted in box 5. Thus the increase in wage rate is shown to 
increase the quantity of capital. This can be traced to the relationship between 
quantity of capital and capital rates depicted in box 6. The supply side increase in 
capital results in a decrease in rates. 
                                                        





Figure 7: Graphical analysis of changes in “own who” laws on land, labor and capital 
In sum, In other words, a restriction in who may on land reduces the quantity of land 
supplied, raises the price of land for owner, decreases the return on labor, but 
increases the return on capital.   
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This analysis may be repeated for each of the types of laws discussed above. A 
restriction on what land may be owned, similarly decreases supply, depicted in box 1, 
and the result is identical to the restrictions on who may own land. 
A restriction on the uses to which land may be put decreases the demand for land. 
This is shown in box 1 of the figure below. The subsequent analysis, however, is 
identical to that of Figure 7.  
 
Figure 8: Graphical analysis of restrictions in land use on land, labor and capital 
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Restrictions in the sale of land reduce the supply of land in the market place as well 
as the demand. While the result is a decrease in the price of land, depicted in box 1 
below, the subsequent results are indeterminate. The changes in the quantities of 
labor and capital are contingent upon the magnitude of the shifts in the supply and 
demand of land.  
 
Figure 9: Graphical analysis of the restrictions in the transferability of land on land, labor and capital 
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If, as mentioned earlier, we assume that preferences over the laws of the different 
owners of the factors of production are determined by the returns they receive 
under changes in the law, we can articulate the preferences of these groups for the 
laws.  For example, an increase in the price of land will benefit owners, and thus 
owners will favor laws which result in such increases.  In the analysis above, the 
effects of all of the laws begin in the land market, and are traced to the other 
markets, thus we can summarize the impact on the owners of the different factors of 
production by how they are affected by a decrease or increase in the supply of land.  
Table 4: Table depicting changes in supply and demand of land and the return on factors of production 
 Price of land (rent) Price of Labor (wages) Price of Capital (rates) 
Decrease in supply Increase Decrease Increase 
Decrease in demand Decrease Decrease Increase 
 
Changes in land laws 
At this point we can assess the effect of changes in different types of laws on 
these outcomes. Restrictions on both who may own land and what may be owned 
can be seen as a restriction in quantity. In the graph, this is represented by a decrease 
in supply, in the model represented by a reduction in T.  For owners of land, this 
increases the value of land, for owners of labor, this decreases the return on their 
labor and for owners of capital, this increases the rates of capital.  
Restrictions on use decrease the demand for land.  In the model, this is 
represented as a decrease in  , in the graphical analysis, this is represented by a 
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leftward shift in the demand curve.  Consequently, use restrictions are predicted to 
harm the owners of land and labor, but benefit the owners of capital. Finally, 
restrictions on the transferability of land can be seen as a decrease in both the supply 
and demand of land. In the model, this is a restriction on in , and in the graphical 
analysis, this is represented as a shift in both the supply and demand curves in the 
land market.  For the owners of land, the benefits or loses are determined by the 
degree of the changes in each curves. However, laborers suffer wage loss, and 
owners of capital benefit.  The chart below modifies the previous chart and 
summarizes the consequences of the laws for the owners of land, labor and capital. 
Table 5: Table showing the results of property right restrictions and the return on factors of production 
Type of law Change in land 
market 
Price of land 
(rent) 
Price of Labor 
(wages) 
Price of Capital 
(rates) 
Ownership restriction  Decrease in supply Increase Decrease Increase 
Use restriction  Decrease in 
demand 
Decrease Decrease Increase 
Transferability 
restriction 
Decrease in supply 
and demand 
Undetermined Decrease Increase 
 
The first part of this chapter has attempted to demonstrate how the owners 
of the factors of production have different interests in different types of property 
rights. The remainder of this chapter will show how these interests translate into 
policy outcomes. This leads to several hypotheses about the preferences of different 
groups for different types of laws: 
H1:  Owners of land will prefer ownership and eschew use restrictions 
H2: Owners of labor will eschew all three types of property right restrictions  
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H3:  Owner of capital will prefer restrictions in all three types of property 
rights. 
 
This analysis offers a partial explanation to the original question, why do 
countries vary in the content of their property laws? The owners of land, labor and 
capital carry different preferences for these laws into the political process, and help 
to determine the types of property laws that are promulgated. However, which 
preferences predominate is not only a factor of group size and influence, but also a 
factor of the political institutions and the way that groups operate in them.  
Institutions 
Interest groups and property rights 
Property rights have distributional consequences.  Libecap states that “…any 
redefinition of decision-making authority over resource use brings about shifts in the 
distribution of wealth and political power. What can be expected, then, is that the 
attitudes toward institutional change taken by the individuals involved in the rights-
allocation process will be decided by the net gains they anticipate from the 
restructuring plan.”62  Calabrasi and Melamed outline the processes a state must 
undertake in the context of “entitlements.” Given that entitlements often involve 
conflicting interests over the same object, the state makes a decision as to whom the 
                                                        




entitlement will belong.63 Given that these distributional consequences exist, 
scholars have argued that there is a relationship between property rights and 
political power.  
Political institutions 
Scholars have argued that the relationship between interest groups and 
legislatures is an important determinant in property rights legislation. Mattei 
suggests that much of the structure of property law in civil law countries is facially 
similar. Code structures are the same and provisions tend to have similar effects. 
What is different across these countries is what Mattei terms “special legislation”, 
legislation passed to supplement the code that represents that capture of the 
legislators by a particular interest group.  This suggests that the way in which 
different interests translated into legislative output is a factor in understanding the 
way in which these laws arise in different institutional contexts.  
Riker and Sened  also postulate about the role interest groups in the context 
of property rights. They suggest that one of the four conditions for the emergence of 
property rights is that the grantor of the right receives a gain in terms of tax income 
and gratitude from the grantees. The gratitude received from the grantees can be in 
the form of legislative support. In terms of the analysis above, the determination of 
                                                        
63 This article does not specifically address property rights. Rather Calabresi and Malemed present a 
framework for analyzing the choice to protect entitlements, arguing that society protects 
entitlements through one of three rules. Property rules involve an initial entitlement and the ability to 
alienate the entitlement. Liability rules involve an initial entitlement and the ability to destroy the initial 
entitlement for a objectively determined price. Inalienability rules involve an initial entitlement and a 
prohibition on transfers of that entitlement). The choice between these rules is determined by 
efficiency, distributional and other justice considerations.  
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which laws are enacted is made according to who benefits from the market 
inefficiency, and whether the group that benefits is able to influence the government 
to enact the laws favorable to it.  
An example of this postulate can be found in the history of the land laws of 
England and France. Rosenthal  contrasts property rights reform in England and pre-
revolutionary France. He argues that while both countries were confronted with 
similar problems, (in England reformers sought to enclose open fields and assign 
property rights, while in France, reformers sought to assign property rights over 
common land), in England the reforms were successful, while in France they were 
not. In England, large landowners uniformly benefited from potential enclosures 
(provided the reforms were enacted in certain ways), and used the Parliament to 
enact reforms and resist change.  
Contrarily in France, not all landowners benefited. Furthermore, in France, the 
judiciary was available as a means to resist efforts at reform. In both cases, it was the 
structure of interests, and the means by which they were able to exert pressure 
which resulted in changes (or no changes) to the land law. In the context of Sub-
Saharan Africa, Bates also argued that the complex and at times contradictory 
agricultural policies of countries in sub-Saharan Africa can be explained by the 
relationships between the government and the interest groups which were 
benefiting from the various policies. Other scholars have also emphasized the 
relationship between political power and property rights .  
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Institutional design plays a role in determining the nature of this relationship 
between interest groups, politicians and the policies and legislation produced. In 
different political systems, legislators face different political constraints, which may 
have an impact on the laws they write to grant certain benefits.  Institutional design 
affects legislation in several ways. Given this foundational element of institutional 
design, this analysis will focus on how institutional design affects the content of 
property laws.    
Presidential and Parliamentary Systems 
The posited normative consequences of presidential and parliamentary 
systems have long been the subject of debate among comparative politics scholars. 
More recently, scholars have begun to assess the policy and economic consequences 
of presidential and parliamentary systems. While only one piece of this literature 
tangentially addresses property rights, the findings of this literature still bear directly 
on the theory of how constitutional design can affect the content of property law.   
Presidential systems are those in which voters elect the president of the state 
separately from the legislature. Presidential systems are characterized by separation 
of power, less party discipline, stronger judicial oversight, more bureaucratic power. 
Unitary governments, strong party discipline, coalitions, and less judicial oversight 
and bureaucratic power characterize parliamentary systems. Specifically, how do 
these differences translate into economic policy, or differences in property right 
systems? Few have addressed the latter question, but several have addressed the 
former question.  
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There are two mechanisms through which presidential and parliamentary 
institutions may influence the number or degree of property law restrictions: through 
the provision of public policy goods or through the access they provide to interest 
groups. These two mechanisms lead to opposite hypotheses.   
Presidential and Parliamentary Systems: Public Policy Provision 
These systems can produce different types of policy. Cox and McCubbins 
(2001) argue presidential systems produce polices that are directed at private rather 
than public gain. In “The Institutional Determinants of Economic Policy Outcomes ”, 
Cox and McCubbins (2001) the authors conclude that the greater the number of 
effective vetoes, the more private regarding the policy.64  In determining the public 
or private nature of the policy, the authors examine the amount of pork attached to 
legislation.  They argue that the electoral system (candidate-centered elections) and 
campaign finance affect the demand for pork.  The constitutional separation of 
powers and the decentralization of the legislature (committees) affect the ability of 
legislators to supply pork. 
An extension of this theory is that of Shugart and Haggard (2001). They argue 
that additional structural features of the presidency can influence the policy making 
process.  The more veto powers a president has (reactive powers in their 
terminology), the more difficult it will be to change policy (policy will be more 
resolute). Contrarily the more decree authority a president has (proactive powers in 
their terminology), the less of a credible commitment there will be to policies (policy 
                                                        
64 Cox and McCubbins, 28 
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will be more decisive).  Extending this argument, Weymouth (2011) argues that the 
more veto players in a system, the better the property rights. Here, Weymouth 
defines property rights as rights in the value of domestic currency, and argues that 
the presence of veto players inhibit the ability of the country to enact policies which 
decline the value of the currency.  In his analysis, he measures veto players in such a 
way as to account for electoral rules, party discipline, party affiliations and electoral 
competitiveness.65   
Other scholars have argued that parliamentary systems generally are related 
to good governance, and higher levels of growth.  Persson (2005) demonstrates that 
parliamentary systems tend to be associated with long-run economic growth.  
Gerring, Thacker and Moreno (2009) found that parliamentary systems are 
associated with measures of economic development and good governance. 
Contrarily, Lijphart (1999) found a negative but statistically insignificant relationship 
between consensus democracy and economic growth.66 If property rights are indeed 
associated with higher levels of growth, as much of the economic literature suggests, 
then this suggests a correlation between parliamentary systems and property rights. 
Presidential and Parliamentary Systems: Interest Groups 
An alternative mechanism through which these institutions may be significant 
is the manner in which they shape interest groups. As Vlaicu  observes “the 
distribution of power among institutions with decision-making authority determines 
                                                        
65 Weymouth, 219-220. 
66 He did find some relationships between consensus democracies and lower inflation and lower 
unemployment, but the differences between consensus and majoritarian democracies in this regard 
were slight.  
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the targets of interest group influence-seeking activities as well as the success of 
their strategies.”67 In parliamentary systems, although parties can form around 
specific interests and these interests can then participate in the government through 
coalitions, the opportunity to have specific interests dominate the political process is 
lessened by the need for compromise and building coalitions. For example, Lijpart  
argues that consensus democracy is more conducive to interest group compromise 
than the Westminister model. A more recent study by Vlaicu  concurs with this 
analysis. Vlaicu compared the role of pressure groups in the UK and the US and found 
that pressure groups have less influence in the UK due to the concentration of 
agenda-setting powers and stronger party cohesion. Bennedsen and Feldman  arrive 
at a similar conclusion, but through a different mechanism. They find that the vote of 
confidence procedure found in parliamentary systems reduces lobbying by interest 
groups. Using a formal model, they show that where the time horizon is long, the 
vote of confidence procedure reduces the incentives interest groups to lobby 
because it induces party discipline and the willingness of the agenda setter to alter 
the winning coalitions.  
In presidential systems, political parties by necessity must have broader bases 
in order to win.  However, interest groups still have the opportunity to influence the 
legislative process through lobbying. Because party discipline in presidential systems 
is not as strong, there is more of an incentive for legislators to heed the lobbying of 
different groups. Furthermore, in presidential systems there are more access points 
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to the legislative process, more means by which to influence the process.  As Gerrng 
et. al.  states, “A separate powers system is generally thought to encourage the 
formation of a highly fragmented, non-party aligned (“independent”) interest group 
community.68”  For example, the authors show that lobby groups/interest groups are 
more active in the United States, in comparison with a European style parliament 
because majority coalitions can transcend party lines.  
In short, if presidential systems create more opportunities for interest group 
influence, then we might expect to find greater restrictions in presidential systems. 
Similarly, if parliamentary systems are less prone to interest group influence, then we 
might expect to find fewer restrictions.  
H4: Presidential systems will have more restrictions on property rights than 
parliamentary systems 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have developed a theory about the relationship between the 
content of property rights, economic outcomes and politics. The first part of the 
chapter demonstrated the differing distributional consequences of different 
property rights on the owners of land, labor and capital. Owner of land benefit from 
restrictions in ownership. Owners of labor do not benefit from any land law 
restrictions, and the owners of capital benefit from all three types of restrictions. The 
second part of the chapter demonstrated that different political institutions can lead 
to different policy outcomes depending on how the institution allows interest groups 
                                                        
68Felman 1999,  Page 6 
82 
 
to capture the policy making instruments. This fact is further tempered by the legal 
family from to which a country belongs.   
In short, the potential gain from different types of laws determines group 
preferences. The influence of these groups is in part determined by institutional 
design. These combination of factors, along with the legal family of a country helps 
to determine the content of property rights legislation. The next chapter 
demonstrates how property laws influence economic outcomes. The hypotheses 




Chapter 4: A Theory of the Components of Property Rights 
and Growth 
This chapter presents a theory of how different types of property laws affect 
economic outcomes. The first part of this chapter shows how different laws affect 
economic outcomes in the short run. The second part of the chapters shows how 
different laws affect long-run growth outcomes. 
Short Run Economic Changes and Property Laws. 
The preceding chapter used a graphical analysis to show how changes in 
property laws create different incentives for economic groups. In demonstrating this 
it showed how changes in laws alter the supply and demand of land, and have 
spillover effects into other markets. This general model will be extended here to 
show the ultimate effects that changes in land laws have on production.  
Recall that if the supply of land decreases, the following analysis captures the 




Figure 10: Graphical analysis of changes in law on land, labor and capital 
Returns on capital (or investment and savings) are negatively related investment. 
That is, at high rates of interest, individuals borrow less money, and with less money, 
make fewer investments. At lower rates of interests, individuals borrow more money. 
If rates of the return on capital decrease, investment will increase. Given the 
following equation,   
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85 
 
where Y is national output or income, T is taxes, C is consumption, G is government 
spending, and I is investment, we can see that investment is directly related to 
output. Therefore, if investment increases, output increases.  This is presented 
graphically below.  
 
Figure 11: Graphical analysis of the effect of changes in law on output 
 
A decrease in the supply of land ultimately lowers output. Conversely, an increase in 
the supply of land ultimately raises output.  The full implications of this are related in 
the chart below: 
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Table 6: Summary of expected changes in law and effects on land, labor and capital  
Type of law Change in land 
market 













Increase Decrease Increase Decrease 
Use restriction  Decrease in 
demand 






Undetermined Decrease Increase Decrease 
 
In short, all such restrictions should lower output.  However, the way that these 
restrictions do so has different implications for different economically organized 
interest groups.  
Long Run Economic outcomes and Property Laws 
The Production Function 
The production function is used to model how the elements in an economy 
relate to output. In its general form, the production function is written as 
         
An often-used production function is the Cobb-Douglas production function, 
expressed as 
               
where K represents capital, AL represents the quantity of effective labor, α 
represents the contribution of capital to output and the quantity (1-α) represents the 
contribution of effective labor to output.  Further, α>0and α <1.    
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Modifying this production function can give insight into the manner in which the 
content of laws affect output.  
          
where T represents the quantity of land, and , ρ represents the contribution of land 
to output. 
The Effect of land laws 
The first part of the economic analysis examines the relationship between the 
content of laws and growth rates, using the Solow growth model.  This analysis is 
derived from Romer . He beings with the Cobb-Douglas Production function, 
modified to include a variable for land. 
  
                
(Equation 9)  
 
where K represents capital, T represents the quantity of land, AL represents the 
quantity of effective labor, α represents the contribution of capital to output, ρ 
represents the contribution of land to output and the quantity (1-α-ρ) represents the 
contribution of effective labor to output.  Further, α>0, ρ>0 and α+ρ <1.    
In addition, capital and the effectiveness of labor behave according to the 
following equations.  




meaning that the growth rate of capital,  , is a the difference between the amount 
of money invested (the rate of savings times the growth in output    ) less the 
depreciation of the previous state of capital,   .    
Further, the growth rate in technology is given by  
        
where g  is exogenous.   
Similarly, the growth in the quantity of labor is given by  
 
        
where n  is exogenous.   
Finally, Romer suggests that because the quantity of land is fixed, implying that  
      
By taking the log of both sides, the equation becomes 
                                       
By taking the derivative with respect to time 
                           
Simplifying the equations based on equation 7 above 
                     
If the economy is on a balanced growth path, it may be assumed that  
       
Therefore,  




The equation becomes: 
   
            
   
    
Finally, growth per worker is found by subtracting growth in labor (on the balanced 
path) from growth in output (on the balanced path):  
 
        
 
   
            
   
    
or 
    
           
   
  
(Equation 10)  
 
Using this model as a basis for analysis, one can derive the estimated effects of 
different types of property rights on rates of growth (or growth rates per worker).  
For example, consider that ownership laws which restrict the content of what may 
be owned, will affect T.  This may be represented as a variable c below.  
                     
(Equation 11)  
 
where c <1. 
Following the Romer analysis above, it can be seen that the result is identical to 
equation 14.   
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Restricting the content of ownership will not have an impact on growth rates.  
Similarly, logically it may be seen that restricting who may own land will not have an 
impact on growth rates because who  may own land does change over time.  This 
results in the first hypothesis: 
  H6: Restrictions on ownership will not affect rates of growth.  
Use laws act not directly on land, but rather on lands contribution to output, ρ.  This 
can be represented in the following manner with the symbol u. 
                   
 
(Equation 12)  
 
This ultimately reduces to: 
 
   
                   
   
   
or 
 
   
             
   
  (Equation 13)  
 
 
The effect of use restrictions on growth depends upon land’s contribution to output 
in a given country.  If the contribution is high, and the restrictions are high, the drag 
on growth will be high (assuming technological progress is not sufficient to 
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overcome it). If the contribution of land to output is low, the laws will have less of an 
impact.  These conclusions can be represented by the following hypothesis: 
H7: Where the contribution of land to output is high, use laws will have a 
greater negative impact on growth rates then if the contribution is low.  
Transfer laws Transfer rights, P, act as an independent element in the Solow 
model, in that the ability to transfer land from less productive forms to more 
productive forms creates economic benefits (much like technology in the model). 
This is modeled as  
                      
(Equation 14)  
 
where S represents the restrictiveness of transfer laws, w represents the 
contribution of these laws to output. And S does not change over time.  
       
This can be reduced to  
   
              
   
  
or 
    
                 
   
  
(Equation 15)  
 
Assuming this particular form of the Solow model with constant elasticity, 
restrictions on transfer have a negative impact on growth independent of other 
factors.  The impacts will be negative and greater where T (land) is larger. 
 H8: Restrictive transfer laws lower growth rates 
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In short, a modification of the Romer model predicts that ownership, use and 
transfer laws have different impacts on long-run growth. This model explains how 
different types of laws impact growth in the long run, which was the object of 
analysis in the majority of the marco-economic studies. 
Conclusion 
This chapter and its preceding chapter have presented a theory of how 
different property laws affect economic outcomes. Given that property rights have 
distributional outcomes, different rights have different effects on the owners of land, 
labor and capital. In parliamentary systems, which are more reflective of the majority 
of the populace, we might see fewer restrictions overall and consequently less short 
run and long term economic consequences. Conversely, in presidential  systems, we 
might see more restrictions, and consequently, more negative economic effects in 
the short run and long run.    
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Chapter 5: The Measurement of Property Rights 
 
This chapter will present data on the content of property law in different legal 
systems. Specifically, this chapter presents a method for comparing property law, a 
conceptual analysis of property law and data on the content of property law in 
different countries. The chapter begins with a presentation of a method of analysis of 
comparative property law.  
It has frequently been lamented by scholars in comparative law that it is a field 
without (an agreed upon) methodology. The comparison of codified law must 
answer several implied methodological questions arising from ontological 
perspectives of both comparative politics and comparative law.  The answers to 
these questions will determine the basis on which to compare countries, and 
therefore the method of selecting countries for comparison. For the present 
purposes, none of the current methods of comparative law are suitable for this the of 
analysis undertaken in this research, and offer an alternative method for comparison 
which satisfies both the ontological and methodological needs of both disciplines. 
Therefore, this section is divided into four sub-sections. The first section contains a 
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discussion of the nature of comparative law, and the major approaches within it. 
Second, this discussion will be followed by an explanation of how the methodology 
of comparative law scholars does not address the needs of a cross-national 
comparison of institutions. Third, this a discussion of the proposed method of 
selection will occur.  Fourth, an explanation of how the variables were coded will be 
presented.  The discussion begins with an overview of the four primary method of 
comparative law: functionalism, hermeneutic comparison, law and economics and 
critical legal studies.  As Brand (2007) provides a good overview of the 
methodologies, this section relies on his synopses.  
Comparative Law 
There is general agreement that functionalism is the dominant method of 
comparative law. While there is divergence among scholars writing chronologies of 
comparative law as to its fountainhead (some scholars name the father of 
comparative law as Montesquieu, while other scholars place the beginnings of 
comparative law in more contemporaneous terms), there is wide agreement on the 
basics of functionalism. Brand (2007) describes that functionalism rests upon several 
assumptions. First, the functionalist assumes laws are attempts by a country to solve 
a problem. Second, the functionalist assumes that legal systems face similar 
problems. Third, the functionalist assumes that legal systems resolve these problems 
differently (and this is thus an explanation for cross-national differences in law). 
Fourth and finally, the functionalist assumes that while countries resolve problems 
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differently, the resolutions are generally the same. Consequently, the functionalist is 
focused not on the content of law, but the effect of law.  A primary concern of the 
functionalist is neutrality, and a fear of applying a domestic lens to foreign laws. The 
methodology of the functionalist is to compare the laws of given countries as they 
solve a particular societal problem.   
An alternative approach is Legrand’s method of comparing cultures. This 
method advanced in the late 1990’s, views laws as embedded within and inextricable 
from a cultural context. Laws are expressions of this context and the values and 
norms that the laws represent are not always translatable. The object of comparison 
is to understand cultural significance and how others operate within the culture. As 
one scholar expressed, hermeneutic comparison is “a search for the cultural, moral 
and linguistic relativism of law.”70  
A somewhat related approach is that of the critical legal studies. According to 
Brand (2007), there are several steps to the comparative legal methodology.  First, 
one must understand the results of removing a problem or set of facts from the 
social to the legal context.  Second, one must then analyze the structure and the 
process of legal decision-making (i.e., the political dimension). Finally, one analyzes 
what aspects of the social-cultural dimension (from the first step) were lost by 
placing the problem in a legal context. The result of this process is an understanding 
(and comparison) of the political and power distribution effects of law.   
                                                        
70 Brand 2007, p 429 
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At the other end of the spectrum, one could place the law and economic 
approach. Brand (2007)  also describes three steps in the methodology. The first is to 
hypothesize about an efficient legal system. The next step is to compare existing 
legal the existing legal rules to the hypothesized efficient system. Finally, the ultimate 
step is to outline policy changes that would lead toward the more efficient set of 
rules.  
A last method of comparative law is called “concepts comparisons”, created 
by Brand (2007).  This method advocates comparison of legal concepts. The first step 
in this analysis is creation of the concept. The second step is to compare the concept 
across legal systems, and the final step is to explain the similarities and differences, 
taking into account historical, political and functional analysis.  
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Table 7: A synopsis of comparative law methodologies71 
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For the purposes of this research, none of the above methods are suitable. 
The linchpin of my theory is that countries differ in the amount and type of 
restrictions they place on property (land) rights, and that it is this variation that 
explains the different observed economic growth trajectories. Therefore, testing this 
                                                        
71 This chart is derived largely from Brand (2007) 
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theory requires an analysis of the content of property laws in different countries, and 
specifically observing the degree to which the content of those laws is in fact 
different. In addition, it requires an analysis of the content of laws in order to observe 
the degree to which different types of restrictive laws induce different types of 
economic behavior.   
Functionalism, therefore, is inappropriate because the unit of comparison is a 
legal problem, rather than the law itself. Furthermore, the assumption of the 
functionalist, that countries resolve legal problems in similar ways, is the very 
concept that this dissertation is testing.  While law and economics begins with the 
law as the basic unit of analysis, the basis for judgment is efficiency. Determining 
which legal rule are the most efficient is not the object of inquiry.  In addition, while 
the second part of this analysis is understanding the effect of political institutions on 
law, hermeneutic comparison and critical legal studies seem to conflate the law and 
the political or societal institutions. The overarching problem with most of these 
methods (with the exception of law and economics) is that their concerns, normative 
values or purpose can cloud the purpose of the study. Consequently, the methods 
are unsuitable for any inquiry outside of those with the same normative approach or 
purpose.   
Rather than adopting one of the tradition methods of comparative law, this 
chapter offers an alternative derived from the concepts comparison and the law and 
economics perspective. Because this dissertation defines property rights from a 
positivist perspective, that is relying on rights as how states define them in their laws, 
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like the law and economics approach, it will use substantive law. From the basis of 
the laws basis of the laws of the various countries, I developed a “concept” for 
various types of laws.  That is, following the concept comparison method, I first 
surveyed the laws and then used the law to develop a construct of a specific type of 
right. I then used this construct as a means of evaluating the substantive law. Finally, 
returning to the law and economics approach, I analyze the law in terms of a desired 




The countries in the data set were limited to states.72 The selected legal 
taxonomy is based on JuriGlobe, the University of Ottawa’s classification of legal 
systems.73 Based on its legal system, a country is assigned to one of the following five 
categories: common law, civil law, customary law, Islamic law, and mixed. Countries 
can have a mix of two or all four types of laws.74 It should also be noted that there is 
only one country, Andorra, with a purely customary system of law. In addition, only 
three countries, Afghanistan, Maldives and Saudi Arabia were classified as having 
                                                        
72 My operational definition of statehood was a sovereign territory; a country for which no other 
country could claim ownership.  
 
73 One of the objectives of JuriGlobe is to provide free information on legal systems and classifications 
via the internet. The project is based on consultation with a substantial number of well-known 
monographs in comparative law, expertise of various scholars and feedback from users of the site. 




purely Islamic systems of law.  Accordingly, in the JuriGlobe classification, all countries 
fall into one of the following 15 categories.  
While ideally future work could consist of a database for all states, for the 
present, a sample of countries is used. The sample  size was 68 countries. The 
selection of countries was intended to insure that the sample had the greatest 
possible variation in the explanatory variable, content of laws. I wanted to capture as 
much as possible from those categories with mixed legal systems, since the mixes are 
likely to yield very different types of legal systems depending on the strength of the 
traditions represented and their various influences on property law. The sampling 
distribution is presented in the table below.   






Sample  Percentage 
of Sample 
Common Law 22 .11 10 .15 
Civil Law 77 .40 28 .41 
Custom 1 .00 0 0 
Muslim 3 .02 1 .01 
Civil/Common 12 .06 4 .06 
Civil/Custom 25 .13 3 .04 
Custom/Common 15 .08 11 .16 
Civil/Muslim 11 .06 1 .01 
Common/Muslim 4 .02 1 .01 
Civil/Custom/Common 5 .03 3 .04 
Civil/Custom/Muslim 7 .04 2 .03 
Common/Custom/Muslim 6 .03 2 .03 
Civil/Common/Jewish/Muslim 1 .00 1 .01 
Common/Civil/Muslim/Custo
m 4 
.02 1 .01 
Muslim/Custom 1 .00 0 0 




Creation of the law variables 
Within the content of the law itself, I focused on legal statutes and provisions 
that pertained to the categories of ownership, use, transferability, mortgage and 
registration.  Based on a pilot study conducted earlier, I developed a coding sheet, 
which asked specific questions about the content of the laws. The procedure was to 
gather and read the relevant laws for each country. Then using the coding sheet, I 
answered questions about the laws. I then converted the answers to the questions 
into an excel spreadsheet. As most of the questions were designed to have “yes” or 
“no” responses, the spreadsheet contained binary data. After entering the coding 
sheets into the excel spreadsheet, I further converted the data in the manner 
described below. 
The Ownership Variable 
Ownership, in the quotidian language as well as in the argot of most legal 
scholarship, conveys absolute dominion and control over an object. To own 
something is to exert physical control over all aspects of the object, its use, its 
disposition.75  This concept of ownership is presented in legal codes around the 
world. For example, the Land Code of Lithuania states “Ownership of land means the 
owner’s right to hold, use and dispose of the land possessed by him.”76 It is most 
notably represented in the codes of civil law countries. For example, in Greek law a 
real right is defined as “a right securing over a thing a direct (immediate) power that 
                                                        
75 It is interesting to note that control derives from the Latin contra meaning “against”. Control over 
things is exercised against the world. 
 
76 Article 3 
102 
 
can be invoked against all persons.”77 The quintessential and oft quoted example of 
an absolute concept of ownership presented in a law is found in the French Civil 
Code. “Property is the right of enjoying and disposing of things in the most absolute 
manner, provided they are not used in a way prohibited by the laws or statutes.”78 
The image that this concept conveys with regard to land ownership is one of an 
aerarian solitary figure, living in a habitation that is surrounded by endless tracts of 
land, rolling hills and sylvan scenery. In such a setting, a person can indeed exercise 
control over his possessions.  He can physically manipulate, use, dispose of and 
destroy any thing he possesses. Yet, when the image is supplemented by even one 
more figure, living nearby, the concept of ownership is untenable. The two figures 
cannot exercise such control over their possessions. The first figure’s desire to mark 
the onset of autumn with a celebratory conflagration of his endless tracts of land, 
may produce a significant amount of smoke, and interfere with the second figure’s 
desire to use his land as an apiary.  
The concept of ownership expressed by the laws reflects the reality more 
than the idyllic image.   My theory, as described earlier, aims at addressing the 
realistic relationship between property law, political institutions and economic 
outcomes 
                                                        
77 Karibali-Tsiptsiou 2012, p 59 
 





Ownership is about power (over a thing). At the same time, laws about ownership 
are about access to that power.  Thus, this data set asks the following questions 
about laws on ownership. 
No Ownership and Restrictions on Amount  
a. Does the law expressly state that all land is owned by the State, and if yes, 
can citizens own immovables on the land? 
b. Does the law restrict the amount of land that can be owned by an individual?  
These questions address questions of what may be owned.  
Of the 68 countries in the data set, 11 had prohibitions on land ownership: 
China, Eritrea, Kiribati, North Korea, Lao, Lesotho, Tanzania, Tonga, Vanuatu, Vietnam 
and Zambia.  Within the confines of this seemingly simplistic question there were 
remarkable differences between these counties in how they expressed the 
prohibition on ownership.  China’s revolutionary new land law, mimics these concept 
of ownership in common law countries in that the State (or the Crown in common 
wealth countries) claims ownership of most of the land occupied by individuals. 
Individuals can, however, own rights to use and occupy land. Further, they can sell 
and mortgage these rights. Similarly, in Eritrea, article 3.1 of Land Proclamation 
58/1994 states that “In Eritrea, land is owned by the State.” Individuals may possess 
usufruct rights over land, granted by the government.  
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In states such as North Korea, Lao, Tanzania and Vietnam, the prohibition on 
land ownership is expressed in the form of statements about land being vested in the 
entire community. For example, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea the land 
belongs to the State and to cooperative organizations.  “All land in the country is the 
commons property of the people’, and cannot be sold, bought or appropriated.”79 
In a somewhat different fashion, Lesotho, Vanuatu and Zambia prohibit the concept 
of Western-style ownership in favour of customary law (although in some cases 
individual ownership is permitted under customary law). Finally, the island nation of 
Tonga retains a feudal structure to property. All land is owned by the King, the king 
distributes land to individuals of a certain class, who then distribute land to others. 
Simple correlation analysis shows that there is almost no correlation between a 
prohibition on ownership and growth.  For this sample, the correlation is .0613.   
Countries within this category also vary in whether or not they give land away to be 
used, or require those using land to pay for the use of land. For example, Lao and 
Zambia citizens lease land from the state. Similarly, in Eritrea there are three types of 
land tenure outside of state owned land: agricultural usufruct, tiesa (roughly, a 
residential property) and leasehold. On agricultural usufruct, a tax is to be paid, and 
leasehold is subject to an annual rent.80 In addition, countries vary in whether or not 
the state grants land for use on a long term or short term basis.  For example, in Lao, 
                                                        
79 Article 9 
 
80 Legal Notice 13/1997, article 4 
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citizens may lease land from the State for a maximum of 30 years.81 In Eritrea, 
leaseholds are granted for 10 to 50 years depending on the use and other factors.82 
Amount 
Fourteen countries in the sample restricted the amount of land that may be 
owned (or used if the country has a no ownership policy): Bhutan, Egypt, Eritrea, 
Indonesia, North Korea, Lao, Mongolia, Nepal, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, 
Thailand, and Tonga. Some countries restrict the amount of some types of land that 
may be owned rather than all. For example, Denmark had very specific restrictions on 
persons acquiring agricultural land in excess of 30 hectares. Such individuals could 
only be EU members, and could not have owned other agricultural land in any other 
EU state (including Denmark). In addition, he must reside on and farm the land within 
six months of purchase and possess the requisite agricultural training.83  
The laws of three countries restricted land without specifying how much land 
may be owned. Several countries restrict the amount of land that could be 
owned/used on the basis of the type of intended use. For example, in Lao, individuals 
or families can obtain anywhere from 1 to 15 hectares depending on whether or not 
they intend to cultivate rice, grow industrial crops, plant fruit trees, or graze 
livestock.84 Similarly, in the Philippines the determining factors for the quantity of 
land are soil fertility, the terrain of the land, the type of crop intended to be grown, 
                                                        
81 Article 13, Land Law 
82 Articles 2-3 
83 Property in Europe, 73. While these restrictions may in effect restrict the amount of agricultural land 
held, it is not a strict prohibition on the ownership or use of an excess amount of land as found in 
other countries. Therefore, I did not code this as a restriction on amount. 
84 Article 17, Land Law 
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and the infrastructure.85 Sri Lanka and Mongolia, also have restrictions depending on 
the use made of the land. Nepal specifies a maximum amount based upon the 
location of the land.86  
The laws of Bhutan specify both a minimum and maximum land holding 
units.87 Both the laws of Indonesia and Tanzania discuss restrictions on amount 
without specifying the limit. For example, Law number 5 of 1960 of Indonesia states 
“In order not to harm the public interest, excessive ownership and control of land are 
not permitted.”88 Similarly, the Land Act of Tanzania states “21. (1) The Minister shall 
make regulations prescribed under section 179 of this Act providing for an area of 
land of occupancy or derivative right or in any way otherwise disposed of to any 
person or body corporate. (2) The regulations made under the provision of section 
179 and subsection (1) of this section shall provide for consultation in determining 
land ceilings under this Section.” In addition, two provisions in the Legal Notice 
No.31/1997 of Eritrea state “To prevent allocation of land to holders with sole aim of 
holding land idle, the size of land to be allocated shall be proportionate to the 
planned aim.”89 Further, “Land to be allocated for every right holder shall, to the 
extent possible, have standard size  through out the nation.”90 
                                                        
85 “Philippines”, in  International Encyclopedia of Laws: Property and Trust, page 123 
86 Land Law, article 7(1) 
87 Land Law, Ka 5.5  and Ka 5.6 
88 Article 7 
89 Article 6 
90 Article 9 
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In Tonga, the Land Law, article 7 does not specify any usage but according to Farran 
2013, the purpose was to permit the allocation of sufficient amounts of residential 
and farm land to all male citizens. 
Restrictions by immutable characteristics (gender and 
ethnicity) 
The next set of questions was aimed at ascertaining whether or not land ownership 
or usage was contingent upon some immutable characteristic of the person seeking 
land. 
c. Does the law restrict ownership by gender? 
d. Does the law restrict ownership by ethnicity? 
Only a small number of countries restricted ownership by ethnicity or gender, 
and most were Pacific Island nations. The laws of Vanuatu restricted ownership by 
ethnicity. Both the constitution and the land laws distinguish between indigenous 
citizens and non-indigenous citizens, restricting land ownership to the former. 
Similarly, in the Solomon Islands, lands are restricted to Solomon Islanders, and 
Solomon Islanders means “… means a person born in Solomon Islands who has two 
grand-parents who were members of a group, tribe or line indigenous to Solomon 
Islands;”91 Tonga was the only nation with gender restrictions. 92  The one nation 
outside of the Pacific Islands that restricted by ethnicity was Liberia.  The constitution 
                                                        
91 Land and Titles Act, article 2 
92 Land Act, article 7 
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of Liberia specifies that land owners must be of citizens, and that with some 
exceptions, citizens must be of Negro ancestry.93   
Citizenship 
The next set of questions inquired into the nature of restrictions on ownership or 
use of land by citizenship of the potential land holder.  
e. Does the law restrict the ownership/use of all land to citizens? 
f. Does the law restrict the ownership/use to citizens and some designated 
foreign persons? 
Citizenship was the most common restriction in the sample of countries. Over 
one third of the 68 countries restricted all land ownership/use to citizens, while only 
six restricted the ownership/use of some land to citizens, the remainder had no 
restrictions. Most of the countries that restricted only some of the land to citizens 
placed these restrictions on the ownership of agricultural land. This was the case with 
Albania, Egypt, Eritrea, and Estonia.94  In Iceland, the restrictions were placed around 
geothermal and hydrothermal rights.95 Kenya, the remaining country which restricted 
only some of its land to citizens, has agricultural land in “land controls areas”. 
Transactions in these areas are highly regulated and in general, disposal of such land 
to non-citizens is prohibited.96  
In some cases, countries restricted laws to their own citizens and the citizens of 
a select number of other countries. While this was frequent in the European Union, it 
                                                        
93 Articles 22, 27, see also http://usaidlandtenure.net/usaidltprproducts/country-profiles/liberia/country-
profile-liberia#Land_Liberia  
94 See (laws) 
95 See “the Act on Foreign Investment in Business Enterprises No. 34/1991 
96 See Land Control Act, sections 6, 9 
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did occur in other places. In Egypt for example, Laws No. 15 of 1963 and 143 of 1981 
banned alien ownership of agricultural and desert land, which might have been 
coded as a limiting land ownership to citizens only.97 However, these restrictions 
were amended to permit a small number of outside groups to own land. For 
example, Law No. 15 of 1963 also made an exception for Palestinians. Law No. 35 
of1971 also exempted foreign charities and the Holy Roman Synod. Law No. 143 of 
1981 permitted citizens of Arab countries to own desert land.98  There were only small 
correlations between these two variables and growth. Restricting land to all citizens 
was correlated with growth at .1640, while restricting some land to citizens was 
correlated at -.0808. 
Foreign Ownership 
These questions were intended to ascertain the nature of restrictions on foreign 
land ownership. These are not the same as the questions above restricting all or 
some land to citizens, for in many countries, although foreign persons could own 
land, they must seek approval before doing so.  
g. Does the law require foreign persons to obtain permission before acquiring 
any land?  
h. Does the law require foreign persons to obtain permission before acquiring 
some land? 
                                                        
97 Presuming, of course, that land is comprised of only desert and agricultural land.  
98 Provided they obtain the requisite approval of the government in Egypt and that their countries 
have reciprocal agreements for Egyptian citizens.  
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Seventeen countries in the sample required aliens to seek permission from the 
government before owning any land in the country.  The level of development of 
these countries was mixed. Six were developed democracies (Austria, Cyprus, 
Iceland, Ireland, Spain and Switzerland), and in these countries there were special 
exceptions for other EU-member citizens. The remaining countries varied in terms of 
geographical and economic position.99  
Some countries place additional restrictions or make exceptions for the 
ownership of land by aliens. For example, Cyprus requires permission to obtain land, 
and limits the requested quantity of land to approximately 4,000 square meters.   
Spain requires permission if the value of land exceeds a certain amount. Denmark 
and Switzerland exempt those who intend to use property as a primary place of 
residence from the need to obtain permission. 
Thirteen countries require aliens to seek permission for the ownership of 
some, but not all land. For example, Albania has several laws restricting ownership of 
certain types of land by foreigners. Law no. 8337 of 1998 forbids foreign ownership 
of agriculture land, pasture land, forest land or meadows. In addition, Law no. 7980 
of 1995 forbids foreign ownership of construction land unless the value of the 
construction on the land exceeds three times the purchase price of the land. Greece 
prohibits the acquisition of land by foreigners in border or high security areas, unless 
the foreigner is an EU citizen. In this case the EU citizen must seek permission first. In 
                                                        
99 Antigua and Barbuda, Brunei, Eritrea, Bahamas, Belize, Lao, Lithuania, Mongolia, Poland, Samoa, 
Tanzania and Zambia 
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Singapore, a foreigner wishes to purchase residential property, must obtain 
permission first.   
The correlation between average GDP growth (over 10 years) and requiring 
permission for ownership of all land is  .1093. The correlation between average GDP 
growth and requiring permission for ownership of some land is 1650. If the two 
categories of foreign permission are combined, the correlation between the new 
category, representing the requirement for foreigners to obtain any permission 
before owning land and average GDP growth is -0.0137. 
Restrictions on what may be owned 
These questions were intended to capture an intrusion on what would 
otherwise be a private space. All states reserve land for the public. For example, 
some states simply reserve certain spaces as public, while others go further and cross 
the boundaries of what would otherwise be private property.  Thus, most states 
expressly reserve as public space land for roads, utilities, national monuments, and 
similar public items. Other states establish an assumption of public land, unless an 
individual takes steps to signal that it is not.  
The scope of this work would not permit an extensive analysis into all the 
variations of public intrusion on what might be private space. Therefore, I focused my 
analysis on resources, on the basis that public intrusion onto private land for 
economic resources might signal a greater willingness of the state to intrude upon 
private land. Thus, the coding sheet contained the following questions:  
112 
 
1. Does the State claim ownership of all mineral resources on a person’s 
property? 
2. Does the State claim ownership of some mineral resources on a person’s 
property? 
3. Does the State claim ownership of all water that might otherwise be part of a 
person’s land?  
4. Does the State claim ownership of all water that might otherwise be part of a 
person’s land? 
A majority of the 68 states in the sample claimed control over all mineral 
resources found on a person’s land, only 7 states claimed control of some mineral 
resources. list Twenty-seven states claimed ownership of all water that may be on a 
person’s land. Sixteen claimed ownership of only some types of water on a person’s 
land..  The correlations were slight. “Minerals some” was correlated with average 
growth at -.0506. “Minerals all” was correlated with average growth at .1160. “Water 
some” was correlated with average growth at  -.0725, and “water all” was correlated 
with growth at “.1366”. Overall the correlations of the variables in the ownership 
category with GDP growth were not strong.  
The Use Variable 
The category of use restrictions was at once the most complicated, most time 
consuming and yet most interesting of the categories. One of the sources of the 
complication was the broadness of the types of laws that could affect use of land. 
Use laws can include laws whereby the state prohibits an individual from using his 
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land in certain ways in general, laws which restrict an individual’s use of land for 
specific public purposes (urban development, zoning and environmental 
regulations), laws in which the state attempts to resolve potential conflict between 
owners of adjacent plots of land (neighbor and nuisance laws), or laws in which the 
state attempts to regulate the ways in which the owner of land binds himself in a 
private agreement with another regarding the use of his land (usufruct, lease, 
landlord and tenant laws, easements, servitudes, covenants and profits). The most 
advantageous way to conceptualize use laws to think about the overall purpose. 
All use laws are about regulating competing uses of property and how the 
legal system decides who should prevail when such conflict occurs. That is, if as 
Barzel (1997) argued, laws imperfectly and incompletely define property rights, and 
consequently there is some aspect of property available for capture, use laws are 
about managing externalities. More precisely, use laws are about managing conflict 
over who captures the benefit or pays the cost of those externalities. Therefore more 
than any other types of property laws, use laws express the Coasian concept of 
property as managing conflict. The conflict can be between individual owners with 
two adjacent pieces of land, or the conflict can be between the individual and the 
state.  
Like ownership restrictions, use restrictions can also be neatly captured in two 
dimensions. The first dimension includes those restrictions that are imposed by the 
state for the benefit of the public. The second dimension includes those restrictions 
on how two (or more) private individuals regulate their own usage. 
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Those restrictions that are imposed by the state for the benefit of the public include 
public moral exhortations, public health and welfare statements, specified usage 
laws, minimum and maximum size restrictions, rent restrictions, and maximum and 
minimum lease (or other) duration restrictions.100 
Restrictions on use of land 
Because of the complications of the concept, the questions in my dataset were 
kept relatively simple.101 My dataset contained the following questions on land use. 
1. Does the country have a specified unit use for all land? 
2. Does the country have a specified unit use for some land? 
3. Does the country divide the land into general use categories?  
These questions are intended to capture information about the degree to which 
the state exerts control over how one may use land. For example, some states have 
very specific restrictions, labeled “specified unit use” in my terminology. These 
                                                        
100 This category would also include environmental regulations and development and planning laws. 
Development and planning and zoning laws are intended to control the spatial location of different 
types of land use. In many countries, these types of laws and regulations are left to the lower levels of 
government. Because of the magnitude of delving into such regulations, and because of language and 
access barriers, development and planning and zoning laws were not captured in this dataset. 
However, in a few cases, there is a national zoning plan specified in the content of the land laws. 
Where there was this type of specification, it was captured under the rubric “zoning.”  
 
Environmental laws are intended to restrict land use to activities which produce a tolerable 
level of impact on the environment. A significant number of countries had environmental regulations 
in place, and the degree of restrictiveness varied. For example, some activities which could pose a risk 
of environmental harm could be prohibited outright, while others were “allowed” so long as the 
consequences of the materialized risk are borne by the actor in the form of penalties. The variation of 
environmental regulations is significant. Further, intuitively, the variation in environmental laws would 
seem to be most influenced by interest groups, and thus these laws seem ripe for a political economy 
analysis. However, as with the development and planning laws, due to time, access and language 
barriers, I was not able to code these types of laws.  
 
101 The original dataset contained a much more extensive list of questions on land use. However, I 
discovered that time limitations prevented me from completing the more detailed data collection in 
the use category.  
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restrictions require individuals undertake certain actions with their land, if they are 
the owners or primary users. Only seven states, Bhutan, Brunei, Guyana, Indonesia, 
Sri Lanka, Tonga,  and Vietnam, had specified unit use laws for all land. Most of these 
restrictions pertain to cultivating land, and range from the general to the specific. For 
example, In Bhutan and Indonesia, the requirement is that land must be cultivated.  
Similarly, in Sri Lanka, land must be cultivated. However the law adds an additional 
requirement that it must be cultivated with the type of  crops, livestock and fish that 
lead to “…the efficient management and better cultivation of agricultural land, as 
are best suited for the land, having regard to the extent and the situation and the 
natural resources of the land, in accordance with standards of cultivation as are 
hereinafter provided by this Act or any regulation made thereunder, with a view to 
improving the productivity and maintaining efficient standards of production both as 
to quantity and quality of the produce.”  
Similarly, in Brunei, all registered land must be used for agricultural purposes, and 
in addition, there is a minimum number of crops that must be grown.102 In Guyana, 
land must “beneficially occupied”.  In Tonga, the most restrictive regulations are 
imposed. The law states that within one year of acquiring land, the owner must have 
growing “200 coconut trees planted in rows and so arranged that the trees are 9 
metres apart or 4.5 metres apart in rows 18 metres distant from each other.” In 
addition, the grounds must be kept clean and reasonable free of weeds.  In Guyana, 
                                                        
102 Land used for residential purposes requires a permit 
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the exception to the requirement of cultivation, the law states only that the land 
must be “beneficially occupied.”     
Twelve countries had “specified use” requirements over some, rather than all of 
the land.  In Antigua and Barbuda, the restriction pertains only to non-citizens, who 
must “develop” their land. In Armenia, there are numerous restrictions over the use 
of agricultural land. Most of the requirements express the idea that the land must be 
cultivated in such a way as to meet certain standards of “earth engineering” or 
protection. In Ghana, according to the Farmland Protection Act, some of one’s land is 
required to be used as farmland, lest the land be taken by the state. In Kenya, certain 
land deemed to be “land control zones” are subject to use requirements.  In Lao, 
citizens are required to “make use of the land according to state socio-economic 
development plans”, and to avoid damage to the soil and the environment. In Spain, 
the only developed democracy to fall into this category, owners of agrarian land 
must obtain the “best yield” for their land. Finally, in Zambia, owners of agricultural 
land must “beneficially hold” the land. “Beneficially holding” land is defined to 
include the practice of good methods of husbandry, care and maintenance of land, 
and cultivation as specified by an agricultural Board. The correlation with GDP growth 
of specifying use for all land is .0097, for specifying use for some land is .2591, and for 
the combined category, .0877. 
Finally the last set of use category questions was intended to capture prohibitions 
on non-use.  
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4. Does the country prohibit non-use of land such that the land will be taken by 
the state if the land is not used? 
5. Does the country have adverse possession laws, if so, for how long is the 
period of adverse  
There are two types of non-use categories. In the first, land is taken by the state, 
and becomes state property. In the second, land is acquired by another private 
property, and remains private property.  Seventeen countries have requirements that 
land be used lest it be taken by the state, and 40 countries had adverse possession 
laws.   
The time limitations for use or non-use (in the case of adverse possession) varied. 
In general, government non-use laws had shorter periods of time for use of land, 
ranging from several months to 5 years. Most of the countries that had these types 
of laws required use of land in less than 1 year from when it was obtained. Contrarily, 
most adverse possession laws had long periods of non-use, ranging from 10 to 30 
years. Most of the countries in the data set had adverse possession laws of 20 years. 
The correlations are slight, and somewhat counterintuitive.  State taking of land is 
with positively correlated with GDP growth at .2238. Adverse possession is negatively 
correlated with GDP growth at -.0991. 
While it might be expected, according to neo-classical theory, that restricting use 
of land would have a negative correlation with growth, all of the correlations above 
suggest that the use variable operates in a counter intuitive manner. For example, 
laws of adverse possession, which have longer periods of time for which an individual 
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must act before losing his land have negative correlations, while government taking 
laws, which have shorter periods of time, have positive correlations.  
The Transferability Variable 
Transferability laws are laws that restrict that exchange of property from one 
owner to another. These laws can include gift and exchange, inheritance, sale and 
according to some, mortgage.  
Restrictions on Transferability  
For simplicity, I focused solely on restrictions on the sale of land. All of the 
questions below are designed to capture the manner of restrictions on the sale of 
land.  
1. Does the law forbid the sale of land completely? 
2. Does the law forbid the sale of land except by permission of the government? 
3. Are there restrictions on what may be sold? 
The distribution in this section was somewhat puzzling as I was not expecting to 
find any significant number of restrictions on transferability. According to the theory 
(see Chapter 3), countries would not have restrictions on transferability.  However, 
the data reflects that this is not the case, and this confirms the findings of many of 
the case studies.  
While only one country, Tonga, forbade the sale of land, 20 countries forbade the 
sale of land except with government permission. Eight of the countries in this 
category were developed democracies. The large number of countries in this 
category was somewhat unexpected, particularly the large number of developed 
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democracies. However, this was largely the result of the manner in which one 
common provision was coded. Many civil law countries, particularly in Europe, had 
“right of refusal” provisions in their land laws. “Right of refusal” provisions require 
that owners of land (or certain types of land) who intended to sale their land offer to 
sell the land to the municipality (or other local body) first. I coded this as requirement 
to obtain government permission before selling land.  
Eight countries, Armenia, Maldives, Philippines, Spain, Sweden and Thailand, had 
provisions restricting the type of land that could be sold.103  
Limitations and Caveat 
While conceiving of ownership as restrictions in the manner described above 
seemed to be the simplest and cleanest way of approaching the laws, this conception 
still resulted in several dilemmas.  
State Ownership of Land 
It was not the goal of this dissertation to quantify the implementation of the 
law, but rather to quantify the content of the law. However, in the case of ownership 
restrictions this rule had to be amended. In the case of State ownership of land, the 
concept that this question was intended to capture was that of a State exercising 
ownership of land to the exclusion of all others. In such cases, states permit citizens 
and others to use land, not to privately own it. However, in the commonwealth, it 
                                                        
103 The Greek provision required transfers of agricultural land in excess of a certain amount to be 
approved by the Minister of Agriculture. Although this could have been coded as a restriction on 




was customary for laws to state that all land is owned by the Queen of England. Yet, 
in these countries individuals can and do exercise private ownership of land. 
Consequently, provisions like these found in commonwealth countries were largely 
ignored. Simple reliance on the content of the law as envisioned would have resulted 
in construct error in the variable creation.  
Other Legal Restrictions 
Another issue was the influence of laws not directly pertaining to land.  It is 
imagined that many countries have laws where by certain persons may not own 
property. Laws regarding mental stability or the control of minors are examples. 
However, not all countries chose to express such provisions in their land laws. 
Provisions such as these which appeared common across multiple countries, and 
which did not appear likely to impact the outcome variable, GDP, were not coded. 
While it may be likely that states have more such restrictions than are listed in their 
laws, because an attempt was made for any given country to collect all laws directly 
pertaining to land, this threat is minimal.   
Legal Family Distinctions  
There were also issues with differences between legal families. First, the 
differences between civil and common law systems were more pronounced in the 
area of property laws. For example, laws typically conceived as property laws in 
common law countries where not so in civil law countries. For example, in civil law 
countries, “leases” are classified as obligations and are found in code books under 
the law of obligations rather than property laws.  Other types of uses restrictions 
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that are seen as “rights” in common law countries are classified as “encumbrances” 
in civil law countries (examples). Further, civil law jurisdictions tend to adhere to a 
“unitary” concept of property. As such, the multiplicity of ways that use (and 
ownership) of property can be divided over time and persons in a common law 
country is foreign to the mindset of the civil law country. All of these may affect the 
construct validity of the use category. In addition, a problem with both use and 
transferability laws was that they could quickly devolve into contract law. 
Scholars have also found differences between different aspects of the 
performance of civil and common law systems.   For the purposes of the present 
analysis, the distinction between the two systems is the primary source of law.  In 
civil law systems, the primary source of law is codified law.  In common law systems, 
the primary source of law is judicial decisions of specific cases.  As a result, judges 
have different roles in common law and civil law systems.  Traditionally, it is thought 
that in common law systems, judges have more power to “legislate”, and also that 
because of this, common law systems are more flexible in response to changes in 
culture or time.  However, other distinctions have also been posited.  Hayek (1960) 
argued that common law countries were more likely to protect individual economic 
freedoms, where as civil law countries were more likely to protect programs that 
redistributed resources. Other scholars have echoed this theory (Mahoney, 2000). 
However, other scholars have suggested that that there is no necessary 
connection between common law countries and economic freedoms, and further 
that the historical association between the two concepts is a historic accident that 
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has been belied by recent history (Atiyah, 1989).  Some have tested the differences 
between common law and civil law systems and find that after controlling for a 
‘transplant effect’, the distinction between civil and common law countries has no 
effect on the effectiveness of institutions that enforce the law (Berkowitz, et. al,. 
2000).  Nevertheless, the distinction remains a persistent one in scholarly literature.  
However, the practical approach taken of quantifying the restrictions on land 
ownership, use and transferability avoided some of the problems conceptual 
differences between common and civil law systems, and further created an 
appropriate boundary to avoid moving too far afield into other areas of law. In 
addition, in order to control for the additional economic effects, each of the models 
in chapter 6 has a control for legal family. 
Federalism and Decentralization  
The second is the presence of federalism and decentralization. Policies differ 
across countries with respect to whether the national or lower levels of government 
would exert more control over land policies.104 In federal countries, it is more likely 
that this particular power would be exercised by the lower levels of government. The 
dataset has eight federal countries, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Germany, Malaysia, 
Switzerland and the United Arab Emirates. Laws obtained at the national level for 
these countries may obscure regional differences.  
                                                        
104 This problem was not limited to federal countries. Some countries, such as Spain while not a federal 
system, devolved considerable power over some land issues to local governments.  
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Chapter 6:  Empirical Analysis of the Effects of Property 
Rights on Politics and Growth  
In chapter 2, I demonstrated that one of the problems in the property rights 
literature is the weak conceptualization of property rights. The misconception of 
property rights arose because of definitional ambiguity beginning with Coase. 
Subsequent econometric analysis, which required more explicit definitions, failed to 
correct the problem. I proposed using the content of laws as a way to correct the 
misconception of property rights. Chapter 5 delineated the methodological basis for 
comparing laws, and outlined the process by which I created the dataset to be used 
in the analysis. This chapter relies on the measurement of property rights explained 
in the last chapter to conduct empirical analysis of the theories outlined in chapters 3 
and 4.  I undertake this analysis in two parts. The first part analyzes the effects of 
laws on economic growth. The second part analyzes whether political and 
institutional factors determine the type of laws. 
Part 1: The Effect of Property Rights on Economic Growth 
All of the models in this section are linear regression models estimated by 
ordinary least squares models, of the following form: 
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         , 
where  X  is a vector of regressor variables, including both the law variables as well as 
the control variables.  The data displayed in a box and whisker plot below reveal the 
problems with high leverage points that were consistently present in all of the 
models and all of the law variables.  
 
Figure 12: Box and Whisker plot of "own who" data 
In this chart, category one is “No ownership” 2 is a combined category of 
citizen and gender/ethnicity restrictions, 3 is “some foreign” 4 is “foreign permit all” 
5 is “foreign permit some” and 6 represents no restrictions.  The plot shows skew for 
several of the variables. Most noticeably, this skew is present in the “some foreign” 
variable, represented as the third plot and the “foreign permit all” variable, 
represented by the fourth plot.  Additionally, as is also evident from the plot, some of 
the data displayed lower variance than others. The range of average growth rates for 
countries with “some foreign” (plot 3) and “no restrictions” (plot 6) was much 
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were exerting considerable influence over the regression line, such that their removal 
or inclusion from the analyses resulted in substantial changes in the outcomes. For 
example, Eritrea was one such country. While it displayed less restrictiveness in some 
of its laws, its average growth rate was considerably lower than countries with 
similar laws. Finally, the analysis did reveal heteroskedasticity.  
These problems were addressed in two ways. First, to address the problem of  
highly influential points, where appropriate, some of the models were run without 
those points. Second, to address the problem of heteroskedasticity, all of the models 
were run using Huber-White sandwich estimates of standard errors. All of the models 
presented below are OLS models with robust standard error estimates.  
The main variables used in each of the regression models were the law 
variables described in chapter 5, as well as the log of GDP 2000, literacy, as a proxy 
for human capital, and rule of law. For a description of the variables, please see 
appendix 4. 
“OWN WHO” 
The first models, presented in table 1 below, estimate the effects of restricting 
ownership of land to certain classes of persons on GDP growth.  All of the 
explanatory variables in this model are categorical variables, save one, and 
comprehensive of the types of restrictions on persons.105  The reference category 
represents no restrictions on ownership by class of person. Recall from chapter 5, my 
theory predicted that ownership restrictions would not have an effect on long-run 
                                                        
105 For further explanation of the categories and the manner in which I coded the data, please refer back to chapter 5.  
126 
 
growth. Thus, in the models below, if neither the ownership variables nor the 
reference category is significant, then the model provides strong support for my 
theory.  
Column 1 summarizes the results of the variables regressed on GDP growth 
per capita, averaged over ten years. The results suggest that some restrictions on 
persons do have an effect on GDP growth. Having no restrictions on person is 
represented by the reference category. This suggests that if a country has no 
restrictions, and that country has the mean value of initial GDP, literacy, rule of law, 
land use and is not a civil law country, then the average growth of that country is 10% 
higher. This coefficient estimate may be inflated due to the presence of skew in the 
data.  Countries that require permits before foreign nationals can obtain some types 
of land are associated with a 1 % increase in average growth over those that have no 
restrictions on ownership. None of the other categories of restrictions on person 
were significant. The customary variable was also significant, suggesting that the 
presence of customary land decreases as compared to the reference category 
growth.  
The log of GDP in the year 2000, the year beginning the period of observation 
is significant, supporting traditional economic growth models. In addition, the 
literacy variable, representing human capital is also significant, and also in line with 
traditional economic growth models.  The rule of law variable was not significant, 
supporting some research suggesting that in many models, the significance of this 
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variable is contingent upon the selection of countries. Additionally, the control for 
civil law was also not significant.  
Of note is the direction of the variables. Citizen Plus, Foreign Permit All and 
Foreign Permit Some are all positive. The common element in these categories is 
control. Countries with laws in these categories are able to assert more nuanced 
control over who may own land than those which have a blanket prohibition on land 
ownership. In addtition, these categories also represent more control over who may 
own land than those which restrict land to some foreign, as this is often the topic of 
treaty.  
It should also be noted that the model in column 1 was run without the 
inclusion of both Eritrea and China. Both countries were highly influential cases, and 
their growth rates were unusual for countries of similar laws. Eritrea has an unusually 
low growth rate. Conversely, China has a higher than expected growth rate.  The 
probability value on the F-test of joint significance on this model was .1195. While this 
is not significant, it is just barely insignificant at the 10% level and could be attributed 
to the low N.  
Columns 2, 3 and 4 attempt to disaggregate the effects of restrictions on 
ownership. Growth models are plagued by indeterminacy.  As some scholars observe, 
the collective scholarship on economic growth has found more predictors than 
countries. The result is that it is impossible to ascertain what predictors are truly 
significant in the presence of all of the others.  One way that this research attempts 
to address this indeterminacy is by examining the impact of the law variables on the 
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components of growth. If the significance of the laws can be found in one of the 
components of growth, this may help to mitigate the indeterminacy. Because the 
Solow growth model maintains that growth is derived from changes in labor, capital 
accumulation and total factor productivity overtime, these models analyze the 
impact of the restrictions on ownership on these components of growth.  
Column 2 shows the results of a regression of the variables on the log of labor 
growth per capita, averaged over ten years.  The constant term, representing no 
restrictions on person is not significant, which would support hypotheses six, that 
ownership laws will not have an effect on growth, presented in chapter 4.  The 
probability value on the F-test of joint significance on this model was .63. 
Column 3 shows the results of a regression of the variables on the log of fixed 
capital as a percentage of GDP. The reference category, representing no restrictions, 
is weakly significant at the 10% level. Countries that restrict land ownership to citizens 
are associated .3% greater growth in the log of fixed capital than those with no 
restrictions.  The probability value on the F-test of joint significance on this model 
was .09, suggesting that the coefficients on these variables are significantly different 
from zero.  
Finally, column 4 shows the results of a regression of the variables on total 
factor productivity (TFP). The low N on this model makes inferences unreliable, but 
the results are suggestive of directions for further research.  The significance of the 
variables in the model mirrors that of the Fixed Capital model (column 3) and the 
Average Growth Model (column 1). That is, like the Fixed Capital model, having no 
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ownership is associated with an average growth rate that is higher than that of the 
reference category. Similarly, like the Average Growth model, having a law which 
requires foreign nationals to obtain permits before obtaining some types of land is 
significant, as is the reference category itself. This suggests, though does not in any 
way confirms, that the primary mechanism through which having these laws have an 
impact is through TFP.  The probability value on the F-test of joint significance on this 
model was .07, suggesting that the coefficients on these variables are significantly 
different from zero. However, given the low N this is hardly reliable.  
Table 9: Models Regressing Own Who Categories on GDP Growth, log of Labor Growth, log of Capital Growth 
and TFP  (in order of restrictiveness) 








     
No ownership -1.006 -0.0226 0.0183 0.971 
 (0.636) (0.0228) (0.118) (0.786) 
Citizen plus 0.630 0.0111 0.255** 1.344* 
 (0.459) (0.0151) (0.0900) (0.547) 
Some Foreign  -0.225 0.0104 0.00941 -0.416 
 (0.490) (0.0139) (0.0704) (0.345) 
Foreign Permit All  0.481 0.0105 -0.0190 -1.032 
 (0.476) (0.0154) (0.0872) (0.618) 
Foreign Permit Some 1.163* 3.49e-05 0.0323 0.616+ 
 (0.533) (0.0136) (0.0793) (0.335) 
Log of time -0.305 -0.00758 -0.0192 0.129 
 (0.245) (0.00879) (0.0341) (0.236) 
Custom -1.545** -0.0353* 0.0120 -1.973** 
 (0.500) (0.0162) (0.105) (0.471) 
Log of GDP 2000 -1.454** 0.0207* 0.0205 -0.820* 
 (0.261) (0.00993) (0.0490) (0.351) 
Literacy 5.468** -0.0527 0.839* 2.123 
 (1.959) (0.0673) (0.399) (3.546) 
Rule of Law 0.657 -0.0198 -0.169* 0.758* 
 (0.443) (0.0135) (0.0740) (0.355) 
Civil  0.520 -0.0253 -0.0176 -1.055+ 
 (0.550) (0.0206) (0.0731) (0.574) 
Constant 9.964** -0.0664 -0.858+ 5.639** 
 (2.095) (0.0678) (0.431) (1.848) 
     
Observations 65 63 62 47 
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R-squared 0.606 0.295 0.376 0.567 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
“OWN WHAT” 
Table 2 presents the results of the regression of “own what” variable 
categories on the dependent variables.  Recall again from chapter 4 that my theory 
predicted that ownership restrictions would have no effect on economic growth. 
Strong support would be that neither the law variables nor the constant term, 
representing no restrictions would be significant.  
The results presented in table 2 show weak support for my hypothesis. 
Column 1 shows that most of the law variables measured are not significant However, 
the “mineral all” variable, representing the state restricting ownership of all minerals 
found on private property is significant, and negative. The results suggest that states 
which prevent the ownership of all minerals on land are associated with 1.3% less 
growth of  GDP per capita than the reference category. Contrarily, the constant term, 
representing no restrictions on land ownership is positive and significant. However, 
as with the models in table 1, this coefficient may be inflated due to the skew of some 
of the variables.  The probability value on the F-test of joint significance on this model 
was .05, suggesting that the coefficients on these variables are significantly different 
from zero. 
The other variables behave in a manner similar to the model presented in 
column 1 of table 1.  Both the customary land indicator and the log of time are 
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negative and significant. Similarly, the log of GDP 2000 is negative and significant and 
the coefficient on the literacy variable is positive and significant.  None of the 
variables are significant predictors of growth in labor or fixed capital as a percentage 
of GDP. However, the “mineral all” variable is a significant and negative predictor or 
total factor productivity, though as in the model from table 1, this is suggestive rather 
than conclusive due to the low N. The probability value on the F-test of joint 
significance on this model was .22, suggesting that the coefficients on these variables 
are not significantly different from zero. 
Table 10: Models Regressing Own What Categories on GDP Growth, log of Labor Growth, log of Capital Growth 
and TFP  (in order of restrictiveness) 








     
Water All -0.391 -0.0125 -0.103 -0.108 
 (0.524) (0.0214) (0.124) (0.669) 
Water Some -0.500 0.00870 -0.0308 -0.333 
 (0.481) (0.0124) (0.0956) (0.538) 
Mineral All -1.269* 0.00674 0.0863 -1.153* 
 (0.510) (0.0150) (0.0962) (0.517) 
Mineral Some -0.0140 0.00533 0.0711 -0.317 
 (0.542) (0.0157) (0.105) (0.500) 
Log of Time -0.810** -0.00461 -0.0133 -0.284 
 (0.293) (0.00896) (0.0420) (0.231) 
Customary -2.157** -0.0277+ 0.125 -1.570+ 
 (0.555) (0.0153) (0.135) (0.854) 
Log of GDP 2000 -1.127** 0.0183+ -0.0301 -0.829+ 
 (0.268) (0.00931) (0.0626) (0.416) 
Literacy  5.392* -0.0667 0.523 1.849 
 (2.453) (0.0607) (0.455) (3.837) 
Rule of Law -0.304 -0.0130 -0.161 0.251 
 (0.464) (0.0135) (0.0995) (0.495) 
Civil  -0.410 -0.0210 0.0765 -0.977 
 (0.602) (0.0212) (0.102) (0.689) 
Constant 11.45** -0.0460 -0.141 8.479** 
 (2.435) (0.0650) (0.500) (1.945) 
     
Observations 64 64 64 47 




Standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
“USE” 
The theory presented in chapter 4 predicted that restrictions on the use of 
land would be associated with a decrease in GDP growth per capita. Thus, it is 
expected that all of the coefficients on the use variables will be negative and 
significant. Weak support of the hypothesis would exist if the constant term, 
representing no such restrictions, was positive and significant. The results provide 
weak support for my theory.   
In column 1 below, two of the use variables are negative, though not 
significant. The constant term was positive and significant, providing weak support 
for the theory advanced in chapter 4. The coefficient suggests that, controlling for 
other factors in the model,  having no use restrictions is associated with a 12% 
increase in the growth of GDP per capita, though the coefficient may be inflated due 
to skew of some of the variables. The variable “Gov Non-use”, a law whereby the 
government will divest an owner of his land after a period of non-use of that land, is 
positive and significant at the 10% level. The coefficient on this variable suggest that a 
country that has this type of law will have a .9% higher average growth rate than a 
country with no use restrictions. This could suggest that a more nuanced theory is 
needed than that presented in the preceding chatpers, as some types of use 
restrictions may be beneficial to growth. It might also be an artifact of the theory of 
convergence. If countries with lower levels of initial GDP will grow faster and 
converge with more developed countries than laws associated with those countries 
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might also be associated with higher levels of growth. Many of the countries with 
this type of law in place are also countries with the lowest levels of initial GDP.   The 
probability value on the F-test of joint significance on this model was .12. 
In column 3, two of the two of the law variables are negative and significant 
predictors of growth in the log of fixed capital. “Unit Use All”, representing a law 
that contains specifications about how all plots of land are to be used, is significant at 
the 10% level. This variable is also strongly significant in column 4, though again, the 
model in column 4 is only suggestive. “Unit Use Some”, representing a law 
containing specification about how some types of land are to be used, is significant at 
the 5% level.  “Government Non-Use” is a positive predictor of growth in the log of 
fixed capital, and is significant at the 1% level. The coefficient on the reference 
category, representing no restrictions, is not significant. The probability value on the 
F-test of joint significance on the models in columns 3 and 4 were .004 and .01 
respectively.  
Table 11: Models Regressing Use Categories on GDP Growth, Log of Labor, Log of Fixed Capital and TFP  
(variables presented in order of restrictiveness) 








     
Amount -0.721 -0.00975 -0.0351 -0.594 
 (0.481) (0.0161) (0.125) (0.764) 
Unit Use All -0.647 0.00252 -0.171+ -3.029** 
 (0.586) (0.0181) (0.0922) (0.851) 
Unit Use Some 0.0190 -0.000548 -0.197* -0.448 
 (0.436) (0.0182) (0.0973) (0.550) 
Gov Non-use 0.869+ -0.00425 0.271** 0.683 
 (0.453) (0.0155) (0.0803) (0.713) 
Log of time -0.440* -0.00423 -0.0285 0.190 
 (0.173) (0.00547) (0.0366) (0.195) 
Customary Land -1.425** -0.0456** 0.0563 -2.390** 
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 (0.521) (0.0131) (0.129) (0.739) 
Log of GDP 2000 -1.235** 0.0149+ -0.0271 -1.478** 
 (0.267) (0.00828) (0.0736) (0.310) 
Literacy 7.802** -0.0362 0.500 7.399+ 
 (1.447) (0.0536) (0.309) (3.691) 
Rule of Law 0.301 -0.0161 -0.153 0.802* 
 (0.358) (0.0108) (0.0989) (0.331) 
Civil 0.268 -0.0148 0.0562 -1.205+ 
 (0.377) (0.0103) (0.0841) (0.646) 
Constant 6.991** -0.0379 -0.0695 6.809** 
 (2.048) (0.0600) (0.511) (2.008) 
     
Observations 60 60 62 45 
R-squared 0.674 0.354 0.421 0.622 
 
 “SALE” 
The table below presents a regression of sale variables on different growth 
outcomes. In chapter 4, I hypothesized that restrictions on sale would decrease 
growth. Strong support for this theory would be negative and significant law 
variables. Weak support would be a positive and significant constant term. The 
results of the model provide weak support for my hypothesis.  
The constant term in the regression of the variables on GDP growth per capita 
(column 1) is significant and positive. Controlling for initial growth, literacy, rule of 
law, customary land, and civil law, countries that have no restrictions are associated 
with 7% higher growth rate of average GDP per capita. Additionally, the coefficient on 
the variable “sale with permit” is negative and significant. This suggests that 
countries which permit sale of land only with permission of the government are 
associated with a .73% lower GDP growth per capita than countries with no 
restrictions. The coefficient on the variable “other sale” is positive and significant. 
This category represents a mixture of other, more stringent restrictions on sale. The 
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results suggest that countries in this group are associated with a .8%  higher GDP 
growth per capita than countries with no restrictions .  The sale variables are not 
significant for the labor or capital models. With the exception of the reference 
category, the variables that were significant in the average growth model are similar 
in significance and magnitude in the TFP model. This suggests that the mechanism 
through which these variables are affecting growth could be through TFP.  The 
probability value on the F-test of joint significance on the models in columns 1 and 4 
were .05 and .004 respectively. 
Table 12: Models Regressing Sale Categories on GDP Growth, Log of Labor, Log of Fixed Capital and TFP 








     
Sale with Permit  -0.726* -0.000615 -0.0147 -0.659* 
 (0.305) (0.0146) (0.0657) (0.298) 
What Sold  0.162 0.00649 0.0201 0.455 
 (0.491) (0.0260) (0.107) (0.549) 
Other Sale 0.791+ 0.0191 -0.0358 0.814+ 
 (0.458) (0.0213) (0.100) (0.441) 
Log of time -0.462** -0.00455 -0.0224 -0.228 
 (0.163) (0.00734) (0.0354) (0.215) 
Customary Land -1.481** -0.0274+ 0.0413 -2.032** 
 (0.445) (0.0155) (0.115) (0.325) 
Log of GDP 2000 -1.189** 0.0216* -0.0184 -1.111** 
 (0.239) (0.0101) (0.0668) (0.305) 
Literacy 7.541** -0.0385 0.162 0.412 
 (1.766) (0.0602) (0.435) (2.576) 
Rule of Law 0.348 -0.0154 -0.180+ 0.917** 
 (0.401) (0.0139) (0.0988) (0.303) 
Civil 0.140 -0.0262 0.0771 -0.744 
 (0.441) (0.0220) (0.0967) (0.488) 
Constant 7.092** -0.0963 0.179 10.72** 
 (1.829) (0.0701) (0.409) (1.032) 
     
Observations 61 60 63 44 
R-squared 0.666 0.265 0.331 0.701 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




In order to check the robustness of the results, I ran regression using 
alternate measures of both dependent and control variables.  These alternate models 
relied on alternative measures of GDP growth, namely using the geomean of growth 
rather than the average growth over time, as well as using growth calculated from 
the PENN world tables. In addition, I used models in which the dependent variables 
were growth averaged over 5 years, and growth averaged over 15 years. In addition, 
for control variables, I used alternative measures of human capital. That is rather than 
using literacy, I used primary and secondary enrollment in the starting years of the 
model. Rather than using the World Bank measures of rule of law, I substituted a 
measure derived from the popular ICRG database. Finally, I added several variables in 
the last models , presented in column 9 of the tables in the appendix. These variables 
were derived from the traditional growth models used by Barro, modern government 
expenditures, and a proxy for price of investments. In addition, in this model, I added 
controls for civil law systems as well as natural disasters. The results are presented in 
Appendix 4.   
Own Who  
For the “own who” model, the constant term, representing no restrictions on 
ownership, remains significant in all of the models. The coefficient on the constant 
term changes substantially in half of the models. This is a likely reflection of the skew 
of some of the variables used in the original regression model. Of note is that in three 
of the models, “no ownership” becomes significant.  Thus in these models, not 
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permitting ownership of land is associated with a 1.1-1.5% decrease in the growth of 
GDP per capita as compared to the reference category. In two of these models, 
enrollment was substituted for literacy, and in the third model, presented in column 
9, additional control variables were added. One interpretation of this is that in the 
original models, “no ownership” was capturing additional information about 
government activity in the economy that was later subsumed by the other variables.  
Additionally, “foreign permit some” becomes significant in the models in 
which enrollment was substituted for literacy, as well as the model for which the 
ICRG measure was substituted for “rule of law”. Again, this might suggest some 
degree of overlap between these variables and government regulation of some types 
of land.  
Finally, it is worth making note of the models for which the law variables are 
regressed on growth measures at 5 years and 15 years. Of particular interest is the 
dynamics between the law variables and the control for legal system. At 5 years both 
the rule of law variables and the control for legal family (the civil law variable) are 
significant. None of the individual law variables are significant. The reference 
category is significant but its coefficient is small. At 10 years, one of the law variables 
is significant, and the constant term is much greater. But both rule of law and the civil 
law control variable are no longer significant. At15 years, two of the law variables are 
significant, the constant term is smaller and the rule of law and civil control variables 
remain insignificant. One explanation for this is that for shorter periods, perhaps rule 
of law and legal family are more important to growth. That is, the strength of 
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institutions is significant. Over longer periods, the affects of law become more 
important than the institutions.   
Own What  
Similar to constant term in the “own who” models, the constant term in the 
“own who” models remains significant in all of the alternate models except one, and 
the coefficient on the constant term varies between the models. “Mineral all” 
remains negative and significant in all of the models except four: those relying on the 
PENN data, those in which the time frame of the average growth was altered and the 
model where primary school enrollment was substituted for literacy.  “Water all” is 
significant in the PENN model, and in the model where the length of time is 5 years, 
“water all”, “water some” and “water all” become significant at the 10% level.  
In the PENN model, and those models where time frame of the dependent 
variable changes, the coefficient on the log of time also diminishes noticeably in 
these models. This might suggest that the relationship between the effectiveness of 
laws on growth is parabolic. Earlier on when laws are first enacted, and they have not 
had a chance to infiltrate society, the significance of the restrictions is diminished. As 
rules become more established, their significance increases. However, perhaps 
beyond a certain time they lose their effectiveness, either because they no longer 
suit the needs of society or because people figure out ways to avoid their impact. 
Nevertheless, the changes in significance of this variable do suggest a cautionary 
interpretation of this variable in the original model is warranted.  
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In the “own who” models, there was a trade off between the significance of 
the law variables and that of the institutional controls, “rule of law” and “civil” when 
alternative time  frames were examined. That pattern is not present in the “own 
what” models. Like the “own who” models, the variable for civil law becomes 
significant in the 5 year model and insignificant in the 15 year model. However, unlike 
the “own who” models the law variables are also significant in the 5 years model, and 
the “rule of law” variable is not.    
Use 
The results of the use model appear to be robust to some alterations in the 
variables. “Government Non Use” is positive and significant in 4 of the models.  Only 
when literacy is dropped or when the time period under consideration changes does 
it become insignificant.  In three of the models, “Amount” becomes significant and in 
two “Unit Use All” is significant. The constant term, representing no use restrictions, 
is positive and significant in all models.  These results suggest that there is some 
relationship between land use restrictions and growth. 
Sale 
The sale variables are also robust to alternative models. The coefficient on the 
constant term, representing no restrictions is positive and significant across all of the 
models.  Additionally, “sale with permit” is significant and negative in all of the 
models except for those where growth is averaged over different periods.  Finally, 
“other sale” is significant in both models where enrollment is substituted for literacy 
(primary and secondary) as well is in the first model (discussed above in this chapter) 
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and the model using geomean. As for the institutional controls, these models are 
somewhat similar to the “own who” models, in that both rule of law and the control 
for the civil law legal family are significant at 5 years but not at 15.  
INTERPRETATION 
The general theory advanced by this dissertation is that different rights are 
important contributors to different types of economic outcomes, and as such, 
different rights have distributional outcomes which can help to explain cross-country 
differences in state property right institutions. Consequently, analyzing rights as 
conglomerate or worse, conflating property rights with other constructs diminishes 
our capacity to understand how property rights affect economic outcomes.  The 
specific hypotheses outlined in chapter 4 were derived mathematically from the 
Solow growth model. Namely, these hypotheses were that ownership restrictions do 
not have an effect on growth, while both restrictions on the use of land and 
restrictions on the transferability of land have a negative effect on growth.  The 
regression results of the models in general provide some support for two of the 
specific hypotheses derived from chapter 4, while collectively the results support the 
general theory that different rights are important contributors to different types of 
economic outcomes.   
The results of the “own who” models suggest that having no restrictions on 
who may own land is associated with growth of GDP per capita. However, the results 
also suggest that different types of restrictions impact capital accumulation.  For 
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example having laws restricting ownership to citizens is a significant and positive 
predictor of capital accumulation. Having laws restricting the ownership of some land 
to those foreign persons who obtain a permit are significant predictors of the 
average GDP growth per capita. The fact that “foreign permit some” is a positive and 
significant predictor while the other variables are not may suggest that a certain 
degree of control is beneficial. Having no restrictions on ownership though 
associated with growth,  may induce too much competition, while disallowing 
ownership altogether may not provide enough employment.  The in between state of 
regulating those foreigners who wish to own land in a country may provide sufficient 
employment while also providing labor with an avenue to influence the choice of 
who is permitted to own land.   
The constant term in the “own what” growth model was positive and 
significant. However, none of the “own what” variables were significant, except for 
the “mineral all” variable.  Minerals represent what might be the most valuable part 
of an individual’s land.  The significant and negative coefficient on this variable might 
suggest that where a state dispossesses a user of the most valuable part of the land, 
growth is lower than it would be without any restrictions.  The effects on labor and 
capital are not expected to be direct because most states which claim ownership of 
all minerals on land control the leasing of mines on land and provide labor to workers 
and benefits to the owners of capital in this way. Thus, the ownership of minerals 
represents a type of restriction which might uniquely harm the land owner, rather 
than other interests in society.  On the other hand, given that in the models were 
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growth was averaged over different time periods, as well as the model where 
primary education was substituted for literacy warrants further investigation.  
Overall, these results suggest that in the case of ownership restrictions, 
having no restrictions is positively associated with growth. However, in the growth 
model, the specific type of legal restriction may be irrelevant. On the other hand for 
the components of growth, the specific type of restriction is significant. This supports 
the overall theory of the dissertation that variation of rights matters in different 
ways. Further, this suggests an added layer of complexity to the effects of property 
rights. Specifically, not only do different types of rights effect growth in different 
ways, but also that different degrees of the same rights effect different sources of 
growth.  
The use models provide some support for the hypothesis outlined in chapter 4 
and for the overall theory of this dissertation. The constant term was positive, 
suggesting that having no use restrictions (at least of the type coded here) is 
associated with GDP growth. In addition, “amount” is significant and negatively 
associated with growth in several for the robust check models.   “Government non 
use” is positively associated with both growth and capital. While this may seem to 
contradict the theory, it may also suggest that having land in some sort of use is 
more beneficial than having no restrictions. Thus, countries that disinvest an owner 
of land for non-use are but place no restrictions on the type of use may experience 
higher growth. On the other hand, as discussed above, the positive and significant 
coefficient on the “government non use” variable could be attributed to the 
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correlation of this type of law with countries with lower initial levels of GDP.  
Restrictions on the how  both some types of land and all types of land are use is 
associated with lower levels of fixed capital growth than those countries with no 
restrictions.  These results suggest, again, that while restrictions in use are associated 
with lower growth, in support of the theory, different types of laws contribute to 
different components of growth.  
The sale models provide support for the hypothesis discussed in chapter 4. 
The coefficient on the constant term was positive and significant, suggesting that 
having no restrictions on sale is positively associated with growth. The “sale with 
permit” variable was negative and significant, providing further confirmation for the 
hypothesis. However, the “other sale” variable was positive and significant. This 
suggests that this peculiar class of restrictions is beneficial for growth. Unfortunately, 
the data is not rich enough to broaden the types of restrictions in this category and 
investigate which of them is positively associated with growth. This type of 
investigation, however, might provide more insight as to why this category of laws 
was contradictory to the hypothesis outlined in chapter 4.  Further, more data, 
particularly in the TFP category would be necessary to confirm which component of 
growth these variables relate. 
While the data collected here is unique and represents a significant advance in 
developing a theory of property rights, it is limited.   The models would benefit from 
the addition of more countries. This improves the coefficients as well as the standard 
errors on the variables in the models. In addition, the addition of more countries 
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would perhaps mitigate the number and influence of countries exerting leverage 
over the regression line. While the robust standard errors alleviated some of this, an 
ideal scenario would have used richer data to avoid alteration to the model in this 
way. Further the addition of more countries would enable more conclusive results to 
be drawn.106  
In addition, the models would have benefited from a finer grained analysis of 
the types of laws. Limitations of time required that only a limited number of broad 
categories of laws be used. However, the variation within these categories can be 
quite substantial. For example, the use categories only coded for specific types of 
government intervention in the use of land. However with the proliferation of 
planning and environmental regulations, this category did not capture the true 
richness of the variety of use laws. Such data, if available, would have enabled more 
conclusive results to be drawn.  
In spite of the limitations of the data however, this analysis did provide some 
support for two of the hypothesis from chapter 4, on use and sale restrictions, as 
well as support for the theory that different types of laws can affect different parts 
of the growth process.  In the next section, I conduct additional analysis to test the 
hypothesis on how interest groups influence the presence of these laws.   
                                                        
106 To address the potential problem of endogeneity, I used an instrumental variables regression. The 
results suggested either that the instruments are weak, or that the causal direction I assert is 
incorrect.  Future work would collect more data in order to parse these two possible conclusions.  
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Part Two: The Political Economy of Property Rights Laws 
Chapter 3 presented several hypotheses about the roles of interest groups in 
determining the type of laws.  The theory articulated was that because different laws 
have different distributional outcomes, different groups will have preferences over 
different laws. The owners of land, labor and capital will prefer different laws 
depending on their perceived benefit from the return on their factor of production.  
The hypotheses are repeated here: 
H1:  Owners of land will prefer ownership and eschew use restrictions 
H2: Owners of labor will eschew all three types of property right restrictions  
H3: Owner of capital will prefer restrictions in all three types of property 
rights. 
Unfortunately, data limitations prevent direct testing of these hypotheses. The 
theory and hypotheses suggest that the key variable of interest is the return on the 
factor of production. However, data on land prices, as well as wages is difficult to 
obtain. As far as the author is aware, as of the writing of this dissertation, there is no 
database containing information on land prices worldwide. Such data is 
understandably hard to generate as even within countries land prices vary 
considerably. In addition, data on wages is also difficult to obtain. The only 
organization of which the author is aware that attempts to collect such wage data is 
the ILO. However, this data did not contain a sufficient number of countries in the 
author’s data set to be of use.   
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 An alternative, and admittedly less satisfactory method of testing these 
hypotheses is to proxy the preferences for the size of the group. For example, a 
country has a large presence of laborers, then one may argue that, controlling for 
other factors, those laws predicted to be beneficial to labor will predominate. This 
method cannot establish a causal connection but rather an association or correlation. 
However, if such a correlation is established it does provide support for the 
hypotheses.  
Additionally, the theory suggested that constitutional design will also have an 
influence on the content of laws.  
H4: Presidential systems will have more restrictions on property rights than 
parliamentary systems 
Both because of the implications of theory and for practical reasons, for all of the 
models rather than regress the variables on the individual types of laws, the variables 
are regressed on aggregates of the laws. Specifically the dependent variable in all of 
the models is a sum of the types of restrictions. Because the variance on “sale sum” 
and “mortgage sum” was low, the last category is a summation of both, entitled 
“Transfer sum.”107 
The model in column 1 presents the results of the variables regressed on the 
“own sum” variable. The results suggest that presidential systems are positively 
associated with more restrictions on ownership.  In addition, population density is 
negatively associated with “own sum”. Less land per person means fewer ownership 
                                                        
107 This variable was transformed due to high skew and kurtosis. 
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restrictions. The capital variable is positive and but not significant, somewhat 
suggestive of the hypothesis that higher levels of capital are associated with more 
ownership restrictions. Generally, these results provide support for the hypotheses 
on the preferences of the owners of land, labor and capital, as well as the hypotheses 
on constitutional design. The rule of law variable is negative. This suggests that 
countries that have higher associations with the rule of law have fewer ownership 
restrictions.  The control variable for legal family, “civil” is positive though not 
significant.  
The model in column 2 presents the results of the variables regress on the 
“use sum” variable.  As in the ownership model, the “presidential” variable is 
significant. Having a presidential system is associated with higher restrictions on the 
use of land. Additionally, “capital” is positive and significant. That is, capital 
contributing a higher amount to GDP is associated with an increase in the number of 
use law restrictions. This provides further support for the hypothesis that capital 
interests favor more use restrictions.  Contrarily however, “population density” is 
significant but positive. This does not support the hypothesis that labor interests 
disfavor use laws.  
In the last model, both “capital” and “presidential” were significant and 
positive predictors of mortgage and sale restrictions.  Additionally, “population 
density” was a significant and negative predictor of these restrictions. This model 
provides support for all of the hypotheses.  
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Table 13: Models Regression Political Variables on Law Content 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Own Sum Use Sum Sqrt Transfer 
    
Presidential 0.650* 0.598* 0.322* 
 (0.259) (0.259) (0.158) 
Population Density -0.000127** 0.000157** -5.92e-05* 
 (3.89e-05) (3.65e-05) (2.23e-05) 
Capital 0.0256 0.0341* 0.0193* 
 (0.0155) (0.0159) (0.00946) 
Rule of Law -0.336** -0.287* 0.0284 
 (0.122) (0.119) (0.0817) 
Civil  0.0389 0.208 0.378* 
 (0.236) (0.255) (0.144) 
Constant 1.710** -0.364 -0.0752 
 (0.377) (0.376) (0.218) 
    
Observations 64 64 63 
R-squared 0.341 0.350 0.197 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Interpretation  
The results of the political models provide support for the hypotheses derived 
from chapter 3.  Presidential systems, or in terms of the theory, those systems in 
which interest groups are more likely to have access to law making authority, are 
associated with more restrictions on all types of laws.  Additionally, the interest 
groups in the model are associated with greater restrictions on different types of 
laws. Capital is associated with higher use restrictions and transferability restrictions. 
While labor is associated with a decrease in the number of ownership restrictions and 
transferability restrictions. However, labor was also associated with an increase in 
the number of use restrictions.  Although the data was not rich enough to test the 
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full implications of the theory, these results do provide support for the initial 
hypotheses. 
Conclusion 
This dissertation presents a detailed analysis of the relationship between 
property rights, economic growth and politics.  I theorize that contrary to the 
assumptions of much of the economic literature, property rights are not uniform 
across countries. Given that in reality (if not in legal theory) property rights represent 
a “bundle,” states can and do choose different aspects of the bundle of rights to 
enact as law.  These different pieces of the bundle have different economic results, 
and can, in part explain differences in economic growth. The pieces of the bundle 
that are chosen in a state are in part, the result of attempts by groups seeking to 
control scarce resources, and the manner in which their attempts become legitimized 
through the political process.  
Using a unique data set, described in chapter 5, this chapter presented the 
results of regressions testing hypotheses derived from this theory. The models in the 
first part of the chapter showed that different parts of the bundle of rights do affect 
growth differently. While the absence of restrictions was predictive for growth in all 
models, some types of restrictions mattered significantly while others were 
insignificant. For example, “mineral all” was negative and significant in the “own 
what” models, while some of the other law variables were not significant.  In 
addition, the robustness estimates showed that it is possible that some types of 
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restrictions may encourage growth. For example, restrictions on what may be sold 
were positively associated with growth in some of the models in the robustness 
checks.  
Finally, the attempts at disaggregating the models suggested that different 
rights may matter for different aspects of growth. Thus, for capital, restricting land 
ownership to citizens  was beneficial. If these results do suggest that different 
components of property right are important to different aspects of growth, and in 
particular growth of labor or capital, then it is easy to see how economic interest 
groups may develop preferences over them.  
The second part of this chapter provided support for the hypotheses that 
those systems with greater interest group access are associated with more 
restrictions on the each of the three components examined (ownership, use and 
transferability). Further, the data supported a hypothesis that the more prevalent are 
different groups in society, the higher the association with specific types of rights. 
Taken as a whole, this chapter has presented a more dynamic conception of property 








Chapter 7: Conclusion and future research   
This dissertation has presented a theory about the variable nature of property 
rights and its effect on politics and growth.  The introduction chapter stated the 
theory that property rights are not uniform, and can have distributional 
consequences for different groups. Because of this, different groups will advocate 
for specific components of the property rights bundle. This not only helps to explain 
the variation in the content of laws but also the variation in cross-country growth. 
The second chapter provided an overview of the literature, highlighting the 
intellectual contribution of this dissertation. It also provided a critical analysis of the 
macroeconomic literature that analyzes property rights and growth. The results of 
this examination showed that property rights in economic literature is either not well 
defined or mis-specified, and consequently most of the knowledge that we have on 
property rights and growth is about either property rights protection and growth, or 
good governance and growth. Little is still about actual property rights themselves 
and their relationship to growth.  
Chapter 2 also provided a meta analysis of the case study literature. This type 
of analysis is useful for several reasons. First, the case study literature on the effect of 
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property rights in land is substantial. Few studies attempt to analyze the literature in 
aggregate, and this chapter provided such an analysis. In doing so, the chapter 
showed how the studies, in aggregate reveal conflicting information about the 
effects of property rights on microeconomic outcomes until one begins to consider 
the content of laws. Once the content of laws is considered, and the distributional 
consequences of the laws for the owners of land, labor and capital is also considered, 
the studies appear to be less conflicting.   
Chapter 3 specified the theory of property laws, economic growth and 
political institutions. The first part of the chapter uses economic relationships and 
graphical representations to outline the manner in which property rights can have 
consequences for the owners of the different factors of production.  Incorporating 
the content of property laws into economic models is important for clearly specifying 
the logical consequences of those laws.  Following this, the chapter showed how 
political institutions through which these groups must initiate the requests for 
different rights, help to determine which rights are enacted into law.  
Chapter 4 relied on an economic model to demonstrate that different parts of 
the property rights bundle can affect output and growth.  Restrictions on ownership, 
use and sale are theorized to diminish output.  However, the components of the 
bundle contribute differently to growth. While use and sale restrictions diminish 
growth, ownership restrictions were predicted to have no effect on growth.  
Chapter 5 then presents the data used to analyze these hypotheses.  The 
chapter describes a unique dataset in which the land laws of 70 countries were 
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analyzed and coded. It draws from two comparative law methodologies and presents 
a method for empirical analysis of laws.  
Chapter 6 presents the empirical analysis of the relationships hypothesized in 
chapters three and four.  I find that the content of laws does have an effect on 
growth. The absence of restrictions is strongly correlated with growth in all models. 
These results are robust to the inclusion of other variables and measures. In addition, 
different types of laws have more of an effect on growth than others. Additionally, in 
some instances, when the data was rich enough, it was possible to see that different 
laws matter for the different components of growth, labor, capital and total factor 
productivity   
The second part of the chapter analyzes the hypotheses about the 
relationships between property laws and political institutions. The regression models 
support the theories of chapter 3. Namely, presidential systems are more likely to be 
associated with restrictions on property. In addition, different groups are associated 
with different types of restrictions.   
Implications of Theory  
This work as presented an argument as to why countries have variation on the 
content of their property rights legislation and in their economic growth outcomes.  
The owners of land, labor and capital have different interests in types of property 
rights laws. The owners of land will favor ownership and use restrictions, the owners 
of labor will not favor restrictions on ownership, use or transferability, and the 
owners of capital will favor all three types of restrictions in property rights.  
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These groups compete with each other in the political arena and their interests are 
mediated through the constitutional design of this arena.  Presidential systems, 
permit more interest group access, will experience greater restrictions in rights.  
Because of differences in the preferences of the interests groups and in 
constitutional design, countries will have differences in the content of their property 
rights legislation.  
While restrictions in all rights lead to lower output in the short run, in the long 
run, only restrictions in use and transferability are hindrances to growth.   The 
empirical portion of this dissertation has provided support for this theory, although 
more work is needed to further confirm the theory, there are several bodies of work 
to which this work contributes.  
 
Contributions  
One are this research contributes to is  political economy, specifically that 
which addresses the political economy of property rights.  As discussed in earlier 
chapters, in this literature,  property rights are identified as essential to economic 
growth (North, 1981; North and Weingast, 1989).  However, the empirical testing of 
these theories of property rights has relied upon overly broad measures. Typically, 
these studies use composite measures of “the rule of law”, and measures of 
“property rights enforcement” to capture the relationship between property rights 
and growth.  As argued earlier, such measures, while advantageous for their ability to 
aid in cross-national comparisons, are not nuanced enough to address the 
particularities of property rights protections.  Further, because of the opaqueness of 
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their methods, it is not clear what aspects of property rights they may be measuring. 
As a result of these measurement problems, these studies may not be conclusive as 
to the relationship between property rights and economic growth. This study 
proposes a more reliable method of measuring property rights, based upon the 
content of laws, and further offers a unique dataset that uses this method. 
Policy Significance  
In addition to the relevance to institutional and political economy literature, 
this project has implications for the policy arena. First, political conflict frequently 
occurs over questions of property rights. This is particularly evident in wars and inter-
ethnic conflict over land. For example, in countries such as Kenya, land remains a 
salient issue, and some believe the lack of resolution over land helped to fuel the 
recent electoral violence. In addition, the study of property rights is significant 
because conflict over property rights is costly and time consuming to resolve.  
Negotiations and peace agreements would be easier if there were a theoretical 
understanding of the different incentive structures that property rights create.  Also, 
many emerging economies are now grappling with issues of property rights. For 
countries such as these which are dually concerned with revising laws and promoting 
economic growth, the theory developed here may be particularly helpful. That is, by 
understanding the preferences that groups have over different types of rights, 
countries may be better able to mitigate conflict over rights. 
Second, developing a theory of property rights is significant because many 
policies are implemented on the basis of existing assumptions of property rights, and 
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these policies have not produced expected results. Advancing a theory of property 
rights could potentially avoid failed policies.  In addition, several scholars have 
suggested that property rights distribution have an effect on the poor (Fandino, 
1995; Flores, 2008).  Those organizations which seek to advance the interests of the 
poor would benefit from understanding how different rights might affect the poor, 
particularly if the poor are predominately laborers.  
Finally, issues of property rights are constantly emerging as new technology is 
developed.  Conflicts over property have resulted over the internet, music, 
pharmaceuticals, and other intellectual property.  With the furtherance of 
explorations into space, one can only imagine that the final frontier will only be a new 
domain over which potential issues of property rights will emerge.  Understanding 
the economic and political consequences of rights distribution will be a new and 
emerging problem which this work may help to resolve.  
Unexpected Findings  
This study has revealed several unexpected findings, which though tangential 
to the issue of property rights and economic outcomes, are nevertheless worth 
noting.  The first of these findings is a possible relationship between the importance 
between the institutions such as rule of law and the importance of the content of 
laws. In several of the models presented in chapter 6, where the rule of law variable 
was significant the variables representing the content of law were not significant, 
and vice versa. Where the variables representing the content of law were significant, 
the rule of law variable was not.  Though these results are not conclusive, as they 
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were not the object of this study, this does suggest that there may be an inverse 
relationship between the importance of enforcement institutions and the content of 
the law itself in some circumstances.  
An additional unexpected finding was the relationship between customary 
law and economic growth. In almost all models, the customary law variable was 
negative and significant.  One possible explanation for this is that the presence of an 
area of customary law is authoritative may detract land and labor resources from the 
state. Further research is needed to explore this relationship.  
A further unexpected finding was the relationship between time a law was in 
operation and economic growth. In many of the models, time was negative and 
significant.  However, in some of the models where the length of time of the 
outcome variable was altered to 5 years or 15 years, time was not significant. This 
may suggest a parabolic relationship between time and economic growth.  When 
laws are first enacted, time is not significant; however, when laws have been enacted 
for an extended period of time, they begin to exert a small and negative impact on 
growth. However, beyond a certain time, the time of the law is insignificant.  As with 
the other unexpected findings, this needs further evaluation and analysis.  
Finally, an unexpected finding was that in many cases the variable 
representing legal type was insignificant. This addresses the debate referenced 
earlier in this dissertation about which type of legal system is better, common or civil 
law. Perhaps the answer is that the system is irrelevant if the content of law is taken 
into account. Further work is needed to explore the implications of this finding.  
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Future Research  
The limitations of the data suggest avenues for future research. Because the  
dataset only contained 70 observations, and was subject to influential  points, it was 
difficult to draw clear inferences about the results of the models. Future research 
would involve not only additional observations, but also a finer grained analysis of 
the types of rights.  For example, the use variables were necessarily broad, given the 
time limitations. However, expanding this variable to capture the wide array of use 
restrictions that countries place on land ownership, including zoning and 
environmental regulations would greatly advance this work.   
In addition, expanding the time period under observation and creating a time 
series- cross sectional dataset would greatly increase the explanatory power of the 
data. Additionally, future work would consider judicial interpretations of the law, 
particularly in common law countries, as well as regulations and executive orders in 
other countries,  in order to further assess how the law in all of its forms impacts 
economic outcomes. However, in spite of these limitations, the models gave 
credence to the theory developed in this dissertation. Not only does the content of 
laws matter, but it matters in a variety of ways which could enhance our 
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54. Solomon Islands 
55. South Africa 
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Table of Laws Used and Legislative History 
Title of Law 
Agricultural Lands Act of 1960 (CAP 187)108 
Description 
This act regulates the control of “state lands”, those land formerly designated for European settlement, 
for the purposes of commercial farming.  It establishes and regulations the governance of an 
agricultural board, and provides for the alienation, and conditions of use of agricultural land.  
Amendments and Statutory History 
By acts 42 of 1963 and 13 of 1994 
                                                        
108 Note that Roth 1995 has this listed as chapter 292 where as the on-line resource http://www.saflii.org, has 
the chapter as 187. 
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By Government Notice 227 of 1964 
And by Statutory Instrument 65 of 1965 
Title of Law 
The Land (Conversion of Titles) Act of 1975  
Description 
This act vests all land in the president, and converts all freehold land into leasehold. It also regulates 
the alienation, leasing and use of this land. According to Roth, 1995, this act applies to land not 
“scheduled” under the Agricultural Land Act.  
“As Bruce and Donner (1982) suggest, there is no logical basis for this distinction between ‘scheduled’ 
and ‘unscheduled’ State Land, and consolidations is advised.” (16)  
Amendments and Statutory History 
REPEALED BY the Land Act 1995 
Title of Law 
The Lands Act (1995) (CAP 187)  
Description 
This act vests all land in the President, and provides for its use and administration. Additionally, it 
repeals The Land (Conversion of Titles) Act of 1975, as well as the Zambia (State Land and Reserves) 
orders 1928 to 1964, governing Reserve and Trust land.  
Amendments and Statutory History 
By Act 20 of 1996 
Title of Law 
The Water Act 1949/2006 (CAP 198)  
Description 
Regulates the  use and control of water  
Amendments and Statutory History 
By Acts 5 of 1950, 39 of 1950, 14 of 1955, 19 of 1959, 69 of 1965, 47 of 1970, 13 of 1994 
And by Government Notices 277 of 1964 and 497 of 1964 
And by Statutory Instrument 55 of 1964 
Title of Law 
Mines and Minerals Act 1995 (CAP 213)  
Description 
Regulates the control of mines and minerals  
Amendments and Statutory History 
Acts 41 of 1996, 1 of 1997, 8 of 1997, 8 of 1998, 5 of 1999, 2 of 2000, 5 of 2003, 4 of 2006 
Title of Law 
Lands and Deeds Registry Act 1914/1994 (CAP 185) 
Description 
Regulates the registration of titles  
Amendments and Statutory History 
By acts 1 of 1925, 5 of 1926, 7 of 1937, 5 of 1943, 53 of 1950, 50 of 1951m 17 of 1954, 20 of 1957, 31 
of 1958, 25 of 1959, 9 of 1967, 46 of 1969 and 47 of 1970 
By Government Notice 274 of 1964 
By Statutory Instrument 65 of 1965 





1. Roth, Michael, ed. (1995) Land Tenure, Land Markets and Institutional Transformation in 
Zambia.  LTC Research Paper 124 
2. Adams, Martin (2003) Land tenure policy and practice in Zambia: issues relating to the 
development of the agricultural sector. Draft. 
http://aec.msu.edu/fs2/zambia/resources/Land1.pdf 
3. Von Loenen, Bastiaan (1999) Land Tenure in Zambia.  
 
Location of Laws 
The South African Legal Information Institute (SALII) 
(http://www.saflii.org/zm/legis/consol_act/)  contains copies of The Lands Act, 1995, and the 
Agricultural Lands Act 1960.  When last accessed (April 24, 2012), the database was last 




Relevant Legal History 
Property law in Zambia is a mixture of treaty remnants, customary law and English common 
law. In the 1880s and 1890s, the British South Africa Company (BSAC) made treaties with 
various chiefs in Zambia. In exchange for mineral rights, the company guaranteed rights of 
Africans to areas of tribal land. These treaties gave the company administrative control over the 
various territories. Different treaties for an area in Zambia known as Barotseland gave it 
territory special protection. For example, in 1899, the Barotseland North-Western Rhodesia 
Order in Council of 1899 designated special areas for the litanga people in exchange for mining 
and trading rights in their territory.   
In 1900 the North-Eastern Rhodesia Order in Council was enacted, and gave the BSAC control 
over the north eastern part of the territory.  In 1911, under the 1911 Northern Rhodesia 
Proclamation Act of August 17, 1911, the existing two territories were consolidated, and control 
over the administration of the territory was given to the BSAC, subject to British authority. The 
1911 Order in Council also required the BSAC to give African sufficient land for use. 1924, the 
BSAC relinquished control of the territory to the British government in exchange for mineral 
rights.   
In 1928 the Northern Rhodesia Order in Council reserved areas of land for white settlement 
(Crown land), governed by English law, and areas for African settlement, governed by 
customary law. Between 1926 and 1928, the government forcibly resettled African populations 
from the Crown lands onto the African reserves.  
Due to overcrowding on the African reserves and undersettlement of crown lands, the policy 
was reversed in 1947. The 1947 Order in Council re-scaled the amount reserved for white 
settlers and transferred approximately 100 million acres (57% of the land in the country) into 
African reserves, calling the new African reserves “Trust Lands.” Unlike the African reserves, the 
new trust lands could be leased to non-Zambians. However, like the Reserves, the Trust land 
was subject to customary law.  Until 1995, both the Trust and Reserve lands were governed by 
the Zambia (State Land and Reserves) Orders 1928 to 1964.  
“Under these orders, the land was set apart for the sole and exclusive use of the 
indigenous peoples of Zambia, although the President could make grants of land to 
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Zambians and rural councils for periods up to 99 years. Under the Zambia (Trust Land) 
Orders 1947 to 1964, which was also repealed by the Lands Act of 1995, the President 
could grant a right of occupancy of up to 99 years to a non- Zambian and demand rent 
for the use of the land. While Zambians and District Councils could own title, non-
Zambians were also allowed to do so provided that they qualified as investors or were 
approved by the President, who normally made such grants in the form of leasehold. 
Either by oversight or design, the laws governing the granting of Reserve and Trust Land 
by the President (in effect the Commissioner of Lands) were not repealed by the Land 
(Conversion of Titles) Act 1975. The practical effect was that land matters in Reserves 
and Trust Lands continued to be interpreted in the light of the Orders of the colonial 
government.” (Adams, 7) 
By 1944, in Crown lands, the colonial government reversed the policy of granting freeholds in 
Crown lands, and granted long-term leaseholds to new settlers instead. However, the Colonial 
government enacted the Land Ordinance of 1956, which permitted settlers to upgrade to 
freeholds if they used the land satisfactorily.  
Zambia attained independence in 1964. By this time, there were 5 different types of land, under 
four different administration schemes. These types were leasehold crown land and freehold 
crown land were governed by English common law and the administrative laws of the territory, 
African Reserves and Trust land were both governed by customary and administrative law, with 
different rules applying to the lands, finally, Barotseland, was governed by a different set of 
regulations due to the 1899 order in council.109 
Adams (2003) describes the post-independence land politics of Zambia. The United National 
Independence Party (UNIP) adopted a socialist platform with visions of a classless society, 
viewing land as the property of the people. Individual rights exited only in the right to use land.  
Land was not to be alienated or use for private commercial gain.  Thus, after the UNIP became 
the sole party in a one-party state, it enacted the Land (Conversion of Titles) Act of 1975. The 
Act established that all land is vested in the President on behalf of the people. All freeholds are 
converted into leaseholds. While the 1995 Lands Act repealed the Land (Conversions of Titles) 
Act of 1975, much of the effect of the law remains unchanged.   
 
Coding Sheet & Interpretation Notes 
OWNERSHIP RIGHTS AND RESTRICTIONS 
RESTRICTIONS ON AMOUNT & WHO 
5. Does the law specify that all land is owned by the state (coded as no ownership in the 
database)? 
a. YES  
i. See Land Act, 1995, article (3) 
1. “3. (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any 
other law, instrument or document, but subject to this Act, all 
land in Zambia shall vest absolutely in the President and shall be 
                                                        
109 While the 1964 Barotseland Agreement, as well as the Constitution of 1964 recognized the control of the 




held by him in perpetuity for and on behalf of the people of 
Zambia. (2) Subject to subsection (4) and to any other law, the 
President may alienate land vested in him to any Zambian. (3) 
Subject to any other provisions and procedures relating to 
alienation of land, the President may alienate land to a non-
Zambian under the following circumstances:…” 
b. CODED AS “1” 
i. Although this suggests that the President may alienate land, the use of 
the word “alienate” does not imply a loss of control. Section 6 of the law 
indicates that alienation means lease. 
1. “(6) The President shall not alienate any land under subsection (2) 
or (3) for a term exceeding ninety-nine years unless…” 
ii. But see Agricultural Lands Act 
1. 25. (1) A lessee whose lease was granted by virtue of paragraph 
(b) of subsection (1) of section twelve shall be entitled to obtain 
an option to purchase his holding where all the following 
conditions have been fulfilled: Option to purchase a holding (a) 
not less than seven years have elapsed since the date of 
commencement of his lease; (b) all the provisions of this Act 
which are applicable to him and all the terms and conditions of his 
lease have been complied with; (c) permanent improvements 
valued by the Board at not less than K20,000 have been effected 
on his holding: Provided that, where the holding is less than 1,000 
acres in extent, the minimum value of the permanent 
improvements for the purposes of this paragraph shall be K10,000 
or such amount as bears the same proportion to K20,000 as the 
hectareage of the holding bears to 1,000, whichever is the 
greater. 
c. If not, is there is a state leasing scheme? 
i. YES, CODED AS 1 
 
ii. What is the longest time limit of the lease permitted?  
1. 99 years 
a. See Lands Act,1995, Section 3(5) 
i. “(5) All land in Zambia shall, subject to this Act, or 
any other law be administered and controlled by 
the President for the use or common benefit, direct 
or indirect, of the people of Zambia. (6) The 
President shall not alienate any land under 
subsection (2) or (3) for a term exceeding ninety-
nine years unless(a) the President considers it 
necessary in the national interest or in the 
fulfilment of any obligations of the Republic; and 
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(b) it is approved by a two- thirds majority of the 
members of the National Assembly.” 
 
6. If ownership is allowed, are there restrictions on the amount of property that may be 
owned?  
NO, CODED AS “0” (ownership not permitted) 
 
a. If yes, what is the size allowed? 
i. N/A 
 
7. For ownership or use, are there restrictions by gender? 
a. NO, CODED AS “0” 
 
8. For ownership or use, are there restrictions by ethnicity? 
a. NO, CODED AS “0” 
 
9. For ownership or use, are there restrictions by residency? 
a. NO, CODED AS “0” 
 
10. For ownership or use, are there restrictions by citizenship? 
a. NO, CODED AS “0” 
 
11. Are there exceptions to citizenship by the ethnicity or country of origin of the intended 
owner? 
a. NO, CODED AS “0” 
 
12. Must foreigners obtain permission from the government before acquiring ownership or 
use? 
a. YES 
i. See Lands Act, 1995, section 3(3) 
1. “(3) Subject to any other provisions and procedures relating to 
alienation of land, the President may alienate land to a non-
Zambian under the following circumstances: (a) where the non-
Zambian is a permanent resident in the Republic of Zambia; (b) 
where the non-Zambian is an investor within the meaning of the 
Investment Act or any other law relating to the promotion of 
investment in Zambia;  (c) where the non-Zambian has obtained 
the President's consent in writing under his hand; (d) where the 
non-Zambian is a company registered under the Companies Act, 
and less than twenty-five per centum of the issued shares are 
owned by non-Zambians; (e) where the non-Zambian is a 
statutory corporation created by an Act of Parliament; (f) where 
the non-Zambian is a co-operative society registered under the 
Co-operative Societies Act and less than twenty-five per centum 
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of the members are non-Zambians; (g) where the non-Zambian is 
a body registered under the Land (Perpetual Succession) Act and 
is a non-profit making, charitable, religious, educational or 
philanthropic organization or institution which is registered and is 
approved by the Minister for the purposes of this section; (h) 
where the interest or right in question arises out of a lease, sub-
lease, or under-lease, for a period not exceeding five years, or a 
tenancy agreement; (i) where the interest or right in land is being 
inherited upon death or is being transferred under a right of 
survivorship or by operation of law; (j) where the non-Zambian is 
a Commercial Bank registered under the Companies Act and the 
Banking and Financial Services Act; or (k) where the non-Zambian 
is granted a concession or right under the National Parks and 
Wildlife Act” 
a. Note: As all of the provisions except (h) and (i) require 
some form of registration or consent by the government, 
this is coded as F Permission All.  
 
b. Is this for all land or some land? (if some, list type of land) 
i. ALL 
 
13. Restrictions on businesses (also corporations, entities, etc)? 
a. YES, CODED AS BUSINESS ALL 
i. See above notes for question 8 
 
14. Other restrictions of note? 
a. No 
 
RESTRICTIONS ON WHAT 
1. Does the State recognize customary land? 
a. YES, CODED AS 1 
 
b. If yes, what is the percent of land in the country that is customary?  
1. 93% 
1. See Adams , page 4 
a. “18. While Zambia covers a total landmass of 75 m ha 
State Land comprises only 4.5 m ha (6%), and Customary 
Land comprises the rest (93.9%) (formerly consisting of 
Reserve Land, 27.2 m ha, 36.2%, and Trust Land, 43.3 m 
ha, 57.7%). See Table 1” 19. The area of each category 
tends to vary as records in the Land and Deeds Registry are 
said to be in some disarray (e.g. piecemeal conversion of 
Customary Land to State Land by way of leasehold since ca 
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1985 does not seem to have been taken into account in 
the 1993 data).”  
 
 
2. Does the State claim ownership of valuable resources on a person’s property (such as 
minerals, etc.)? 
a. Yes  
1. See Mines and Minerals Ct 1995/2006 
1. 3. (1) All rights of ownership in, searching for, and mining and 
disposing of, minerals are hereby vested in the President on 
behalf of the Republic. (2) The provisions of this section have 
effect notwithstanding any right, title or interest which any 
person may possess in or over the soil in, on or under which 
minerals are found 
2. CODED AS “1” MINERALS ALL 
 
3. Does the law claim ownership of natural bodies of water, or similar, such as shorelines, 
rivers, etc. that might otherwise be part of a person’s land?  
a. Yes  
1. See  article 5 Water Act, 1949/2006 
1. ‘5. The ownership of all water is vested in the President. The use, 
diversion and apportionment of all water shall be made in terms 
of this Act: Ownership of all water vested in President Provided 
that a landowner shall have the right to take free of charge such 
private water occurring on his land as he may need for his own 
primary secondary or tertiary use.” 
 
4. Other restrictions of note? 
a. NO 
 
USE RIGHTS & RESTRICTIONS 
RESTRICTIONS FOR PUBLIC BENEFIT 
5. Does the law have a specified unit use (defined as restrictions on how a person’s land 
must be used aside from zoning and general requirements- these may include required 
agricultural yields, technology usage, etc.)? 
a. Yes, for agricultural land 
1. See Agricultural Lands Act, article 21 
1. “21. (1) Every lessee shall take up effective personal residence on 
his holding within six months after the date of commencement of 
his lease, or within such longer period as may be approved by the 
Board, and shall beneficially occupy his holding. (2) Beneficial 
occupation in respect of any holding shall mean- (a) from the date 
of taking up effective personal residence as required by 
subsection (1)- (i) in the case of an individual lessee, personal 
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residence on the holding, and in the case of a company, personal 
residence on the holding by a manager who is in charge of 
farming operations and who is approved for that purpose by the 
Board; (ii) the practice of sound methods of good husbandry; (iii) 
the proper care and maintenance of all improvements effected on 
the holding; (b) before the expiration of a period of three years 
after the date of the lessee taking up effective personal residence 
as required by subsection (1)- (i) the annual cultivation of such 
proportion of the area of the holding as may be laid down by the 
Board; (ii) the maintenance of stock as laid down by the Board; 
(iii) the provision for the numbers of stock maintained under the 
provisions of subparagraph (ii) of dipping or stock spraying 
facilities, paddock fencing or ring fencing and water supplies, in 
each case considered adequate by the Board; (iv) the provision of 
a habitable house and such farm buildings as may be reasonably 
necessary for the purposes of the proper working of the holding; 
(v) the provision of permanent improvements, whether required 
by or under the preceding provisions of this section or not, valued 
by the Board at not less than such sum as may have been lai down 
by the Board.” 
2. See also, article 23  
a. “23. (1) A lessee shall have the right to cut down and use 
such indigenous trees on his holding as he may from time 
to time require for his own farming and domestic 
purposes, but he shall not be entitled, except with the 
prior written approval of the President, to sell or remove 
any timber from the holding.  (2) Any lessee who sells or 
removes any timber in contravention of the provisions of 
subsection (1) shall be guilty of an offence and shall be 
liable to a fine not exceeding three thousand penalty units. 
(As amended by S.I. No. 65 of 1965 and Act No. 13 of 
1994)” 
b. CODED AS “SPECIFIED UNIT USE SOME” 
 
6. Does the law have a specified general use (i.e. a zoning scheme outlined in the law)? 
a. NO 
b. CODED AS “0” 
 
7. Regardless of ownership, does the law have a minimum or maximum use requirement? 
Minimum or maximum? 
Size? 
a. NO 




8. Does the law have restrictions on non-use (if property is not used for a certain period of 
time, it may be taken away)? YES 
 
a. State-taking or adverse possession?  
1. STATE TAKING 
1. See Agricultural Holdings Act   
a. “36. (1) For the purposes of this section, land comprised in 
a State Grant shall be deemed to have been abandoned if 
the owner fails-  (a) for a period exceeding three years, to 
maintain occupation of the land in person or through a 
tenant or manager; or (b) for a period exceeding three 
years, to maintain on the land, to the satisfaction of the 
Board, a reasonable standard of agricultural production, 
having regard to the character, extent and situation of the 
land and the general level of agricultural production being 
maintained at the time on agricultural holdings of similar 
character in the neighbourhood. (2) In the event of the 
abandonment of any land comprised in a State Grant, the 
Board may serve notice on the owner thereof requiring 
such owner within such period, not being less than twelve 
months from the date of the notice, as may be specified in 
such notice, to reoccupy or arrange for the reoccupation 
of such land, and such notice shall state in detail the steps 
which the owner is required to take in order to comply 
therewith.” 
 
b. How long is the period of non-use (indicate below ) 
1. 3 YEARS 
 
9. Are there other use restrictions not mentioned above?  
a. Yes 
1. See Agricultural Holdings Act 
1. Need approval before making certain improvements to land 
a. 40. (1) A tenant who proposes to effect at his own expense 
any of the improvements set out in the Second Schedule 
shall seek the prior approval of the Board which shall 
consider whether such improvements are reasonably 
required for the management, improvement or 
development of the holding.” 
 
SALE OF LAND 
10. Does the law outright forbid SALE of land?  
a. NO 




11. Does the law forbid SALE of land without permission or notice?  
a. Yes 
1. See Land Law 1995, article 5(1) 
1. “5. (1) A person shall not sell, transfer or assign any land without 
the consent of the President and shall accordingly apply for that 
consent before doing so.” 
b. CODED AS “1” 
 
12. If yes, is this for all land or some land (if some, list type) 
a. ALL 
13. If yes, whose permission is required (government, neighbor, tenant, etc.) 
a. GOVERNMENT (PRESIDENT) 
 
14. Are there restrictions on WHAT may be sold?  
a. NO 
b. CODED AS 0 
 
15. If yes, what type of land is restricted?  
a. N/A 
 
16. Are there other restrictions on SALE of land?  
a. NO 
b. CODED AS 0 
 
REGISTRATION/RECORDING 
17. Does the country have a registration law? 
a. Yes 
 
18. What must be registered? 
a. See Lands and Deeds Registry Act 
1. “4. (1) Every document purporting to grant, convey or transfer land or 
any interest in land, or to be a lease or agreement for lease or permit of 
occupation of land for a longer term than one year, or to create any 
charge upon land, whether by way of mortgage or otherwise, or which 
evidences the satisfaction of any mortgage or charge, and all bills of sale 
of personal property whereof the grantor remains in apparent 
possession, unless already registered pursuant to the provisions of "The 
North-Eastern Rhodesia Lands and Deeds Registration Regulations, 1905" 
or "The North-Western Rhodesia Lands and Deeds Registry Proclamation, 
1910", must be registered within the times hereinafter specified in the 
Registry or in a District Registry if eligible for registration in such District 
Registry: Provided that if a document creating a floating charge upon land 
has been registered under the provisions of section ninety nine of the 
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Companies Act or section thirty-two of the Co-operative Societies Act, it 
need not be registered under the provisions of this Part unless and until 
such charge has crystallised or become fixed.” 
 
19. What is the minimum period of requirement for lease registration?  
a. 1 YEAR 
1. See above 
 
20. Is the system one of titling or deeds or does the country have both? 
a. Does the state provide a guarantee of the validity of the registered documents or 
does registration provide indefeasibility of title? 
1. DEEDS 
a. See Lands and Deeds Registry Act  
i. “21. Registration shall not cure any defect in any 
instrument registered or confer upon it any effect 
or validity other than that provided by this Part.” 
b. See also next section  
i. 22. (1) Subject to such regulations as the Minister 
may make from time to time, the Register may 
during the usual office hours be searched and 
examined by anyone and certified copies of any 
entry may be obtained, if required, upon payment 
of such fees as may be prescribed. Registry open 
for search (2) Where a register or part of a register 
is kept other than in the form of a book, it shall be 
made available for search in a convenient written 
form, as a printed document or by means of an 
electronic device. (As amended by G.N. No. 274 of 
1964 and Act No. 38 of 1994) 
 
21. What is the effect of registration?  
a. Does the registration complete the transaction (i.e. is registration require for the 
transaction to become effectual)?  
1. See Lands and Deeds Registry Act, 6 
1. ” 6. Any document required to be registered as aforesaid and not 
registered within the time specified in the last preceding section 
shall be null and void: Provided that- (i) the Court may extend the 
time within which such document must be registered, or 
authorise its registration after the expiration of such period on 
such terms as to costs and otherwise as it shall think fit, if satisfied 
that the failure to register was unavoidable, or that there are any 
special circumstances which afford ground for giving relief from 
the results of such failure, and that no injustice will be caused by 
allowing registration; (ii) the probate of a will required to be 
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registered as aforesaid, and not registered within the time 
specified in the last preceding section, shall be null and void so far 
only as such will affects land or any interest in land.” 
2. CODED AS “1” COMPLETES TRANSACTION 
 
22. Does registration protect some third parties (good faith purchases for value, without 
notice) or all third parties? 
a.  
1. See Lands and Deeds Registry Act,  
1. “58. Except in the case of fraud, no person contracting or dealing 
with or taking or proposing to take a transfer or mortgage from 
the Registered Proprietor of any estate or interest in land in 
respect of which a Certificate of Title has been issued shall be 
required or in any manner concerned to inquire into or ascertain 
the circumstances in or the consideration for which such 
Registered Proprietor or any previous Registered Proprietor of the 
estate or interest in question is or was registered, or to see to the 
application of the purchase money or of any part thereof, or shall 
be affected by notice, direct or constructive, of any trust or 
unregistered interest, any rule of law or equity to the contrary 
notwithstanding, and the knowledge that any such trust or 
unregistered interest is in existence shall not of itself be imputed 
as fraud.” 
2. See also next section 
1. “59. Nothing in Parts III to VII shall be so interpreted as to render 
subject to action for recovery of damages, or for possession, or to 
deprivation of any land in respect to which a Certificate of Title 
has been issued, any purchaser or mortgagee bona fide for 
valuable consideration of such land on the ground that his vendor 
or mortgagor may have become a Registered Proprietor through 
fraud, or error, or under any void or voidable instrument, or may 
have derived from or through a Registered Proprietor through 
fraud or error, or under any void or voidable instrument, and this 
whether such fraud or error consists in wrong description of the 
boundaries or of the parcels of any land, or otherwise 
howsoever.” 
b. CODED AS 1 “PROTECTS SOME” 
 








b. CODED AS “0” 
 
25. Does the law outright forbid the MORTGAGE of land without government permission? 
a. NO 
b. CODED AS “0” 
 
26. Are there restrictions on WHAT may be Mortgaged?  
a. Yes Agricultural Lands Act  
1. “24. (1) A lessee shall not- Restraint on Alienation (a) assign, sublet, 
mortgage, charge or in any manner whatsoever encumber, or part with 
possession of his holding or any part thereof or interest therein or 
concerning the same; or (b) attempt so to assign, sublet, mortgage, 
charge, encumber or part with possession; or (c) enter into any 
partnership for the working of his holding; without the prior written 
consent of the President, and every application for such consent shall be 
made in writing to the Board. Any contravention of the provisions of this 
subsection shall be deemed to be a failure to comply with a requirement 
of this Act. (2) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent a 
lessee from incurring any debt or any charge upon his holding under the 
provisions of the Natural Resources Act or of any other written law under 
the provisions of which debts or charges may be imposed upon a 
landholder without his consent. (As amended by S.I. No. 65 of 1965)” 
b. CODED AS “1” 
  
27. Are there restrictions on to what institution the land may be mortgaged?  
a. NO 
b. CODED AS “0” 
 
28. Are there other restrictions on MORTGAGE of land?  
a. No 
 
29. Type of Mortgage 
a. Transfer of property a lender by title or lease subject to a right to redeem (title 
theory) 
b. Lien on property (lien theory requires Court Action) 
1. See Lands And Deeds Registration Act , section 65 
1. “A mortgage of any estate or interest in land shall have effect as 
security and shall not operate as a transfer or lease of the estate 
or interest thereby mortgaged, but the mortgagee shall have and 
shall be deemed always to have had the same protection powers 
and remedies (including a power of sale, the right to take 
proceedings to obtain possession from the occupiers and the 
persons in receipt of rents and profits or any of them and, in the 
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case of land held in leasehold, the right to receive any notice 
relating to the land the subject of the mortgage which under any 
law or instrument the mortgagor is entitled to receive) as if the 
mortgage had so operated as a transfer or lease of the estate or 
interest mortgated. (No. 31 of 1958)” 
 
c. Mortgage entitled to possession upon default before foreclosure (intermediate 
theory) 
 
TIME AND TYPE OF LAWS 
30. How long have the laws been operational (original)? 
a. Ownership 
1. Land Act 1996 
1. 2009-1996=13 
2. CODED AS 13 Years 
2. Mines and Minerals Act 1949 
1. 2009-1949=50 
3. Water Act 1995 
1. 2009-1995= 14 
b. Use 
1. Agricultural Lands Act, 1960 
1. 2009-1960=49 
c. Sale 
1. Land Act 1996 
1. 2009-1996=13 
2. CODED AS 13 Years 
2. Agricultural Lands Act, 1960 
1. 2009-1960=49 
d. Mortgage 
1. Land and Deeds Registry Act 1914 
1. 2009-1914=95 
2. CODED AS 95 YEARS 
e. Registration 
1. Land and Deeds Registry Act 1914 
1. 2009-1914=95 
2. Agricultural Lands Act, 1960 
1. 2009-1960=49 




31. How long have the laws been operational (consolidated/last amended)? 
a. Ownership 
1. Land Act 1996 
1. 2009-1996=13 
2. CODED AS 13 Years 
2. Mines and Minerals Act 2006 
1. 2009-2006=3 
3. Water Act 2006 
1. 2009-2006=3 
b. Use 
1. Agricultural Lands Act, 1965 
1. 2009-1965=44 
2. CODED AS 44 YEARS 
c. Sale 
1. Land Act 1996 
1. 2009-1996=13 
2. CODED AS 13 Years 
2. Agricultural Lands Act, 1965 
1. 2009-1965=44 
d. Mortgage 
1. Land and Deeds Registry Act 1994 
1. 2009-1965=44 
2. CODED AS 15 YEARS 
e. Registration 
1. Land and Deeds Registry Act 1994 
1. 2009-1994=15 
2. Agricultural Lands Act, 1965 
1. 2009-1965=44 
2. CODED AS 15 YEARS 
 
32. Type of legal system 
(juriglobe) Common/customary  
a. If common law, what is the name and date of the application statute? 
1. The English Law (Extent of Application) Act (Cap 11), 1963 
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1. “2. Subject to the provisions of the Constitution of Zambia and to 
any other written law- (a) the common law; and (b) the doctrines 
of equity; and (c) the statutes which were in force in England on 
the 17th August, 1911 (being the commencement of the Northern 
Rhodesia Order in Council, 1911); and (d) any statutes of later 
date than that mentioned in paragraph (c) in force in England, 
now applied to the Republic, or which hereafter shall be applied 
thereto by any Act or otherwise; and (e) the Supreme Court 







Appendix 3: Control Variable Descriptions 
Main Models 
GDP Growth  
The outcome variable is gross domestic product (GDP) growth per capita. The primary 
source of the data on GDP growth per capita used was the World Bank’s (hereinafter Bank) 
World Development Indicators measure of GDP in constant 2000 U.S. dollars. The Bank 
measures GDP as the “sum of gross value added, at purchaser prices converted at market 
exchange rates to current U.S. dollars, by all resident producers in the economy plus any 
product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output.”110 The data are 
obtained from statistical organizations and central banks of individual countries. Data from 
“high-income” countries are obtained from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OEDC).111 I used the banks data on population to calculate the GDP per capita 
for each year, and used the results of these calculations to calculate Growth of GDP per 
capita. Of special note is that data on North Korea is unavailable. While the advantage of 
                                                        
110 World Bank, 2008, “Quick Reference Tables” 
111 Although the Bank has a preference for use of GNI, I choose GDP because GNI includes the calculation of net 
receipts of primary income from abroad. These receipts of income from abroad do not pertain to my theories 
about land within the geographic boundaries of a country, and may have the effect of overstating estimates of 
the production of goods and services as they relate to land laws. 
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using the Bank’s data lies in the depth of its cross-national coverage, there are several 
disadvantages.   
One disadvantage from using the Bank’s data is the possibility of measurement error. The 
Bank’s measure of GDP, by definition (stated above), does not take into account 
depreciation of some capital assets, and thus may overstate the GDP, and ultimately in my 
analysis, overstate the effect of land laws on output. Additional problems with this data 
arise from different use of different accounting methods for value added across different 
industries in different countries, from inabilities to take into account improvements in 
quality as part of the calculation of value added, and from inability to take into account 
activity in the informal sector, particularly in developing countries.  
An additional disadvantage was the need to supply missing data with data from other 
sources, which necessarily were not measured in the same manner as the Bank’s data.  GDP 
growth data for four observations was not available from the Bank, and consequently 
obtained from other sources.  
Following much of paradigm of much of the growth literature (Barro 1991, 1997; Mauro, 
1995; Zak and Knack, 2001;), in this paper, GDP growth per capita was averaged over a 
period of years. Although I primarily rely on GDP growth per capita averaged over 10 years, 
later, when checking for robustness, I consider the average at both 5 and 15 years. 
Initial level of GDP 




The importance of human capital as a source of variation in growth rates has been 
confirmed by multiple studies. These measures are obtained from UIS estimations or 
country estimations. An alternative measure used by others (Romer, 1989) is initial literacy 
rate. The World Development Indicators Database literacy rates are obtained from UNESCO. 
The measures are sporadically collected (not available every years). In addition, as Barro 
(1991) also observes there is inconsistent methodology across countries for collecting the 
information. For example, the information is collected via household declarations as part of 
census information, surveys conducted by international organizations (UIS, UNICEF, and 
MLS) and some nation-specific surveys (as in Eritrea, Lao and the Philippines). In some 
instances, more than one method is employed within a single country for different years 
(see for example, Albania and South Africa). Another problem with the literacy measure 
obtained from the World Bank was the magnitude of the missing data.  
As an alternative, I also obtained literacy measures from the CIA world Factbook. Although 
few countries had reported rates that were current, there was much more information 
available. GDP growth is correlated with the World Bank literacy value (averaged over 10 
years) at a level of .19, and with the CIA value at .01.  
Time  
A variable for time that the law was in operation was also included. This variable measures 
time (from 2009) since original enactment.112  
                                                        
112 This coding was not as straight-forward as it may appear, and some decisions were made as to which law 
was most relevant to be used as the basis for the time variable. For further explanation on the coding for each 




It was important to control for of the extra-legislative effects that may be a natural part of a 
legal system.  For example, as briefly discussed in the Appendix 1, outside of the structure of 
the law, there are operational differences between common and civil law countries. 
Previous studies have argued that legal system type is important for the quality of 
enforcement of rights (La Porta, et. al., 1998), governing institutions (La Porta, et. al., 1999),  
and the degree of regulatory activity by the government (Djankov, et. al., 2003). Thus, I used 
the JuriGlobe classification, and added controls for legal type. Because of a concern about 
over-fitting the variables in cases where there were only a few observations in a category, I 
chose only to include in the model, the largest categories: civil law. 
In the dataset set it is an indicator variable with a value of “1” where a country is purely civil 
(rather than a combination of civil and some other family), and “0” elsewhere.  
Rule of Law 
This measure is compiled by Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (see Kaufman, Kraay, and 
Zoido-Lobatón, 1999; Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatón, 2002; Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi, 2003; Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2005; Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 
2006; Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2007; Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2009; Rodrik, 
2002; Easterly and Levine, 2003; )113 These scholars compile an index of governance 
                                                        
113 The following sources used in the Kaufman, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatón (2003) index purport to measure 
property rights: Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey under the rubric  Rule of Law poses 
a question of “Are property rights protected; The Country policy and Institutional Assessment (World Bank) 
measures property rights as a category of rule of law; the Economists Intelligence Unit asks questions about  
private property and intellectual property rights protection as part of “Rule of Law”; Freedom House asks  
“Are there personal social freedoms, which include such aspects as gender equality, property rights, freedom 
of movement, choice of residence, choice of marriage, size or family” (73); the Global Competitiveness Survey 
181 
 
measures using a composite of 14 different sources114  The authors then compile the surveys 
and polls to create six composite measures of governance: voice and accountability, political 
instability and violence, government effectiveness, regulatory burden, rule of law, and graft. 
This measure is now known as the World Bank’s “Rule of Law” measure. 
Robustness Models 
Geomean  
This is the geometric mean.  
PENN  
This is the  average growth rate of the rgpl2 data (), from the PENN World Tables.  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
asks, “Is intellectual property weak? (78); the Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal assesses property rights 
as part of the Rule of Law category; the Institute for Management Development  surveys about Rule of Law, 
which includes asking whether “Personal security and private property are not adequately protected” (85); 
PriceWatersCooper (PWC) has a measure of opacity is defined as "the lack of clear, accurate, formal, easily 
discernible, and widely accepted practices" in the following areas: corruption in government bureaucracy, laws 
governing contracts or property rights, economic policies, accounting standards, and business regulation (88); 
the  World Business Environment Survey has survey questions on the rule of law which includes “Confidence in 
judicial system today in insuring property rights”(90) 
 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton produced several versions of this dataset with larger bases of sources. 
However, in each of the versions reviewed (Governance Matters [1999], Governance Matters II [2002], 
Governance Matters III [2003],Governance Matters IV [2005], Governance Matters V [2006], Governance Matters VI 
[2007], Governance Matters VII [2008], Governance Matters VIII [2009] the changes to the property rights 
measurement were minor. In 2005, measures from the African and Asian Development Banks, and the 
Bertelsmann Transformation Index were added. All of these databases measured property rights as a 
component of the rule of law. Also in 2005, the Global Competitiveness Survey, was subsumed into a different 
measure. 
In 2006, the Price Waters Cooper Index was discontinued. In 2007, the Freedom House measure was altered 
and the World Business Environmental Survey was dropped. In 2008, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index 
was discontinued, and in 200i, the Business Environment and Performance survey was altered. 
 
114 The sources include five different risk consultancy groups, such as the aforementioned BERI and PRS, in 





One of the most popular data sources is the International Country Risk Group (ICRG) (see 
Knack and Keefer, 1995; Barro, 1996; Clague, Keefer, Knack and Olson, 1996; Keefer and 
Knack, 2001 ). The ICRG is a subscription service of the Political Risk Services (PRS) Group.  It 
reports on business and investment risks on 22 indicators for countries around the world.  
The on-line subscription service produces monthly reports and risk ratings. The Researcher’s 
dataset is a yearly assessment of the risk ratings, and contains ratings on different aspects of 
risk that may be important to investors, such as law and order, bureaucratic quality, 
democratic accountability, corruption, etc.  Each country is assigned a numerical rating for 
different categories analyzed.  The numerical ratings are based on statistical models used by 
PRS Group.   
The most frequently used ICRG measures to capture the concept of property rights are 
“Expropriation Risk”, “Repudiation of Contracts by Government”, “Corruption in 
Government”, “Quality of Bureaucracy” and “Rule of Law”. Several scholars use combined 
versions of ratings to measure property rights. Knack and Keefer (1995) use the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) to measure property rights institutions115. They 
combine scaled versions of the above mentioned measures to create a “property rights 
                                                        
115 They also rely on the Business Environmental Risk Intelligence (BERI) services to measure property rights institutions. 
The BERI is like the ICRG a subscription service which collects political, social and economic data on countries, evaluates the 
countries on a variety of measures in order to assess the risk of investment in a given country. However, the 
BERI did not perform as well in the regressions as did the ICRG, and since it is sufficient for the purposes of this 




index”. Specifically, they create an additive measure of “Expropriation risk”, “Repudiation of 
contracts by government”, “Corruption in government”, “Quality of bureaucracy” and 
“Rule of law’.116 
In the 2010 ICRG Researcher’s Data Set,  two of the variables used in the composite 
“property rights variable”, “Expropriation Risk”, “Repudiation of Contracts by 
Government”,  compiled by Knack and Keefer were not available. Instead, “Investment 
Profile”, seems to have replaced those two variables. “Investment Profile” is a measure of 
contract viability or risk of expropriation, profits repatriation and payment delays.    
                                                        
116The “Expropriation Risk” is measured on a scale of 0 to 10 and purports to capture the risk of “outright 
confiscation” or “forced nationalization”.  
 
The “Repudiation of Contracts by Government” is also measured on a scale of 0 to 10. It measures the risk of 
changes in contract (repudiation, postponement or diminishing) due to fiscal pressures, “indigenization 
pressure”, changes in government or changes in government priorities.  
 
The “Corruption in Government” measure is scored on a scale of 0 to 6. Low scores are indicative the “high 
government officials are likely to demand special payments”, “illegal payments are generally expected 
throughout lower levels of government” and of the existence of “bribes connected with import and export 
licenses, exchange controls, policy protection and loans.”  
 
The “Quality of the Bureaucracy” measure is also scored on a scale of 0 to 6 and measures “autonomy from 
political pressure”, “strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruption in 
government services”, and an “established mechanism for recruiting and training.”  
 
The ICRG measure of “Rule of Law” is also on a 6 point scale.  Researchers at ICRG assign up to three points for 
the degree to which citizens generally obey the law, and 3 points are given to a country for the perceived 
strength and impartiality of the legal system. 
  
The use of “Expropriation Risk” and “Rule of Law” are proxies for security of property and contract rights. In 
addition, “Repudiation of Contracts by Government” measure is used because the authors reason that if 
private parties cannot rely on the government to keep contracts with them, then parties cannot rely on 
government enforcement of contracts between two private parties. “Repudiation” is used because if officials 
have the power to repudiate contracts, they will be likely to influence other types of economic activity. Finally, 
“Corruption in Government” and “Quality of Bureaucracy” are used as proxies for efficiency in the provision of 
government services, and for the extent of rent-seeking behavior. Officials in weak bureaucracies are likely to 
engage in rent-seeking behavior. In addition, they reason that weaker bureaucracies will not protect against 




The two measures, the ICRG composite score and the World Bank measure compiled by 
Kaufmann, et. al. are highly correlated.  Averages of the scores over a period of 10 years are 
correlated at the .9675 level. As more data was available for the rule of law estimate, than 
was for the ICRG measures, I use the rule of law estimate in the in primary analysis, and the 
ICRG measure in the robustness check.  
Enrollment 
I used secondary and primary school enrollment rates obtained from the World 
Development Indicators database. The gross measures represent the ratio of the total 
population enrolled to the population of students corresponding to the level of education.117  
As Barro (1991) observes, there is an endogeneity problem with the initial level of enrollment 
as a proxy for the initial capital stock.  For it could be that the measures reflect the 
investment in human capital (that flows from having higher growth rates) rather than an 
initial stock of human capital. 
Modified Government Expenditures  
Barro (1991) argues that the ratio government expenditure on items outside of education 
and defense to real GDP reduces growth through increases in taxes or other effects. Thus, 
government spending should be negatively associated with GDP growth. I collected the 
government spending data from the Bank’s World Development Indicators. The Bank 
defines General government final consumption expenditure as “General government final 
consumption expenditure (formerly general government consumption) includes all 
                                                        
117 For Philippines, Sri Lanka, Papua New Guinea and Thailand, data from the closest year to the year of interest 
was imputed. For Singapore, gross enrollment rates were obtained from a UNESCO report 
(http://www.childinfo.org/files/IND_Singapore.pdf, last accessed 9/3/2011).  
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government current expenditures for purchases of goods and services (including 
compensation of employees). It also includes most expenditures on national defense and 
security, but excludes government military expenditures that are part of government capital 
formation.”118  
Data on education expenditures was taken from the World Development Indicators.  The 
variable measures “current and capital public expenditure on education includes 
government spending on educational institutions (both public and private), education 
administration as well as subsidies for private entities (students/households and other 
privates entities),”119 and is obtained from UNESCO.  Almost all countries had missing data 
for a substantial number of years, so it is expected that there will be some measurement 
error associated with this variable, which could impact the estimates of the other 
coefficients to a small degree.120  
Data on military expenditures was also obtained from the World Development Indicators. 
This variable is measured as a percentage of GDP and also consists of “all current and capital 
                                                        
118 See Meta Data long description, for the variable. Data was missing for Kiribati, North Korea and Samoa. 
Information on Kiribati available from the Kiribati Statistics Office for the years 1998-2008 
(http://www.spc.int/prism/Country/KI/Stats/Economic/GFS/Consolidated-Exp&Rev.htm, last accessed 9/3/2011). 
I divided the current government expenditure by the current GDP reported to obtain the ratio of government 
spending to GDP.  Similarly, information about government expenditures in Samoa for the years 1996-2010 was 




pdf, last accessed 9/3/2011). Information on GDP was available from the website only from 2003 to 2008, thus I 
only have data on Government expenditures as a percentage of GDP from 2003 to 2008. Information on North 
Korea was not obtained.  
119 WDI  
120 The following countries had missing data for the 10 year period under examination: China, Papua New 
Guinea, Solomon Islands and Sri Lanka. 
(http://www.oclc.org/reports/escan/economic/educationlibraryspending.htm, last accessed 9/3/2011). For both 
Solomon Islands and Sri Lanka, 1998 estimates were used. For Papua New Guinea, the Education Policy Data 
Center (www.epdc.org) had data on education expenditure as a percentage of GNI (rather than GDP), for the 
year 2002. Because this includes GNI it might overestimate the data point.  
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expenditures on the armed forces, including peacekeeping forces; defense ministries and 
other government agencies engaged in defense projects; paramilitary forces, if these are 
judged to be trained and equipped for military operations; and military space activities. Such 
expenditures include military and civil personnel, including retirement pensions of military 
personnel and social services for personnel; operation and maintenance; procurement; 
military research and development; and military aid (in the military expenditures of the 
donor country).”121 The Bank obtains this data from NATO and the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute.    
There was missing data for this variable for all of the years under consideration for a number 
of observations.122  These cases were supplemented with data from the CIA World Factbook 
and other sources.123 The value I used in the analysis is the average government expenditure 
less average expenditures on education and defense.  
PPIDEV 
Barro (1991), Knack and Keefer (1995)  measure market distortions as standard deviations 
from the average price of investment goods. The prices of investment goods were obtained 
                                                        
121 WDI 
122 These countries were: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bhutan, Kiribati, North Korea, Maldives, Samoa, 
Tonga and Vanuatu.  
123For North Korea, Kiribati, Samoa and Vanuatu, the CIA did not have data available.  In the cases of both 
Kiribati, the Statistics Office publications of government expenditure for both countries had categories for law 
and order, but not military expenses. I therefore estimated the military expenses to be zero.   
For North Korea, the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation reports that North Korea military 
expenditures in 2007 as 6.6 billion (in constant 2009 dollars). Based on calculations (discussed above) for GDP 
in North Korea, I estimated GDP in North Korea in 2000 constant dollars to be 572.78. After converting this 
figure to 2009 dollars, I arrived at the estimate for military spending as a percentage of GDP.  
For Vanuatu, I examined reports on government expenditure as well as a report ECORYS on government 
expenditure and openness and found no listings for military expenditures. Further, the ECORYS report 
discussed areas of underreporting for expenditures in Vanuatu, and military expenditures were not discussed 
as an area of underreporting.  
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from Penn World Tables, and the standard deviation for all countries in the data set was 
calculated for each of the 10 years.   
Disasters 
Although not often taken into account in growth models, natural disasters can have a 
significant impact on the economy. Such disasters, if substantial enough can significantly 
affect the population and investment. Taking into account the effect of disasters was 
particularly important in this analysis because of the implicit analysis of the effect of land on 
growth.124 In this analysis, Disasters is an interval variable indicating the estimated amount of 
monetary damage done by natural disasters, averaged over 10 years. A natural disaster for 
the purpose of this dataset is defined to include an earthquake, flood, drought, hurricane or 
volcano.  Data on natural disasters was obtained from EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED 
International Disaster Database at the Université Catholique de Louvain in Belgium.  Data is 
coded as a natural disaster if at least one of the following conditions is true:  10 or more 
people are reported killed, 100 people reported affected, there is a declaration of a state of 
emergency or there is a call for international assistance. In this sample, the mean of Disasters 




                                                        
124 Not taking disasters into account may result in a lower coefficient on the law variable.  
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Table 14: Robustness Check of Ownership Who Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 








Average Growth Average Growth Average Growth Average Growth 
          
No Ownership -1.006 -0.421 -0.00478 -0.00133 -0.0110+ -1.534* -1.187* 0.206 -1.192+ 
 (0.636) (0.859) (0.00815) (0.00802) (0.00580) (0.589) (0.567) (0.747) (0.616) 
Citizen Plus 0.630 0.00305 0.000196 0.00205 0.00382 0.540 0.393 0.799+ 0.324 
 (0.459) (0.538) (0.00667) (0.00509) (0.00578) (0.591) (0.511) (0.462) (0.407) 
Some Foriegn -0.225 -0.629 -0.00921+ -0.00129 -0.00564 -0.225 -0.179 0.160 -0.429 
 (0.490) (0.447) (0.00545) (0.00445) (0.00601) (0.460) (0.457) (0.426) (0.383) 
Foreign Permit All  0.481 -0.118 -0.00119 -0.00192 0.00454 0.659 0.842+ -0.0909 0.439 
 (0.476) (0.569) (0.00558) (0.00547) (0.00510) (0.453) (0.423) (0.558) (0.426) 
Foreign Permit Some 1.163* 0.391 0.00361 -0.00218 0.0118+ 1.017+ 1.027+ 1.015+ 0.546 
 (0.533) (0.508) (0.00752) (0.00536) (0.00691) (0.554) (0.521) (0.552) (0.470) 
Log of time -0.305 -0.283 -0.00346 -0.00390 -0.00499+ -0.366+ -0.371+ -0.231 -0.566* 
 (0.245) (0.258) (0.00267) (0.00258) (0.00261) (0.213) (0.207) (0.227) (0.224) 
Customary Land -1.545** -2.100** -0.0112+ -0.00679 -0.0162** -1.594** -1.197* -1.229* -1.517** 
 (0.500) (0.610) (0.00611) (0.00492) (0.00572) (0.561) (0.487) (0.528) (0.424) 
Log of GDP 2000 -1.454** -1.760**    -1.147** -1.562** -0.992** -1.378** 
 (0.261) (0.314)    (0.422) (0.336) (0.290) (0.233) 
Literacy  5.468** 7.553* -0.00336 -0.00686 0.00240   7.288** 7.656** 
 (1.959) (2.883) (0.0267) (0.0213) (0.0214)   (2.675) (1.787) 
Rule of Law 0.657 1.070* -0.00809+   0.414 0.675  0.555+ 
 (0.443) (0.477) (0.00418)   (0.576) (0.447)  (0.323) 
Civil  0.520 0.374 0.00822 0.00883+ 0.00549 0.888 1.071* 0.201 0.369 
 (0.550) (0.574) (0.00631) (0.00474) (0.00578) (0.533) (0.472) (0.500) (0.478) 
Log of PENN 2000   -0.00477*       
   (0.00236)       
Log of GDP 2005    -0.00644**      
    (0.00130)      
Rule of Law (5 years)    -0.00690*      
    (0.00312)      
Log of GDP 1995     -0.00650**     
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     (0.00235)     
Rule of Law (15 years)     -0.00105     
     (0.00319)     
Primary Enrollment 
2000 
     0.0111 0.0146   
      (0.0174) (0.0172)   
Secondary Enrollment 
2000 
      0.0150   
       (0.00950)   
ICRG (10 years)        -0.0991  
        (0.263)  
Modified Government 
Expenditures 2000 
        -0.0474 
         (0.0333) 
PPI DEV 2000         -0.000415 
         (0.0251) 
Disasters         -3.12e-07 
         (3.47e-07) 
Constant 9.964** 11.09** 0.0902** 0.100** 0.0930** 11.38** 12.82** 5.431* 9.096** 
 (2.095) (3.078) (0.0323) (0.0261) (0.0230) (2.920) (2.786) (2.294) (1.646) 
          
Observations 65 65 65 61 63 60 58 49 58 
R-squared 0.606 0.619 0.364 0.593 0.459 0.576 0.676 0.677 0.729 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 15: Robustness Table of "Own What" Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 








Average Growth Average Growth Average Growth Average Growth 
          
Water All -0.242 0.421 0.00995* 0.00938+ 0.00185 -0.0439 -0.642 0.149 0.277 
 (0.548) (0.411) (0.00477) (0.00472) (0.00513) (0.716) (0.587) (0.414) (0.411) 
Water Some -0.510 -0.116 -0.00277 -0.00879+ -0.00712 0.0376 -0.545 -0.447 -0.380 
 (0.462) (0.420) (0.00500) (0.00511) (0.00515) (0.529) (0.511) (0.397) (0.401) 
Mineral All -1.197* -1.348** -0.00227 -0.00584 -0.00466 -0.510 -1.283* -1.215* -1.024* 
 (0.514) (0.504) (0.00549) (0.00643) (0.00587) (0.589) (0.600) (0.490) (0.416) 
Mineral Some -0.148 -0.154 -0.00763 -0.00933+ -0.00870 0.308 0.0369 -0.107 0.131 
 (0.488) (0.496) (0.00694) (0.00486) (0.00615) (0.563) (0.624) (0.485) (0.543) 
Log of time -0.539* -0.523* -0.00580+ -0.00153 -0.00359 -0.538* -0.630* -0.474* -0.688** 
 (0.213) (0.241) (0.00295) (0.00229) (0.00254) (0.239) (0.258) (0.222) (0.230) 
Customary Land -1.694** -2.292** -0.0164** -0.00346 -0.0140* -1.258+ -2.098** -1.780** -1.715** 
 (0.484) (0.555) (0.00505) (0.00531) (0.00636) (0.667) (0.592) (0.521) (0.397) 
Log of GDP 2000 -1.142** -1.468**    -0.809* -1.318** -1.208** -1.036** 
 (0.243) (0.294)    (0.358) (0.336) (0.271) (0.205) 
Literacy  6.642** 8.964** -0.0205 -0.0211 -0.0129   7.977** 6.822** 
 (2.087) (2.060) (0.0186) (0.0278) (0.0208)   (2.727) (1.800) 
Rule of Law -0.270 0.194 -0.00606   -0.0732 -0.397  0.00209 
 (0.423) (0.432) (0.00390)   (0.529) (0.495)  (0.308) 
Civil  0.0785 -0.154 0.0110 0.0187** 0.00962 1.019 0.0431 -0.120 0.0370 
 (0.511) (0.572) (0.00675) (0.00609) (0.00653) (0.672) (0.644) (0.593) (0.526) 
Log of PENN 2000   -0.00481*       
   (0.00211)       
Log of GDP 2005    -0.00538**      
    (0.00110)      
Rule of Law (5 years)    -0.00520      
    (0.00487)      
Log of GDP 1995     -0.00304*     
     (0.00145)     
Rule of Law (15 years)     -0.00425     
     (0.00349)     
Primary Enrollment 
2000 
     0.0322 0.000418   
      (0.0304) (0.0167)   
Secondary Enrollment 
2000 
      0.0270*   
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       (0.0107)   
ICRG (10 years)        -0.0480  
        (0.168)  
Modified Government 
Expenditures 2000 
        -0.0481 
         (0.0288) 
PPI DEV 2000         -0.0172 
         (0.0253) 
Disasters         -5.24e-07* 
         (2.38e-07) 
Constant 9.071** 9.338** 0.107** 0.0920** 0.0800** 7.360 14.89** 8.420** 8.776** 
 (1.985) (2.012) (0.0238) (0.0252) (0.0191) (4.712) (2.334) (1.947) (1.522) 
          
Observations 62 62 62 60 62 60 59 48 58 
R-squared 0.619 0.677 0.559 0.554 0.367 0.431 0.603 0.692 0.743 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 






Table 16: Robustness Table of Use Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 








Average Growth Average Growth Average Growth Average Growth 
          
Amount -0.721 -0.760 -0.0162* 0.000768 -0.00387 -1.077 -1.352+ -0.561 -1.079+ 
 (0.481) (0.496) (0.00716) (0.00659) (0.00817) (0.774) (0.691) (0.585) (0.549) 
Unit Use All -0.647 -1.006+ 0.00604 -0.0147* -0.00390 0.547 -0.187 -0.960 -0.611 
 (0.586) (0.510) (0.00729) (0.00662) (0.00702) (0.598) (0.812) (0.621) (0.621) 
Unit Use Some 0.0190 -0.284 0.00282 -0.00524 -0.00270 0.504 0.120 -0.450 -0.377 
 (0.436) (0.449) (0.00898) (0.00675) (0.00749) (0.636) (0.568) (0.595) (0.452) 
Government Non Use 0.869+ 0.748+ 0.00370 -0.00392 -0.00669 0.549 0.918 0.986+ 1.026* 
 (0.453) (0.407) (0.00663) (0.00527) (0.00571) (0.701) (0.597) (0.583) (0.466) 
Log of time -0.440* -0.433* -0.00484* -0.00323 -0.00538* -0.476* -0.443+ -0.405* -0.537** 
 (0.173) (0.183) (0.00222) (0.00211) (0.00261) (0.233) (0.225) (0.197) (0.186) 
Customary Land -1.425** -1.601** -0.0132* -0.00641 -0.0128* -1.660* -1.591* -0.978 -1.395** 
 (0.521) (0.538) (0.00574) (0.00624) (0.00586) (0.673) (0.636) (0.582) (0.463) 
Log of GDP 2000 -1.235** -1.471**    -0.843* -1.232** -1.135** -1.122** 
 (0.267) (0.246)    (0.326) (0.342) (0.197) (0.232) 
Literacy  7.802** 9.132** -0.00107 0.0199 0.0160   10.83** 7.371** 
 (1.447) (1.594) (0.0261) (0.0211) (0.0260)   (2.365) (1.796) 
Rule of Law 0.301 0.463 -0.00824*   0.0579 0.0327  0.200 
 (0.358) (0.379) (0.00381)   (0.514) (0.466)  (0.351) 
Civil  0.268 0.297 0.00694 0.00741 0.00278 0.894+ 0.678 0.0650 0.248 
 (0.377) (0.397) (0.00463) (0.00460) (0.00525) (0.455) (0.449) (0.516) (0.421) 
Log of PENN 2000   -0.00702**       
   (0.00189)       
Log of GDP 2005    -0.00662**      
    (0.00127)      
Rule of Law (5 years)    -0.0114**      
    (0.00343)      
Log of GDP 1995     -0.00400**     
     (0.00124)     
Rule of Law (15 years)     -0.00700*     





     0.00288 0.00226   
      (0.0174) (0.0176)   
Secondary Enrollment 
2000 
      0.0221*   
       (0.00876)   
ICRG (10 years)        -0.0712  
        (0.132)  
Modified Government 
Expenditures 2000 
        -0.0879** 
         (0.0294) 
PPI DEV 2000         0.00893 
         (0.0241) 
Disasters         -2.19e-07 
         (3.45e-07) 
Constant 6.991** 7.711** 0.112** 0.0802** 0.0695** 10.36** 11.97** 4.186* 7.746** 
 (2.048) (2.119) (0.0301) (0.0239) (0.0245) (2.919) (2.882) (1.805) (2.003) 
          
Observations 60 61 60 60 61 58 57 49 59 
R-squared 0.674 0.703 0.482 0.634 0.377 0.549 0.612 0.707 0.736 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table 17: Robustness Table of Sale Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 








Average Growth Average Growth Average Growth Average Growth 
          
Sale with Permit -0.726* -0.832* -0.00912* -0.00355 -0.00223 -0.853* -0.721* -0.861** -0.892** 
 (0.305) (0.320) (0.00389) (0.00416) (0.00503) (0.359) (0.333) (0.304) (0.303) 
What Sold 0.162 -0.202 -0.0124 -0.000436 -0.00395 0.896 0.504 0.0142 0.0413 
 (0.491) (0.468) (0.00791) (0.00580) (0.00860) (0.642) (0.636) (0.497) (0.482) 
Other Sale 0.791+ 0.811+ 0.00630 0.000604 0.000512 0.980+ 1.337** 0.265 0.231 
 (0.458) (0.434) (0.00608) (0.00471) (0.00631) (0.523) (0.474) (0.473) (0.459) 
Log of time -0.462** -0.453* -0.00948** -0.00452+ -0.00533+ -0.362+ -0.430* -0.443* -0.441** 
 (0.163) (0.187) (0.00251) (0.00248) (0.00289) (0.206) (0.204) (0.166) (0.143) 
Customary Land -1.481** -1.902** -0.0149** -0.00626 -0.0111+ -1.233* -1.082* -1.342* -1.251** 
 (0.445) (0.550) (0.00444) (0.00536) (0.00620) (0.588) (0.499) (0.570) (0.415) 
Log of GDP 2000 -1.189** -1.563**    -0.826** -1.246** -1.107** -1.212** 
 (0.239) (0.307)    (0.298) (0.274) (0.225) (0.182) 
Literacy  7.541** 9.225** -0.00910 -0.00770 0.00190   7.439** 6.282** 
 (1.766) (2.104) (0.0180) (0.0203) (0.0239)   (2.331) (1.607) 
Rule of Law 0.348 0.733+ -0.00696+   0.210 0.306  0.597* 
 (0.401) (0.433) (0.00387)   (0.511) (0.386)  (0.279) 
Civil  0.140 0.0308 0.00663 0.00894+ 0.00661 0.600 0.583 0.383 0.767+ 
 (0.441) (0.468) (0.00495) (0.00471) (0.00528) (0.513) (0.479) (0.442) (0.412) 
Log of PENN 2000   -0.00501*       
   (0.00231)       
Log of GDP 2005    -0.00647**      
    (0.00144)      
Rule of Law (5 years)    -0.00727*      
    (0.00313)      
Log of GDP 1995     -0.00360*     
     (0.00159)     
Rule of Law (15 years)     -0.00397     
     (0.00359)     
Primary Enrollment 2000      0.00108 -0.000403   
      (0.0160) (0.0149)   
Secondary Enrollment 
2000 
      0.0220*   
       (0.00931)   
ICRG (10 years)        0.00373  





        -0.0606* 
         (0.0300) 
PPI DEV 2000         -0.0384 
         (0.0253) 
Disasters         -2.93e-07 
         (2.32e-07) 
Constant 7.092** 8.692** 0.117** 0.104** 0.0729** 10.22** 12.05** 6.614** 9.233** 
 (1.829) (2.172) (0.0194) (0.0217) (0.0202) (1.847) (1.595) (1.952) (1.364) 
          
Observations 61 62 62 60 61 59 58 48 58 
R-squared 0.666 0.672 0.578 0.593 0.327 0.577 0.683 0.737 0.760 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<.10 
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